Strengthening National Comprehensive Agricultural Public Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa

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BURKINA FASO
BASIC AGRICULTURAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURE DIAGNOSTIC REVIEW (2004–2012)

MAIN REPORT

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SECRETARIAT PERMANENT DE LA COORDINATION DES POLITIQUES SECTORIELLES AGRICOLES
PERMANENT SECRETARIAT FOR COORDINATION OF AGRICULTURAL SECTOR POLICIES (SP/CPSA)
With:

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADELE	Eastern Burkina Local Development Support Project (*Projet d'Appui au Développement Local de l'Est*)
ADIPAC	Private Irrigation and Associated Activities Association (*Association des Professionnels de l'Irrigation Privée et des Activités Connexes*)
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIBP	Agro-Industrial By-Product
APROCOP	Cotton Companies Association (*Association des Sociétés Cotonnières*)
ASTI	Agricultural Science and Technology Indicator
ATA	Agricultural Trade Association
AU	African Union
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (*Banque Arabe pour le Développement Économique en Afrique*)
BUNASOL	National Soil Agency (*Bureau National des Sols*)
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CES	Computerized Expenditure System
CFAF	CFA Franc
GCT	Local Authorities General Code (*Code Général des Collectivités Territoriales*)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIFE	Integrated External Financing System (*Circuit Intégré des Financements Extérieurs*)
CNA	National Chamber of Agriculture (*Chambre Nationale d'Agriculture*)
CNRST	National Center for Scientific and Technical Research
CNSF	Forestry Seed National Center (*Centre National des Semences Forestières*)
CNSFL	National Fruit and Vegetable Specialization Center (*Centre National de Spécialisation en Fruits et Légumes*)
COFOG	Classification of the Functions of Government
CPF	Faso Farmers' Union (*Confédération Paysanne du Faso*)

CRA	Regional Chamber of Agriculture (*Chambre Régionale d'Agriculture*)
CSE	Livestock Sector Contribution (*Contribution du Secteur Élevage*)
DACT	Directorate of Support to Local Authorities (*Direction de l'Appui aux Collectivités Territoriales*)
DADI	Irrigation Management and Development Directorate (*Direction des Aménagements et du Développement de l'Irrigation*)
DAF	Directorate of Administration and Finance (*Direction de l'Administration et des Finances*)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DEP	Directorate of Research and Planning (*Direction des Enquètes et de la Planification*)
DEPSI	Directorate of Project Evaluation and Investment Monitoring (*Direction de l'Évaluation des Projets et du Suivi des Investissements*)
DGADI	Directorate General of Irrigation Management and Development (*Direction Générale des Aménagements et Développement de l'Irrigation*)
DGB	Directorate General of the Budget (*Direction Générale du Budget*)
DGCOOP	Directorate General of Cooperation (*Direction Générale de la Coopération*)
DGEP	Directorate General of the Economy and Planning (*Direction Générale de l'Économie et de la Planification*)
DGPER	Directorate General of the Promotion of the Rural Economy (*Direction Générale de la Promotion de l'Économie Rural*)
DGPV	Directorate General of Plant Production (*Direction Générale des Productions Végétales*)
DGTCP	Directorate General of the Treasury and Public Accounting (*Direction Générale du Trésor et de la Comptabilité Publique*)
DIMA	Directorate of Agricultural Mechanization (*Direction de la Mécanisation Agricole*)
DIPAC	Private Irrigation and Associated Activities (*Développement de l'Irrigation Privée et des Activités Connexes*)
DONATA	Dissemination of New Agricultural Technologies in Africa
DOS	Strategic Orientation Document (*Document d'Orientations Stratégiques*)

DP	Development Partners
DPSAA	Directorate of Agricultural and Food Forecasting and Statistics (*Direction de la Prospective et des Statistiques Agricoles et Alimentaires*)
DRAH	Regional Directorate of Agriculture and Hydraulics (*Direction Régionale de l'Agriculture et de l'Hydraulique*)
DRECV	Regional Directorate of the Environment and Living Conditions (*Direction Régionale de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie*)
DREDD	Regional Directorate of the Environment and Sustainable Development (*Direction Régionale de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable*)
DRRA	Regional Directorate of Agricultural Research (*Direction Régionale de la Recherche Agricole*)
DSONG	Directorate of NGO Monitoring (*Direction de Suivi des ONG)*
DVRD	Directorate of Extension and Development Research (*Direction de la Vulgarisation et de la Recherche-Développment*)
DWSS	Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
EPA	Continuous Agricultural Survey (*Enquête Permanente Agricole*)
EU	European Union
FAID	International Development Aid Fund (*Fonds d'Aide Internationale au Développement*)
FAIJ	Youth Initiative Support Fund (*Fonds d'Appui aux Initiatives des Jeunes*)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAPE	Employment Promotion Support Fund (*Fonds d'Appui à la Promotion de l'Emploi*)
FARA	Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
FEER	Rural Equipment and Water Fund (Fonds *de l'Eau et de l'É*quipement Rural)
FER	Road Maintenance Fund (*Fonds d'Entretien Routier*)
FODEL	National Livestock Fund (*Fonds de Développement de l'Élevage*)
FPDCT	Permanent Local Authorities Development Fund (*Fonds Permanent de Développement des Collectivités Territoriales*)
FSD	Foundation for Sustainable Development

FTE	Full-Time Equivalent
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GIRE	Integrated Water Resources Management (*Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau*)
GPC	Cotton Producer Group (*Groupement de Producteurs de Coton*)
HAD	Hydro-Agricultural Development
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IDA	International Development Agency
IDB	Islamic Development Bank
IEFS	Integrated External Financing System
IEPC	Livestock, Poverty, and Growth Initiative (*Initiative Élevage, Pauvreté, et Croissance*)
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFDC	*International Fertilizer Development Center*
INERA	National Environment and Agricultural Research Institute (*Institut National de l'Environnement et de Recherches Agricoles*)
INSD	National Statistical and Demographic Institute (*Institut National de la Statistique et de la Démographie*)
IRSAT	Applied Sciences and Technological Research Institute (*Institut de Recherches en Sciences Appliquées et Technologies*)
LISHDP	Letter of Intent for Sustainable Human Development Policy
LNE	National Livestock Laboratory (*Laboratoire National d'Élevage*)
LPDA	Agricultural Development Policy Document (*Lettre de Politique de Développement Agricole*)
LPRDR	Decentralized Rural Development Policy Document (*Lettre de Politique de Développement Rural Décentralisé*)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAFAP	Monitoring African Food and Agricultural Policy

MAH	Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulics (*Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Hydraulique*)
MAHRH	Ministry of Agriculture, Hydraulics, and Fisheries (*Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Hydraulique, et des Ressources Halieutiques*)
MATD	Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (*Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et de la Décentralisation*)
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MCPEA	Ministry of Trade, Enterprise Promotion, and Crafts (*Ministère du Commerce, de la Promotion de l'Entreprise, et de l'Artisanat*)
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MEBA	Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy (*Ministère de l'Éducation de Base et de l'Alphabétisation*)
MECV	Ministry of the Environment and Living Conditions (*Ministère de l'Environnement et du Cadre de Vie*)
MEDD	Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (*Ministère de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable*)
MEDEV	Ministry of the Economy and Development (*Ministère de l'Économie et du Développement*)
MEF	Ministry of the Economy and Finance (*Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances*)
MENA	Ministry of National Education and Literacy (*Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation*)
MESSRS	Ministry of Secondary and Higher Education and Scientific Research (*Ministère des Enseignements Secondaire, Supérieur, et de la Recherche Scientifique*)
MICA	Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Crafts
MID	Ministry of Infrastructures and Improved Access (*Ministère des Infrastructures et du Désenclavement*)
MJFPE	Ministry of Youth, Professional Training, and Employment (*Ministère de la Jeunesse, de la Formation Professionnelle, et de l'Emploi*)
MOB	Bagré Project Ownership (*Maîtrise d'Ouvrage de Bagré*)
MPF	Ministry for the Promotion of Women (*Ministère de la Promotion de la Femme*)

MRA	Ministry of Animal Resources (*Ministère des Ressources Animales*)
MRSI	Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (*Ministère de la Recherche Scientifique et de l'Innovation*)
MS	Ministry of Health (*Ministère de la Santé*)
MSSE	Ministry of Secondary and Tertiary Education (*Ministère des Enseignements Secondaire et Supérieur*)
MTEF	Medium-Term Expenditure Framework
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NTFP	Non-Timber Forestry Product
ONEA	National Office for Water and Sanitation (*Office National de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement*)
OPE	Organization of Livestock Breeders (*Organisation Paysanne d'Éleveurs*)
PABSO	Southwest Burkina Lowland Management Project (*Projet d'Aménagement des Bas-Fonds dans le Sud-Ouest*)
PADAB	Burkina Faso Agricultural Support Program (*Programme d'Appui au Développement Agricole du Burkina Faso*)
PAFICOT	Support Project for the Cotton Sub-Sector (*Projet d'Appui aux Filières Coton Textile*)
PAFR	Rice Value Chain Action Plan (*Plan d'Action pour la Filière* Riz)
PAGIRE	Action Plan for the Integrated Management of Water Resources (*Plan d'Action pour la Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau*)
PAMER	Rural Micro-Enterprise Support Project (*Projet d'Appui aux Micro-Entreprises Rurales*)
PANA	National Action Program for Adaptation (*Programme d'Action Nationale pour l'Adaptation*)
PAP	Priority Action Program
PAPISE	Action Plan and Investment Program for the Livestock Sub-Sector (*Plan d'Actions et Programme d'Investissements du Sous-Secteur de l'Élevage*)
PAPOPC	Support Project for the Professionalization of Cotton Producers' Organizations (*Projet d'Appui à la Professionnalisation des Organisations*

	des Producteurs de Coton)
PASA	Agricultural Structural Adjustment Program (*Programme d'Ajustement Structurel Agricole*)
PASNMF	National Strategic Micro-Finance Action Plan (*Plan d'Action Stratégique Nationale Micro-Finance*)
PDA/ECV	Ten-Year Action Plan for the Environment and Living Conditions (*Plan Décennal d'Action pour l'Environnement et le Cadre de Vie*)
PDL	Local Development Project (*Project de Développement Local*)
PDRI	Integrated Rural Development Project (*Projet de Développement Rural Intégré*)
PEBASO	Southwest Burkina Small Dam Project (*Projet Petits Barrages dans le Sud-Ouest*)
PEFA	Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability
PGA	Aid Management Platform (*Plateforme de la Gestion de l'Aide*)
PGRN	Natural Resource Management Program
PIP	Public Investment Program
PISA	Investment Program for the Agriculture Sector (*Programme d'Investissment dans le Secteur de l'Agriculture*)
PIV	Particle Image Velocimetry
PNAEPA	National Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Program (*Programme National d'Approvisionnement en Eau Potable et Assainissement*)
PNAG	National Policy for Genetic Improvement (*Politique Nationale d'Amélioration Génétique*)
PNDDAI	National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Irrigated Agriculture (*Politique Nationale de Développement Durable de l'Agriculture Irriguée*)
PNDEL	National Policy for Sustainable Livestock Development (*Politique Nationale de Développement Durable de l'Élevage*)
PNDSA	National Program for Agricultural Services Development (*Programme National de Développement des Services Agricoles*)
PNE	National Environment Policy (*Politique Nationale en matière d'Environnement*)

PNGFAP	National Program for the Management of Wildlife and Protected Areas (*Programme National de Gestion de la Faune et des Aires Protégées*)
PNGT	National Land Management Program (*Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs*)
PNGTII	Second National Rural Development Program (*Second Programme National de Gestion des Terroirs*)
PNPTF/LCP	National Multifunctional Platform Program for the Fight Against Poverty (*Programme National de Plateforme Multifonctionnelle de Lutte contre la Pauvreté*)
PNSA	National Program for Food Security (*Programme National pour la Sécurité Alimentaire*)
PNSFMR	National Policy for Secured Rural Land Tenure (*Politique Nationale de Sécurisation Foncière en Milieu Rural*)
PNSR	National Rural Sector Program (*Programme National du Secteur Rural*)
POSEF	Economic and Finance Sectorial Policy (*Politique Sectorielle de l'Économie et des Finances*)
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PREM	Poverty Reduction and Economic Management
PRFCB	Strengthening Project for the Cotton Value Chain in Burkina Faso (*Projet de Renforcement de la Filière Coton au Burkina*)
PRGLA	Local and Regional Governance Strengthening Project (*Projet de Renforcement de la Gouvernance Locale et Administrative*)
PROSPER	Regional Specialization Program (*Programme de Spécialisation Régionale*)
PRPC	Municipality-Based Poverty Reduction Project (*Projet de Réduction de la Pauvreté au Niveau Communal*)
PRSF	Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework
PSE	Water Policy and Strategy (*Politique et Stratégie en Matière d'Eau*)
PSNA	National Sanitation Policy and Strategy (*Politique et Stratégie Nationales d'Assainissement*)
PSO	Operational Strategic Plan (*Plan Stratégique Opérationnel*)
PSSA	Food Security Special Program (Programme Spécial *de S*écurité Alimentaire)

R&D	Research and Development
ReSAKSS	Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System
RGAP	Comprehensive Reform of Public Administration (*Réforme Globale de l'Administration Publique*)
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SCADD	Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (*Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable*)
SDR	Rural Development Strategy (*Stratégie de Développement Rural*)
SIM	Market Information System (*Système d'Information sur les Marchés*)
SIMP	Public Contract Management System (*Système Intégré de Gestion des Marchés Publics*)
SMC	Steering and Monitoring Committee
SNAT	National Land Management Matrix (*Schéma National d'Aménagement du Territoire*)
SNSA	National Strategy for Food Security (*Stratégie Nationale de Sécurité Alimentaire*)
SNVACA	National Strategy for Agricultural Outreach and Extension (*Stratégie Nationale de Vulgarisation et d'Appui Conseil Agricole*)
SOFAB	Animal Feed Production Corporation (*Société de Fabrication d'Aliments pour Bétail*)
SOFITEX	Burkinabe Textile Fiber Corporation (*Société Burkinabè des Fibres Textiles*)
SONAGESS	National Food Security Reserves Management Corporation (*Société Nationale de Gestion du Stock de Sécurité Alimentaire*)
SOSUCO	Comoé Sugar Corporation (*Société Sucrière de la Comoé*)
SP	Sub-Program
SP/CPSA	Permanent Secretariat for the Coordination of Agricultural Sector Policies (*Secrétariat Permanent de la Coordination des Politiques Sectorielles Agricoles*)
SRAT	Regional Land Management Matrix (*Schéma Régional d'Aménagment du Territoire*)

SRFP	Strategy for Strengthening the Public Finances (*Stratégie de Renforcement des Finances Publiques*)
TTL	Task Team Leader
UN-STAT	United Nations Statistics Division
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNPSB	National Union of Burkina Seed Producers (*Union Nationale des Producteurs de Semences du Burkina*)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar
VARENA	Natural Resource Valorization through Self-Promotion (*Valorisation des Ressources Naturelles par l'Autopromotion*)
WAAP	West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program
WADB	West African Development Bank
WAEMU	West African Economic and Monetary Union
WFP	World Food Program
ZOVIC	Village-Based Hunting Zone (*Zone Villageoise d'Intérêt Cynégétique*)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

1. This report summarizes the findings of a team of World Bank consultants who visited Burkina Faso from May 1 to 18, July 17 to August 3, and December 4 to 7, 2012 to support the Ministry of Agriculture and Water (MAH), the Ministry of Animal Resources (MRA), and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD) in undertaking a **basic agricultural public expenditure diagnostic review.** The team comprised Joël Hourticq (agricultural economist, consultant), Maurice Taondyande (statistician, economist, consultant), and Sidiki Soubeiga (economist, intern consultant).

   Under the review's terms of reference, specific working papers were drafted by Isidore Gnanda (researcher at the Institute for Agricultural and Environmental Research – INERA, consultant in charge of the livestock breeding section), Sébastien Kiéma (INERA researcher, consultant in charge of forestry), Alain Siri (economist, consultant in charge of farm inputs), and Abel Tigasse (water specialist, consultant in charge of irrigation systems).

2. The process of preparing this review was highly collaborative. A Steering and Monitoring Committee (SMC) was set up under the aegis of the Permanent Secretariat for the Coordination of Agricultural Sector Policies (CPSA), bringing together representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulics (MAH), the Ministry of Animal Resources (MRA), the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD), the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), other institutions that intervene in the agricultural sector (such as INERA), civil society (including agricultural trade associations), and the private sector.[1] The SMC held weekly workshops during the first two missions. In addition, committee members acted as focal points within their respective structures, and along with the colleagues they mobilized, contributed greatly to this review by assisting with data collection. A launch workshop was organized in the MRA conference room on May 10, 2012. This workshop was opened by the MRA's Secretary General, and sessions were chaired by the CPSA's Permanent Secretary, with participation from representatives of relevant government departments in addition to development partners (DP) and civil society. These various consultations provided a comprehensive view of the actors whose intervention in the agricultural sector has a public character and helped steer the consultants' work. Finally, a workshop aimed at presenting and discussing the findings was held on December 5, 2012 at the Palace Hotel in Ouagadougou. This workshop was opened by the MAH's Secretary General and the Resident World Bank Representative in Burkina Faso. The sessions were chaired by the CPSA's Permanent Secretary and attended by representatives of relevant government departments, the DPs, and civil society.

3. The consultants wish to express their gratitude to the Burkina Faso authorities, the DPs, and other non-governmental partners for their warm welcome, their availability, and their excellent collaboration. They thank the SMC members, and in particular Saga Pascal Ilboudo, CPSA Permanent Secretary, and Abdoulaye Ouédraogo, agro-economist engineer and CPSA analyst, for their continued support toward this review.

4. The consultants also thank Mariam Diop (Lead Economist, World Bank PREM), Stephen Mink (Task Team Leader – TTL, Lead Economist, World Bank AFTSN), Kofi Nouvé (Lead Agriculture Specialist, World Bank), Elisée Ouédraogo (Agriculture Specialist,

[1] Composition of the SMC is shown in Annex 3.

World Bank), Emmanuel Nikiema (Lead Natural Resource Management Specialist, World Bank), and Gwladys Kinda (Rural Development Program Assistant, World Bank) for their support, advice, and comments throughout the duration of this work.

5. The cost of this review was met by the Strengthening National Comprehensive Agricultural Public Expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa Program, co-funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and executed by the World Bank.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction

i. The rural sector, defined here as the economic sector that falls under the scope of the Ministry of Agriculture and Water (MAH), the Ministry of Animal Resources (MRA), and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD), is one of the pillars of the Burkina Faso economy. Although its contribution to GDP has decreased in recent times from 35% in 1999 to 30% in 2011 due to the development of the other sectors of the economy, agricultural activity still employs approximately 86% of Burkina Faso's labor force and is the main source of income for poorer populations. Consequently, the rural sector is among the primary beneficiaries of public expenditures by the Burkina Faso government and constitutes one of the pillars of the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) adopted in 2010.

ii. As part of the implementation of the rural sector SCADD, in 2012, the three relevant ministries finalized the National Rural Sector Program (PNSR), which provides a single framework for planning and implementing public interventions in rural development with the aim of making an enduring contribution to food and nutrition security, vigorous economic growth, and poverty reduction. An annual review of the PNSR has been planned, which will take place alongside an annual review of public expenditures in the sector. Against this backdrop, MAH, MRA, and MEDD required that a public expenditure review be carried out for the period prior to the implementation of the PNSR in order to serve as a benchmark. The cost of this review was met by the Strengthening National Comprehensive Agricultural Public Expenditures in Sub-Saharan Africa Program, co-funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the CAADP Multi-Donor Trust Fund, and executed by the World Bank.

iii. The goals of this Agriculture Public Expenditure Review in Burkina Faso are as follows:

a. Draw lessons from the past in terms of budget execution in the agricultural sector in order to promote the design and implementation of public expenditure programs that are more efficient and more equitable and have a greater impact;

b. Initiate the implementation of the databases and methodology required to conduct similar reviews regularly and thus contribute to the institutionalization of the process;

c. Contribute to establishing the conditions for increased support for the sector while encouraging the harmonization and alignment of support with respect for national strategies.

iv. The review was conducted according to a participatory process and drew on works already carried out on this subject by ReSAKSS (MAH 2009a), the 2009 review (Savadogo et al. 2009; World Bank 2009), PEFA (MEF 2010b), and MAFAP/FAO.

v. Given the introduction of a new budget nomenclature in the 2004 fiscal year, the review's Steering and Monitoring Committee decided to confine the study to the period 2004–2011.

Considerable Support for Agriculture Mostly Funded from External Resources but with Increasing Input from Domestic Funds

vi. Public expenditures in the agricultural sector, which were estimated according to

NEPAD's COFOG methodology,[2] attained or exceeded the target of 10% of the national budget set by the Maputo Declaration for the majority of the period under consideration (Table 1 and Figure 1). Moreover, this amount is rising, with expenditures on agriculture virtually doubling over the period from CFAF 65 billion in 2004 to CFAF 129 billion in 2011. This reflects the priority the government ascribes to this sector, whose central role in the economy and potential in terms of growth and poverty reduction it recognizes.

vii. Over the period, 60% of actual public expenditures in agriculture came from the budgets of the three rural development ministries, 18% from other sections of the national budget, of which 73% came from inter-ministerial expenditures, and 27% from other ministries (in descending order of magnitude MEDEV/MEF, MESSRS/MRSI, Prime Minister's Office, etc.), and 22% was implemented off-budget and was not included in the budget laws.

Table I: Executed agriculture expenditures estimated according to NEPAD's COFOG methodology, 2004–2011, CFAF billions

	MAH - MRA - MEDD	Other ministries and inter-ministerial expenditures	Off-budget projects	Other[1]	Total COFOG expenditure	Executed expenditures in national budget[2]	% Maputo
2004	40.2	12.2	8.8	4.0	65.3	640.3	10.2%
2005	42.7	11.1	9.8	2.3	66.0	716.7	9.2%
2006	56.2	11.3	11.8	2.2	81.5	835.1	9.8%
2007	53.5	32.3	34.7	1.6	122.0	944.2	12.9%
2008	59.2	11.1	25.7	1.5	97.6	886.1	11.0%
2009	56.5	38.3	21.0	2.3	118.0	1,083.1	10.9%
2010	71.2	8.0	15.1	2.9	97.2	1,121.1	8.7%
2011	89.1	14.2	22.1	3.8	129.2	1,357.1	9.5%
Total	468.7	138.5	148.9	20.8	776.9	7,583.7	10.2%

[1] Share of FODEL financed by CSE and revenues of research institutes not included in the national budget.
[2] Including executed expenditures from special treasury accounts.
Sources: Authors' calculations based on data provided by DGB, DEPSI, DGCOOP, MRA, INERA, IRSAT, etc.

viii. Note that these figures most likely underestimate actual expenditures from external funds. This is because actual expenditures from external resources were not included in the accounts

[2] In accordance with NEPAD directives, this review takes into account expenditures executed, not budgets allocated. All investment made in water and sanitation (DWSS), which accounts for 26% of total budgets under consideration, rural feeder roads (1%), and other non-productive infrastructures (schools, health clinics, etc., or 3%) was deducted from the budgets of MAH, MRA, and MEDD as well as from projects financed by the other ministries that intervene in rural development and from projects implemented off-budget. Expenditures on non-farm water and environmental management not directly related to agricultural activities were also excluded. The budgets of public or commercially focused semi-public bodies (ONEA, SOFITEX, etc.) were not taken into account as only subsidies granted to these entities out of the national budget were considered public expenditures. Similarly, private investment, including by producers themselves, was not considered. Expenditures by NGOs to promote agricultural development were only considered when they acted as implementing agencies under projects included in the national budget or by an agreement with the Burkina Faso government registered by the DGCOOP.

during the study period but was compiled off the accounts by two separate MEF departments: DGCOOP, and DEPSI. This large gap in the accounting treatment of expenditures from external resources should be corrected when the Integrated External Financing System (IEFS) comes online, which will enable expenditures from external resources to be accounted for, just as the Computerized Expenditure System (CES) does for internal resources. Moreover, it should enable the majority of expenditures executed off-budget to date to be included in the government's budget.

Figure I: Agriculture expenditures estimated according to NEPAD's COFOG methodology, 2004–2011, CFAF billions and as % of executed government budget



Source: Table 1

ix. This increase in the budgets allocated to the sector is due in particular to a sharp increase in national funding in the MAH budget, with the reliance of MAH's total provisional budget on external funding decreasing continuously over the period from 81% in 2004 to 56% in 2012 (Figure 2), for an average of 71% over the period. However, this external reliance has always been much higher than for MRA (48% on average, 33% in 2012), MEDD (45% on average, 33% in 2012), or the national budget (30% on average, 26% in 2012).

Figure II: Share of internal resources in total provisional budgets (including all headings) of MAH, MRA, MEDD, and government, 2004–2012, %



Note: Internal resources in the overall national budget include general and sectoral budget support, booked here as internal resources.

Source: CES (DGB); see detailed data in Annex 2.

x. Actual agricultural expenditures estimated according to NEPAD's COFOG methodology represented 8.2% of agricultural GDP on average during the period 2004–2011, which places Burkina Faso among the Sub-Saharan African countries that provide the most support to their agricultural sector (Table 2).

Table II: International comparison of budget transfers to agriculture, 2002–2011

Region/Country	Share of agriculture in GDP	Share of agricultural budget expenditures in national GDP	Share of agricultural budget expenditures in agricultural GDP
High-income countries/regions			
Australia	3.0%	0.3%	10%
Canada	2.3%	0.5%	22%
EU	2.3%	0.7%	28%
USA	1.6%	0.7%	46%
Middle-income countries			
Turkey	13.0%	2.0%	15%
Mexico	4.0%	0.7%	18%
Venezuela	5.0%	0.5%	12%
China	15.0%	1.2%	8%
Brazil	9.3%	0.7%	8%

Russia	6.0%	1.0%	16%
Ukraine	11.6%	1.3%	11%
Low-income countries			
Burkina Faso	33%	2.7%	8.2%
Uganda	32%	1.5%	5%
Tanzania	45%	1.2%	3%
Ethiopia	44%	2.7%	6%
Kenya	29%	1.3%	4%
Togo	41%	1.9%	3.9%

Note: The data shown here concern different years depending on the country but all falling between 2002 and 2011. Those for Burkina Faso cover the period 2004–2011. Sources: World Bank 2010, 2012; authors' calculation for Burkina Faso; DGEP/MEF for Burkina Faso's GDP and agricultural GDP; (see detailed data in Annex 2).

xi. Agricultural expenditures executed by NGOs (excluding their services provided under projects already taken into account in the previous sections) were not included in these figures for public agriculture expenditure. We estimate that these NGO expenditures amounted to around CFAF 100 billion over the period 2004–2011, or 13% of public agricultural expenditures estimated according to the COFOG methodology.

Balanced Economic Composition of Budgets but Little Transparency

xii. The official economic composition of the overall budget of the three rural development ministries as stated in the budget laws is misleading because Heading V (investment) contains the total annual amounts of projects and programs, including personnel and operating expenditure. On the basis of a thorough analysis of a representative sample of projects, the actual share of current expenditures (personnel and operations) in the total budget of the three ministries was estimated at between 20% and 25%. Although this proportion of recurrent expenses seems reasonable, the fact that two-thirds of the allocation is funded by projects and does not feature in the official budgets of the ministries raises two fundamental problems:

a. First, this situation does not allow the ministries concerned to effectively manage their current expenditures because they have no clear view and have only few levers with which to control them, for instance in order to seek economies of scale. Truthfulness should be restored to budgets if the foundations for an efficient and sustainable sectoral approach alongside the DPs are to be laid;

b. Second, this situation raises the question of the sustainability of interventions. What becomes of the provisions required to supervise and maintain investments carried out after the project that supported them comes to an end? For the time being, this question is not being addressed systemically.

xiii. In general, accounting for recurrent costs for investment maintenance is one of the weak links in the rural development ministries' budget planning. At present, there is no systematic mechanism for addressing this issue, whether in terms of resources made available to government departments, the public infrastructure in place, or infrastructures transferred to beneficiaries.

Highly Neglected Sub-sectors: Livestock Breeding, R&D, and Rural Accessibility

xiv. To establish benchmarks for the implementation of the PNSR, it was decided to classify overall agricultural expenditures executed over the period 2004–2011 into 13 PNSR sub-

programs (SP). This showed that during this period, around 26% of rural development expenditures concerned water and sanitation (DWSS) initiatives (SP 4.1 and 4.2 of the PNSR), 3% were spent on social infrastructure (health clinics, schools, etc.), and 1% on developing rural feeder roads. Altogether, 30% of expenditures did not involve agricultural development in the conventional sense of the term. DWSS expenditures represented the largest single expenditure item (26%), followed by crop production (SP 1.1, 17%) and hydro-agricultural developments (HAD) (SP 1.4, 17%), while the commercialization and promotion of the agricultural economy (SP 2.1) received 10% of expenditures. However, it should be noted that the share of expenditures earmarked for DWSS decreased over the period, from 39% in 2004 to 15% in 2011, while the share spent on crop production and HADs increased, from 13% in 2004 to 22% in 2011 for the former and from 13% in 2004 to 29% in 2011 for the latter.

xv. If we exclude from the calculations expenditures not traditionally included in agricultural development (DWSS, rural feeder roads, social infrastructures), we note that over the period, crop production (food and cash crops) and livestock breeding received 63% and 7% of agricultural public expenditures, whereas they contributed 55% and 35% (respectively) of primary sector GDP over the same period (Figure 3). The weak support for the livestock breeding sub-sector is therefore in stark contrast to its weight in the Burkina Faso economy and its importance in the coping strategies of rural households.

xvi. Forestry development (SP 3.4, including activities aimed at develop fauna and freshwater fisheries) received relatively stable support of around 4% of agricultural expenditures on average over the period. However, this amount is also lower than the sector's weight in the rural economy (10% of primary sector GDP during the period 2004–2011).

xvii. Expenditures in support of the cotton sector, estimated at CFAF 88.2 billion from 2004 to 2011, or 11% of agricultural expenditures proper over the period, may be considered commensurate with this sector's place in Burkina Faso's rural economy, with cash crops representing 12% of agricultural GDP from 2004 to 2011 on average, of which cotton accounted for 7%, especially as most of these expenditures concerned heavy investments (SOFITEX capital injection, setting up a price buffer fund) concentrated in the years from 2007 to 2009. These investments are likely to be non-recurring.

Figure III: Comparison of the weights of the various sub-sectors in primary sector GDP and in agricultural expenditures (excluding DWSS, rural feeder roads, and social infrastructures)



Sources: DGEP/MEF for contributions to GDP (see Annex 2), Table 9 for shares of expenditures

xviii. With regard to the subsidies for food crop fertilizer in place since the 2008/2009 crop year, their cost is quite modest relative to annual amounts spent on agriculture. The total cost of the operation is estimated at around CFAF 23 billion over the period 2008–2011, or CFAF 6 billion per crop year on average. Given the revenues generated by the sale of fertilizer, the net cost of the subsidy to the government over the four crop years is estimated at around CFAF 9 billion, or CFAF 2.3 billion on average per crop year. This represents 2% of the budget allocated to agriculture each year over the period 2008–2011 (or around CFAF 110 billion per year on average) and 4% of the budget earmarked for developing crop production (SP 1.1 and SP 1.4) over the same period.

xix. Agricultural R&D was considerably underfunded during the study period. Since the PNDSA came to a close in 2004, it has received no specific support and very little funding from projects implemented in the rural development sector. During the period 2004–2011, public expenditures on agricultural R&D came to CFAF 4.1 billion on average, of which 75% was allocated to INERA and 25% to IRSAT and CNSF. Over the period, 39% of public expenditures on agricultural R&D were financed by the government (payroll included), 47% by agreements with projects, NGOs, and private firms (including SOFITEX), and 14% by the three research institutes' own revenues through sales of products and services. Over the period 2004–2011, the budget for agricultural research in Burkina Faso represented 0.3% of agricultural GDP and 0.1% of total GDP, which is far below the target of 1% of national GDP devoted to applied agricultural research set by the AU Executive Council in its 2006 Khartoum decision on science and technology. At around USD 0.50 per person per year, spending on agricultural research in Burkina Faso is among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Recent studies (Mogues et al. 2012) show that agricultural R&D, in particular in food crop products, is the type of public investment that has the greatest impact on agricultural growth and poverty reduction as well as the most stable long-term effects.

xx. In addition, although this area does not fall under the terms of reference of this review, it is interesting to briefly compare the budgets allocated by Burkina Faso to improving connections to isolated rural areas with those allocated to agricultural development. In terms of agricultural R&D, a number of studies have highlighted the importance of investments in public goods such as rural infrastructures as a driver of rural development. By combining investments carried out by the Ministry of Infrastructure and Improved Access (MID), those

carried out by projects, and sums allocated to maintenance, we arrive at an executed budget for rural feeder roads of around CFAF 13 billion per year over the period 2004–2011, whereas over the same period, average actual expenditures on support for agriculture was in the vicinity of CFAF 100 billion per year (Table 6). It therefore appears—although this would need to be confirmed by a more thorough study of the matter—that the issue of improving access to rural areas does not currently receive enough attention or funds commensurate with the amounts invested in support for agricultural development or the importance of road infrastructures to the return on these investments, especially with regard to access to inputs and markets.

Geographic Distribution of Expenditures Guided by Criteria of Efficiency More Than Equity

xxi. Our analysis of regional distribution covered 93% of agricultural expenditures over the period 2007–2011, which is a marked improvement on the 2009 Review (Savadogo et al. 2009), for which only 54% of expenditures could be broken down geographically.

xxii. When we compare the regional distribution of public agricultural expenditures over the period 2007–2011 with the contributions of each region to the value of total crop production over the period 2002–2006, the overall trend emerges whereby the regions with high agricultural potential also receive the largest share of public support. In particular, the Western and Southwestern regions of the country (Boucle du Mouhoun, Hauts-Bassins, Cascades, and Sud-Ouest) generated 46% of crop production over the period 2002–2006 and received 47% of public agricultural expenditures over the period 2007–2011. The Gini ratio calculated on the basis of the regional distributions of crop production and public expenditures is close to zero (0.059), which confirms the even distribution of public agricultural support according to the regions' agricultural potential.

xxiii. However, an analysis of the distribution of agricultural expenditures in relation to the breakdown of the number of poor by region shows an unequal allocation of public resources, with the Gini ratio now reaching 0.22, or around four times the previous ratio. For example, although 32% of the poor lived in the regions of Centre-Nord, Centre-Sud, Nord, and Plateau Central in 2003, these regions received only 17% of public agricultural expenditures from 2007 to 2011. Symmetrically, while 11% of the poor lived in Cascades and Hauts-Bassins, these regions received 28% of agricultural investments. However, these remarks should be qualified by the observation that most of the time, the objectives of equity and efficiency are incompatible. The fact that the allocation of public funds to agriculture under the nominal objective of efficiency has led to relatively modest inequality (with a Gini ratio of 0.22 showing low inequality) is a positive outcome.

Increasing Efficiency in Budget Planning and Execution

xxiv. The country has implemented a large number of reforms in the civil service and the management of public finances. These reforms paved the way for a significant increase in efficiency in terms of budget planning and execution. In particular, they had a clearly positive impact on the execution rates from internal resources of MAH and MRA, for both current and investment expenses. In particular, the execution rate of Headings II, III, and IV by MAH came to 74% for the period 2004–2005, 92% for 2006–2008, and 92% for 2009–2011. For MRA, these rates were 67%, 88%, and 99%, respectively. With regard to the internal resources portion of Heading V, the performance of MAH came to 76% for the period 2004–2005, 66% for 2006–2008, and 95% for 2009–2011. The improvement in the performance of MRA was even more spectacular, with execution rates of capital expenditures from internal

resources of 25% for the period 2004–2005, 52% for 2006–2008, and 93% for 2009–2011. On the other hand, although MEDD improved the execution rate of its operating expenditures, it encountered difficulties in executing investments from internal resources. MEDD's execution rates of Headings II, III, and IV came to 70% for the period 2004–2005, 103% for 2006–2008, and 101% for 2009–2011. However, with regard to the internal resources portion of Heading V, MEDD's performance fell from 73% in the period 2004–2005 to 71% in 2006–2008 and 57% in 2009–2011.

xxv. Although the three ministries show quite low execution rates from external funds, this observation should be qualified by the absence of a reliable mechanism for accounting for this expenditure, as mentioned above. However, the programming of external resources and therefore the monitoring of their execution suffers from a lag between the scheduling for the preparation of the government's budget and project scheduling. Projects are required to provide a definitive program in May/June of year (n) for the budget law of year (n+1) while projects continue to develop their projected budget until the end of the year before submitting it to their respective steering committee. The IEFS should help resolve this problem by making it possible to include these changes in supplementary budget laws.

xxvi. Discussions with the heads of the three ministries concerned led us to conclude that the three greatest problems affecting the execution of these expenditures are cumbersome procurement procedures, poor communication between DPs and project managers, and, in some cases, the cumbersome procedures of the donors themselves. With regard to procurement procedures, although a large number of improvements have been made, the process still takes at least three months even when conducted in the most efficient manner possible, which penalizes investments scheduled early in the fiscal year, before the onset of the rainy season.

Transition to the Budget Program: A Very Important Reform at a Pivotal Stage

xxvii. Whereas the MTEF seems well established, the budget program approach has reached a pivotal moment for the three rural development ministries. Considerable effort has been made to establish its programmatic basis, namely the PNSR. In terms of ownership of interventions and improving their impact, the process will only be fully realized if the defined sub-programs really become vehicles used by the government to implement its rural development strategy. This will require appointing sub-program leaders with authority over all of the services and projects within the scope of their sub-program and, by definition, defining a vision and a clear strategy for each of the sub-programs accompanied by performance indicators.

xxviii. On the government's side, the effective implementation of results-based management through the budget program therefore requires ambitious institutional reform. With regard to the DPs, it relies on their acceptance of the fact that their financial support will be much more effective, efficient, and sustainable if it is part of a process of which the national authorities are owners and guarantors. Through the significant reforms it has undertaken since the beginning of the 2000s in the areas of the civil service, the management of public finances, and decentralization, the Burkina Faso government has demonstrated—and continues to demonstrate—its willingness and ability to modernize. At this pivotal moment for the operationalization of the budget program, strong support at the highest level from both the government and the DPs is vital to the process, which is already well advanced, if it is to become irreversible and the budget program is to become a definitive tool for accelerating development and not a mere exercise in style, leading to frustration.

M&E: The Weak Link in Agricultural Development

xxix. M&E is currently highly deficient both at the central level (DEP) as well as at the level of departments and projects. Very little information is available on the cost, incidence, and impact of interventions, which are generally not measured against a benchmark. As a result, there is very little capitalizing on positive experiments with a view to their replication. It is therefore imperative that the implementation of the budget program be accompanied by considerable strategic reflection in this area and by a consequent strengthening of M&E capabilities at all levels in terms of personnel, training, and operating resources. This reflection should include the question of archiving and disseminating information.

Another Shortcoming: The Low Degree of Ownership at All Levels

xxx. In general, we note a low degree of ownership of policies and strategies as well as activities. Many of the policy statements produced since 2000 appear excessively contingent on economic crises, institutional changes, and the agenda of DPs. This has resulted in a low degree of ownership by the departments concerned and by the DPs as well as in an overall below-forecast level of financing and implementation. This low level of ownership can be explained by excessive fragmentation, as follows:

a. Too many projects, which sometimes appear to respond more to the agenda of the DPs than that of the country.[3] The proliferation of projects reduces the clarity of the government's strategy and makes it difficult to manage, complicates the budget planning process, significantly increases the transaction costs of development aid, creates an additional workload (meetings, missions, etc.) that prevents managers from dedicating sufficient time to the core functions of their ministry (in particular in terms of strategic thinking and M&E), accelerates personnel turnover and weakens public services by diverting already scarce human resources to largely independent management units, dilutes responsibilities, and creates overlaps and in some cases contradictions. In addition, as stated above, it gives rise to a problem with capitalizing on experiments and the sustainability of interventions, as the records, responsibilities, and financial resources needed to continue activities and maintain investments generally disappear at the same time as the project. In the words of the Minister of the Economy and Finance in his preface to the 2010 Report on Cooperation and Development (MEF 2011), "The contribution of projects and programs to development remains a challenge to be resolved."

b. Roles are too fragmented. Discussions with technical directorates often gave the impression of highly diluted roles, with financial aspects left to DAF or the Public Procurement Directorate, aspects of practical implementation left to the Regional Directorates, and aspects of M&E left to DEP. On many matters (including food crop and cotton fertilizer, seed, animal feed, etc.), it is difficult to find anyone capable of delivering a strong and exhaustive message such as: "We did this, it cost that much, it had this incidence and that impact, its sustainability is ensured by such a measure, we will repeat the experiment but adjust such or such an aspect, etc."

xxxi. Ownership of activities at the local level is hampered by the high degree of centralization. Whereas regional directorates account for a large share of the payroll of the three ministries (44% on average in the period 2010–2012 for MAH, 46% for MRA, and 50% for MEDD), they receive very modest operating budgets and are assigned very few investment credits. They are also under-staffed in terms of field agents. It is therefore legitimate to question whether optimal use is made of these decentralized human resources,

[3] MAH's budget comprises 80 to 100 projects each year.

which are supposed to support young local authorities in their investments in agriculture and natural resource management and are, as a result of their proximity and their knowledge of the field, much more likely to ensure that development interventions match local priorities.

xxxii. The problem of fragmented roles is also found at the level of the regional directorates, in this case between the managerial entities of the various ministries. MAH and MRA agents do not always communicate with each other despite the fact that 80% of rural households engage in both crop and livestock farming and many issues concern both activities (manure pits, animal traction, animal feed crops, etc.). Greater coordination is required, especially in light of the shortage of means of transportation.

xxxiii. Finally, ownership by operators in the sector is often curbed by excessive government intervention. Examples abound of public departments deciding to intervene in an economic activity under the assumption that the private sector will subsequently take the reins (production and storage of animal feed, supply of fertilizer and seed, dairy facilities, etc.). This approach seldom succeeds because government interventions generally create distortions in competition that drive away private operators from the sector concerned. In addition, when public services try to pull out and hand over the reins to the private sector, they tend to impose public service requirements (service to remote areas, pre-set target populations, transparency, etc.) that are not necessarily compatible with the operating environment of a competitive market. The rural development ministries should restrict their interventions in economic activities to cases of blatant market failure and favor non-confined interventions by the private sector in all other cases.

Conclusion: The "Burkinabe Paradox":[4] Considerable Government Resources Allocated to the Sector and Significant Efforts to Improve Budget Planning and Execution Processes but Disappointing Results in Terms of Growth and Poverty Reduction Due to the Poor Quality of Public Expenditures

xxxiv. Despite the significant resources made available to the sector and continuous improvements in budget planning and execution and despite the occasional positive experience in a large number of areas of rural development, it must be said that the overall outcome in terms of the sector's contribution to growth and poverty reduction was disappointing over the period considered. Average annual agricultural growth was only 3.5% in real terms from 2004 to 2011 and was largely due to the expansion in cultivated land area that resulted not from an increase in average farm size (which remained 0.66 ha) but from vigorous population growth (3.1%). Meanwhile, average yields at the national level did not increase significantly (Table 3) and the vulnerability of the sector—and therefore of the national economy—to climatic risks has not diminished. Finally, agricultural growth contributed only 29% to overall growth in current terms over the period, which is highly insufficient for a sector that supports 86% of the country's population. As a result, rural poverty decreased only marginally during the period, from 52.3% in 2003 to 50.7% in 2009 (MEF 2010c).

Table III: Change in yields of main food crops, 2005–2011, tons/ha

	2005	2006	2007	**2005–2007 average**	2008	2009	2010	2011	**2008–2011 average**
Millet	0.91	0.96	0.82	**0.90**	0.80	0.77	0.84	0.72	**0.78**
Maize	1.81	1.94	1.13	**1.63**	1.67	1.53	1.43	1.54	**1.54**
Rice	1.78	2.58	1.70	**2.02**	2.27	2.32	2.02	1.77	**2.09**

[4] The "Burkinabe paradox" was already used to describe the health and education sectors (World Bank 2009).

Sesame	0.54	0.48	0.34	**0.46**	0.56	0.60	0.72	0.70	**0.65**
Groundnut	0.80	0.69	0.59	**0.70**	0.94	0.72	0.83	0.68	**0.79**
Soybeans	1.70	1.14	0.80	**1.21**	2.73	1.45	1.26	0.89	**1.58**
Cowpea	0.68	0.72	0.48	**0.63**	0.79	0.65	0.79	0.69	**0.73**
Sorghum	1.09	1.14	0.94	**1.06**	0.99	0.92	1.00	0.90	**0.95**

Source: Farm inputs working paper, EPA (DGPER/DPSAA).

xxxv. As was underscored in the 2009 Agriculture Public Expenditure Review (Savadogo et al. 2009), the case of Burkina Faso therefore provides a clear illustration of the fact that considerable public expenditures are a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving the standard of living of rural households. Another necessary condition is the quality of the public expenditures in terms of content, organization, and M&E.

xxxvi. The failure of the agricultural sector to contribute sufficiently to national growth was one of the reasons behind the changeover from PRSF to SCADD in 2010, which adopted a poverty reduction policy more focused on developing production capacity and set an ambitious target for the primary sector of 9.5% annual average growth in real terms over the period 2011–2015.

The Challenge: How Can the Quality of Public Agricultural Expenditures Be Improved over the Previous Decade to Meet the SCADD Targets?

xxxvii. If this question is not addressed, the risk is that the same mixed results will be found when evaluating the SCADD, just like the PRSF and for the same reasons. One of the main findings of this review is that the large number of initiatives and projects, the lack of overall vision and coordination, the near-complete lack of M&E, the low level of R&D, and the lack of resources available to the decentralized public services at the service of the decentralized authorities are the main culprits behind the poor quality of public expenditures in agriculture, in particular by preventing the accumulation and dissemination of successful experiments and the adjustments to those that are less successful. Accordingly, the impact of agricultural expenditures has a long way to go to before it is maximized.

xxxviii. For better-quality public expenditures in agriculture that generate a greater degree of ownership, incidence, impact, and sustainability, the authors recommend the following broad policy lines (Table 4).

Table 4: Recommended actions for improving the efficiency of public expenditures in agriculture

Domain	Actions	Responsibility	Resource and assistance needs			
			Low	Medium	High	Type
Organization and conceptual framework for public expenditures	**Effective switch to the budget program, a precondition for successful implementation of the PNSR**: (a) Appointment of sub-program leaders with a strong hierarchical status giving them authority over all activities in their sub-program, including projects, and making them accountable for achieving targets; (b) Restructuring of personnel in line with PNSR sub-programs; and (c) Definition of a vision and a clear strategy for each sub-sector, accompanied by performance indicators.	Ministers - SG			X	Technical assistance
	Increase in the number of basket funds, trust funds, sectoral budget support, etc., in order to put an end to the excessive number of projects and to reduce transactions costs in public development aid.	DPs	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Increased resources and responsibilities (through gradual delegation of more credits) for the regional directorates so that they may play a central role in the regional deployment of the PNSR and increase their support for decentralized authorities and local initiatives.	Ministers - SG	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Rationalization and increase in resources given to financing facilities for local initiatives (public and private), with active involvement of decentralized public services drawing on the experience acquired from the PADAB and PNGT projects.	MAH-MATD-MEF-DPs			X	Financial resources Technical assistance

	Closer and more systematic involvement of sector actors (ATAs, private sector) in policy formation and implementation, with less government intervention and the acknowledgement that public service targets and operating methods should not be imposed on private operators but that their involvement remains vital to the sustainability and large-scale replication of positive initiatives, which is a precondition for meeting the SCADD objectives and targets.	Ministers - SG	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Budget planning and monitoring	**Inclusion of all agricultural development projects in the budget of the rural sector ministries,** including the agricultural sections of projects managed by other ministries and agricultural expenditures financed under inter-ministerial common expenditures and off-budget projects in order to improve the visibility and running of the sector by the relevant ministries and to promote their empowerment through results-based management. Agricultural projects financed under inter-ministerial expenditures during the fiscal year (including expenditures unforeseen when the initial budget law was drafted) should be included in the supervising ministry's budget in the supplementary budget law or settlement law. Likewise, the livestock breeding section of multi-sector projects under the MAH budget should be included in the MRA budget.	DAF- MEF	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Operationalization of IEFS for the rural development ministries in order to enable the accounting treatment and monitoring of external resources	DAF- MEF	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Improved cost accounting, with better separation of operating costs, including those borne by projects, better monitoring of investments made at the level of support services and of beneficiaries, and better monitoring of the	DAF- MEF	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

	regional distribution of expenditures.					
	Setting up of systematic budgeting mechanisms for recurrent costs of investment maintenance, at the level of public services, public infrastructures, and infrastructures transferred to beneficiaries.	DAF-Project leaders-DPs		X		Technical assistance
	Alignment of provisional budgets for projects included in the initial and supplementary budget laws with amounts actually adopted by projects.	DAF-Project leaders	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Budget execution	**Increased alignment of donors with national strategies and procedures,** in particular effective cooperation with MEF within the IEFS.	DPs-MEF	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
	Implementation at all levels of an effective M&E system coupled with an efficient information, archiving, and dissemination system.	Ministers-SG-DEP-DPs			X	Financial resources Technical assistance
	Additional efforts to reduce delays in procurement procedures.	Directorates-MP-MEF	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Strategic guidelines	**Better functional distribution of expenditures: in particular, increased support for livestock breeding, R&D, and forestry** (including freshwater fisheries and fauna). For the livestock breeding sub-sector, optimization of FODEL funding.	MRA-MRSI-MEDD-DPs			X	Financial resources Technical assistance
	Strategic reorientation of irrigation development toward simple, adapted, and inexpensive HADs, carried out at the request and with maximum involvement of private sector farmers' associations.	MAH-PTF			X	Financial resources Technical assistance
	Improvement in farm input and livestock feed subsidy programs to increase their efficiency and effectiveness and their impact on the national economy, on the basis in particular of the greater involvement of ATAs and the private sector, and search for possible alternative strategies to address market imperfections.	MAH-MRA-DPs			X	Financial resources Technical assistance

	Clarification of priorities, the role of the various operators, and the resources needed in terms of capacity building in the forestry sector and, more broadly, in natural resource management.	MEDD-DPs			X	Financial resources Technical assistance
	Greater investment in order to improve access to rural areas and implementation of a scheme involving local communities in the maintenance of feeder roads (MID).	MID-DPs			X	Financial resources Technical assistance

INTRODUCTION

1. **The rural sector, defined here as the economic sector corresponding to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulics (MAH), the Ministry of Animal Resources (MRA), and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD), constitutes one of the pillars of the Burkina Faso economy.** Even though its contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth has decreased recently from 35% in 1999 to 30% in 2011 as a result of growth in other economic sectors, the sector continues to employ roughly 86% of Burkina Faso's labor force, and represents the primary source of income for the poorest populations. Besides contributing to food sovereignty,[5] the sector also accounts for 50 to 60% of export earnings.[6]

2. **Given this, the Government of Burkina Faso annually places the rural sector among the primary recipients of public expenditures from both the national budget and external resources, and has made it one of the pillars of the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) adopted in 2010.** The objective is to achieve sustained economic growth (an average of 10% annually in real terms) over the period 2011–2015, capable of improving the population's quality of life while adhering to the principles of sustainable development. The good performance of the rural sector represents one of the foundations of this sustained growth, as the objective for the average growth rate in the primary sector is 9.5% per year over the period (an average of 10.7% per year for crop production and 4.0% for livestock).[7]

3. **As part of the operationalization of the SCADD for the rural sector, the three ministries involved finalized the National Rural Sector Program (PNSR) in 2012**, which offers a unique framework for the planning and implementation of public action in the field of rural development, with the objective of a sustainable contribution to food safety and nutrition, strong economic growth, and poverty reduction. The PNSR provides for substantial investments in thirteen sub-programs covering all of the sub-sectors. An annual review of the PNSR is also planned and will be accompanied by a review of the sector's public expenditures.

4. **In this context, the MAH, MRA, and MEDD recommended that a review of public expenditures for the period prior to the implementation of the PNSR be conducted in order to serve as a frame of reference.** In response to this request, the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency selected Burkina Faso for this review. The review was conducted by the World Bank's Strengthening National Comprehensive Agricultural Public Expenditure in Sub-Saharan Africa Program and jointly funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) Multi-Donor Trust Fund. This program, which is implemented by the World Bank, aims to improve the impact of the scarce public resources available to the governments of Sub-Saharan African countries with a view to promoting agricultural growth and combat rural poverty, which

[5] Grain estimates generally show a surplus for the country as a whole. However, per capita output is down, and around twenty provinces in four regions (Nord, Sahel, Centre-Nord, and Est) are structurally in deficit, while others, such as the Boucle de Mouhoun and Cascades regions, show a grain surplus, yet are among the regions most affected by malnutrition (MAH 2012).

[6] The agricultural sector provided 80 to 90% of export earnings until 2008, when gold exports began to play an increasingly significant role in the trade balance. In 2010, agricultural products represented 52% of export earnings, 35% of which came from cotton, while gold represented 40%. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).

[7] MEF 2010c.

accounts for most of the poverty in the majority of the countries concerned, Burkina Faso being no exception, with over 90% of the poor living in rural areas.[8]

5. **The objectives of the Basic Agricultural Public Expenditure Review in Burkina Faso are the following:**

i. **Learn from past experience of budget implementation in the agricultural sector so as to support the design and implementation of public expenditure programs that are more effective and equitable and have greater impact; particular attention will be paid to public expenditures for agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilizer, and livestock feed) and hydro-agricultural developments;**

ii. **Initiate the creation of the databases and methodology required in order to conduct similar reviews on a regular basis and thus contribute to the institutionalization of the process;**

iii. **Contribute in this way to creating the conditions for a better support system for the sector while encouraging the harmonization and alignment of support in conformity with national strategies.**

6. **This study follows—and is based on—a number of similar studies conducted in recent years**, notably:

i. The work of the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (ReSAKSS) as part of the support provided to the country for CAADP monitoring and evaluation, particularly the study on the Evolution of the Agricultural Sector and Household Living Conditions in Burkina Faso (MAH 2009a);

ii. The Burkina Faso Agricultural Public Expenditure Review (Savadogo et al. 2009), conducted as part of a more extensive review by the World Bank: the Public Expenditure Review Beyond the Burkinabe Paradox; and A Roadmap for a Successful Decentralization and More Effective Public Expenditure (World Bank 2009);

iii. The Public Financial Management Performance Evaluation, using Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) methodology (MEF 2010b);

iv. More recently, the work carried out by the MAH as part of the FAO's Monitoring African Food and Agricultural Policy (MAFAP) program.

7. **In particular, the work of the ReSAKSS (MAH 2009a) and the review conducted by the World Bank (Savadogo et al. 2009) allowed for the following conclusions to be drawn**:

i. The government's budget allocation to the agricultural sector fulfills the objectives of the Maputo Declaration (2003), which calls for allocating at least 10% of the annual budget to the agricultural sector. However, this allocation decreased from an average of 20% for the period 1991–1999 to 12% for the period 2000–2006. In addition, the government's effective agricultural expenditure also reaches 10%;

ii. Investments in the sector remain strongly dependent on external financing, which leaves the government little flexibility, may cause a gap between expenditures and

[8] MAH 2009a and MEF 2010c.

needs, and explains the limited role given to agricultural development as part of the decentralization process;

iii. Budget implementation rates remain weak, especially for capital expenditures;

iv. A large proportion of public expenditures is allocated to the sub-sector of crop production, particularly in the form of input subsidies, while the share dedicated to livestock production, hydro-agricultural development and – more importantly – agricultural research and the dissemination of its results remains limited;

v. The objectives of the regional distribution of expenditures do not appear to be clearly defined either in terms of effectiveness (it does not give priority to regions with the highest potential) or of reducing inequality (it does not give priority to regions most affected by poverty).

8. **Unfortunately, the impact of the analyses included in these studies is weakened by a number of limitations affecting the processing of information, which this review tries to overcome.** In particular, in this study, non-agricultural expenditures included in the budget of the ministries involved were isolated (expenditures for a clean environment, Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (DWSS), feeder roads and social infrastructures, etc.). Meanwhile, agricultural expenditures included in the budget of ministries other than the MAH, MRA, and MEDD were included (Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Labor, Prime Minister's Office, Shared Inter-ministerial Expenditure, etc.). Expenditures from external resources not included in the national budget were estimated and taken into consideration. Finally, the regional analysis covered 93% of expenditures over the period 2007–2011, as compared to 54% for the 2009 review.

9. **This report is organized in six sections:**

i. **The first chapter presents the strategic and institutional context;**

ii. **The second chapter examines the level of agricultural public expenditures in Burkina Faso;**

iii. **The third chapter analyzes the composition and regional distribution of agricultural public expenditures (allocative efficiency);**

iv. **The fourth chapter evaluates the technical efficiency of the agricultural budget preparation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation processes;**

v. **The fifth chapter examines the consequences, impact, and durability of agricultural public expenditure, in particular on the basis of hydro-agricultural developments and input and livestock feed subsidies;**

vi. **The sixth and final chapter summarizes the conclusions and recommendations arising from the preceding chapters.**

10. **The terms of reference for the analysis provide for a period of study of ten years, from 2002 to 2011. Given that a new budgetary nomenclature was introduced for the 2004 fiscal year, the Monitoring and Steering Committee (MSC) decided to limit the study to the period 2004–2011.**

11. **For the purpose of this study, agricultural public expenditures refers to:**

i. Expenditures planned and executed by the three ministries involved in rural development and financed by the national budget and until 2006, the Special Fund for Economic and Social Development and Poverty Reduction;

ii. Expenditures of other ministries whose activities provide support to the agricultural sector;

iii. Expenditures executed as part of projects not included in the budget laws but that are the object of a convention with the Burkina Faso government and registered by the MEF's General Directorate for Cooperation (DGCOOP);

iv. The resources of the National Livestock Fund of Burkina Faso (FODEL, see Box 1) funded by the Contribution to the Livestock Sector (CSE), and the resources of research institutes not included in the national budget (see Box 5). This is because even though they are not included in the national budget, these resources are managed by public agencies whose mission is to support agricultural growth.

12. In contrast, in accordance with the NEPAD recommendations (AU/NEPAD 2005), the budgets of commercial public or public-private agencies such as the National Office for Water and Sanitation (ONEA) or the Burkinabe Textile Fiber Corporation (SOFITEX) were not taken into consideration as only the subsidies these agencies sometimes received from the national budget were considered public expenditures. Similarly, private investments, including those from the producers themselves, were not taken into consideration. Expenditures by NGOs in support of agricultural growth were only taken into consideration when these NGOs acted as executing agencies as part of a project included in the national budget or that had been the object of a convention with the Burkina Faso government registered by the DGCOOP. The contribution of NGOs beyond the scope of these projects was evaluated (see Chapter 2.4) but was not included in public expenditures.

13. The methodology and all of the assumptions used in this review are presented in Annex 1, with the base data presented in Annex 2. Finally, specific reviews of the hydro-agricultural development, agricultural input, livestock, and forestry sub-sectors are presented in the Working Papers appended to this report.

1. STRATEGIC AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

1.1. Strategic Context

1.1.1. National Strategic Context

14. **Burkina Faso's recent history has been marked by three important phases in terms of national policies:**

i. **In the 1990s, Burkina Faso introduced a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) that launched an economic reform process** supported by the international financial community and that in particular marked the State's withdrawal from the productive sectors of the economy. During this period, in 1995, the Letter of Intent for Sustainable Human Development Policy (LISHDP) marked the government's commitment to focusing the country's development strategy on human security (economic security, education, professional training, employment, health safety, food safety, environmental safety, individual and political security).

ii. **In 2000, as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief initiative, of which it was one of the first beneficiary countries, Burkina Faso developed a Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework (PRSF), which was revised in 2003.** The PRSF recognized that economic growth and policies had not been particularly pro-poor during the 1990–2000 decade, which had resulted in stagnation in the poverty rate at around 45%. The PRSF was based on four strategic pillars: (i) accelerating broad-based growth; (ii) promoting access to basic social services for the poor; (iii) increasing employment and income-generating opportunities for the poor; and (iv) promoting good governance. A rolling triennial Priority Action Program (PAP) was put in place to define, monitor, and evaluate in a participatory manner the priority programs aimed at meeting the development goals defined in the PRSF. The primary quantitative goals of the PRSF were: (i) increasing GDP per capita by at least 4% per year from 2004 onward; (ii) reducing the poverty rate of 46.4% in 2003 to less than 35% by 2015; and (iii) increasing life expectancy from 54 years of age in 2003 to at least 60 by 2015 (MEDEV 2003).

iii. **In 2010, the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) 2011–2015 replaced the PRSF.** The assessment of the PRSF implementation showed that much had been achieved, especially in terms of access to basic social services and political and administrative governance. However, in a context of strong demographic growth (3.1% per year on average from 1996 to 2006) and despite a macro-economic performance ranking among the best in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), with an average of 5.2% annual growth in real terms from 2000 to 2009, economic growth had not been constant enough to lead to a significant decrease in poverty, the rate of which was estimated at 43.9% in 2009 (or only 2.5 points lower than in 2003). Furthermore, it was found that the economy remained excessively weak and vulnerable to climatic conditions, exogenous shocks such as a depreciation of the dollar, volatility in commodity prices (cotton, gold, oil), financial crises, and natural limitations (such as isolation), thus making the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) highly uncertain. In light of this, the government decided to implement a poverty reduction policy that targeted the development of the country's productive capacities. Four strategic priorities were defined with a view to accelerating pro-poor growth: (i) the development of the pillars of accelerated growth, based on: promoting a new growth

model (growth areas, development of promising sectors, and promotion of pro-poor growth) in four priority sectors (agriculture, mining, traditional crafts/tourism, and small and medium-sized businesses); the development of support infrastructures (irrigation, transportation, energy, communication, marketing, etc.); the creation of a favorable institutional environment; and the promotion of economic integration into regional and world markets; (ii) the consolidation of human capital and the promotion of social protection; (iii) strengthening good governance; and (iv) ensuring that development policies and programs take into account cross-cutting priorities (gender, control of demographic growth, natural resource management, capacity building, etc.). Eight specific objectives, corresponding to the MDGs, were defined, including most notably average real GDP growth rate of 10% and a poverty rate of less than 35% by 2015 (MEF 2010c).

15. **Furthermore, throughout the implementation of the PRSF and to the present day, the Burkina Faso government has initiated major reforms to administrative governance and the management of public finances.** In this respect, Burkina Faso is one of the leading countries in Francophone Africa (World Bank 2009). The main reforms were carried out through the Comprehensive Reform of Public Administration (RGAP) program and the Strategy for Strengthening Public Finances (SRFP, replaced in 2001 by the Economic and Finance Sectoral Policy (POSEF)). For its part, public administration reform involved the devolution of the MEF's departments as part of the devolution of budget implementation, notably decentralization, the improvement of staff management, and the fight against corruption.

16. In terms of budget planning, progress was primarily made by introducing new tools and procedures, notably the prioritization of capital investments, the Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF), and the Public Procurement and Funding Release plans, which are set by each ministry at the start of each fiscal year. The budget implementation process was also improved, notably by simplifying funding release procedures and reducing the number of supporting documents required, reforming public procurement procedures and introducing the Public Contract Management System (SIMP), and strengthening control. A mid-term review of budget implementation was introduced. This begins in June and allows for necessary changes to be made for the remainder of the budget year through the passing of a supplementary budget law, based on the diagnostic review of the first six months of implementation and the current socioeconomic situation.

17. **It is important to note that budget proposals are always submitted to the National Assembly on time (early September), that the Assembly has a sufficient amount of time to debate the proposals and meet with the sectoral ministers, and that budgets are always passed and put in place before the beginning of the fiscal year in question.**

18. **Finally, the efforts made in order to improve the budget management information systems must also be mentioned.** The Computerized Expenditure System (CID), which can now interface with the computerized administrative and salary management of State employees, provides up-to-the-minute data on budget implementation (national resources). All appropriation managers now have access to the CID, which improves efficiency and accountability. Finally, the operationalization of the Integrated External Financing System (IEFS, see Box 6) in 2011 will provide a global view of central budget implementation, with all headings combined based on 2012 budget management.

19. **Although the MTEF has now been established at the level of both the State and the sectoral ministries, it continues to suffer from a number of limitations.** In particular, a

significant drawback of the current MTEF is that it only takes into account capital expenditures from national resources as external resources are not included, thus limiting the value of the process, which should be based on an assessment of all available resources. Furthermore, in the past few years, Heading V (investments) from national resources is communicated by the MEF much later than other headings (for which it is essentially a matter of renewing the previous budget after making slight adjustments). This limits the possibility of profound reflection over investment planning within the ministerial departments.

20. **The implementation of results-based management using program budgets was revived, with the objective of making the process effective by 2015.** In fact, the introduction of program budgets dates back to 1997 (in preparation for the 1998 budget law). Although some ministries have continued to set a program budget every year since then, the quality of these documents was considered highly unsatisfactory because they generally showed little connection with the sectoral strategy action plans, lacked performance indicators, and were not standardized. Although these program budgets were attached to traditional budget proposals, they were not used in arbitration with the MEF or during presentation of the budget to the National Assembly, which did little to encourage improvement. The process was revived in 2009 through the adoption of WAEMU Directive no. 06/2009/CM/UEMOA, which had not yet been enshrined in national legislation and provided for all member states to transition to program budgets no later than the 2017 budget year. That same year, the government also decided to establish support units for budget program implementation within the MEF and the sectoral ministries. The objective is to make the 2016–2018 national budget, which will be prepared in 2015, a program budget. Six pilot ministries, including the MAH, were involved in 2010, rising to 15 in 2011. Moreover, in 2012, all State institutions were required to present a program budget attached to the traditional budget for 2013–2015 (MEF 2010a; MEF 2010b).

21. **Finally, the PRSF implementation period was marked by another important change, namely the effective implementation of decentralization.** Since the early 1990s, through the political, economic and institutional reforms it carried out, the government has moved to decentralize so as to promote grass-roots development. The decentralization process reached a turning point when the full municipalization of the country was introduced by law no. 055-2004/AN of December 21, 2004, which enacted the Local Authorities General Code (CGCT). The elections that followed in April, 2006 allowed for the implementation of the law throughout the country's 351 municipalities, including 49 urban communities and 302 rural communities, as well as thirteen regions. The regional level now serves as both administrative district and local authority, while the municipal territory corresponds to the former *départements*, the employees of which were transferred to the municipalities.

22. **Despite being in its early stages and impeded by a number of obstacles, the decentralization process is indisputably a major trend, fed by ever-growing social demand and supported by increasingly determined political will, as illustrated by the measures taken by the government. The main challenges include:**

i. **Improving the human resources of local authorities in both quantity and quality:** Although local authorities must set their development plan in compliance with national policies and despite the fact that the government has assigned a secretary-general to each authority, local authorities do not have the experience needed to carry out such activities;

ii. **Increasing the financial resources of local authorities:** Local authorities set a

budget that is financed primarily (over 90%) by the government (including general operating and material allocations, taxes shared with the State, transfers for recurrent expenses incurred as a result of the powers transferred to the local authorities, and contributions from various local authority support funds) and to a lesser extent from their own resources (local taxes) and in some cases, from external sources (projects, NGOs, decentralized development aid). The CGCT confers eleven areas of expertise to local authorities, for which they are responsible for ensuring the continuity of government services. However, the transfer of resources related to these eleven areas of expertise has been limited thus far as since 2009, only those related to health, early childhood, and primary education, drinking water and sanitation (DWSS), and culture, youth, sports, and leisure have been allocated funding. Furthermore, the CDCT established a Permanent Local Authorities Development Fund (FPDCT), the mission of which is to finance local authorities' priority programs for local development and contribute to improving their operational capacities. However, this fund is not yet fully operational. In particular, the operationalization of the FPDCT is hindered by the continued operation of other important projects and alternative funding mechanisms for local authorities, especially as regards rural areas. Beside complicating access to funding (by multiplying the number of sources) for inexperienced local authorities still lacking in competent human resources, this situation confines the FPDCT to a secondary role when it should be the linchpin of local development funding. For now, the resources of local authorities are highly limited and unequally distributed, with government transfers to local authorities (excluding delegated staff) and funding from the FPDCT representing less than 7% of internal resources in the national budget in 2009 and less than 4% in 2012. In 2009, municipalities with special status (Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso) received 47% of operating funding and 48% of investment funding, while other urban communities received 26% and 15%, rural communities received 22% and 29%, and regions received 4% and 8%, respectively (MEF 2010c; DACT/MEF).

iii. **Completing the devolution of the public administration.** The human and material capacities of devolved administrations are currently too limited to allow them to provide the substantial technical support new local authorities need (see Section 4.4).

23. **Finally, a National Land Management Matrix (SRAT) was recently set up. This determines general land use as well as the nature and location of large infrastructures for the entire country.** It is expected to last a generation (25–30 years), and includes seven strategic areas: (i) demographic control, (ii) land issues, (iii) public facilities, (iv) agricultural development, (v) improving links with isolated areas, (vi) urban policy, and (vii) infrastructures and mines.

1.1.2. Sectoral Strategic Context[9]

24. Given the importance of the rural sector in the national economy, rural development has always been at the center of national policies. Major rural development policies have been the sectoral application of national policies and thus correspond to the major steps in the general strategic context.

25. **In the early 1990s, Burkina Faso launched an Agricultural Structural Adjustment Program (PASA) with the issuing of the Agricultural Development Policy Document (LPDA).** The LPDA defined the conditions for the State's gradual withdrawal from its

[9]Sources: MAH 2009b; MAH 2012.

various functions in the production, processing, and marketing of agricultural products in favor of the private sector, the gradual liberalization of the trading and pricing of food and agricultural products, and the redefining of the State's role to that of guiding, controlling, monitoring, and evaluating the sector. Along with the restoration of the terms of trade through the devaluation of the CFA Franc to half of its previous value in 1994 as well as favorable climatic conditions, this policy of liberalization revitalized the sector, which strongly contributed to sustained growth in the Burkina Faso economy in 1995–1999 (5.5% per year on average in real terms).

26. **Passed in 1998 and 1999, the Strategic Orientation Document (DOS) and its operational variation, the Operational Strategic Plan (PSO), created the frame of reference for the elaboration and implementation of agriculture and livestock development programs and projects for 2010**. Their objectives were to support the development of a market economy in rural areas, modernize and professionalize agricultural and livestock holdings, and improve natural resource management, with the primary goal of achieving 5% to 10% annual growth in agricultural production, contributing to an increase in incomes of at least 3% per person per year for livestock breeders and farmers, creating the favorable conditions necessary for agricultural production and providing the population with adequate and balanced food in terms of both calories and protein (objective: 2,500 calories per person per day and a doubling of the consumption of meat and meat substitutes, which at the time was 9.3 kg per person per year).

27. Five priorities had been defined as part of the implementation of the PSO: (i) soil fertility with a view to maintaining production capabilities and the sustainability of production systems; (ii) food safety in the context of the forecasting and management of climate-related risks; (iii) the modernization of agriculture with a view to increasing production and improving the trade balance; (iv) the support of operators in the agriculture industry in order to encourage their professionalization; and (v) the institutional support of decentralization, devolution, and the increased involvement of the private sector. Six leading branches of the sector were identified based on their comparative advantage and potential contribution to reaching the defined objectives. These concern not only crops such as cereals (corn, sorghum, millet, and rice), cowpeas, and tubers (yam and potatoes) but also export crops (cotton, fruits and vegetables, and oilseeds). In addition, the PSO targeted the following sectors of the livestock sector: cattle/meat, small ruminants, pig production, milk, poultry, and hides and skins.

28. **The National Forestry Policy was adopted in 1998** to illustrate the importance of the forestry, wildlife, and fisheries sub-sectors and to clarify the government's options, with the following objectives: (i) streamlining resource management; (ii) providing a conceptual basis for the drafting of legislation on the management of these three sub-sectors; and (iii) establishing a negotiating tool and frame of reference for consultations with development partners (DP) over the coordination and harmonization of interventions. The options selected for the policy are the following: (i) intelligent exploitation of natural resources; (ii) creation of employment and steady incomes in rural areas; (iii) conservation of biodiversity; (iv) improvement in the quality of life and development of green belts around cities; and (v) constant improvement in knowledge and information about the environment.

29. **The general purpose of the Water Policy and Strategy (PSE), which was also adopted in 1998,** was to contribute to sustainable development by providing appropriate solutions to water-related problems in order to keep these from becoming a limiting factor for socioeconomic development. Its specific objectives are the following: (i) sustainably meet the water needs, in both quantity and quality, of a growing population and a developing economy

while ensuring the health of aquatic ecosystems in an environmental context that is not conducive to the renewal and mobilization of the resource; (ii) protect the country against water-related disasters, including erosion, corrosion, flooding, epidemics, and dam failures; (iii) help improve public finances by reducing the burden of the water sector by equally distributing the costs between the partners involved, namely the government, the municipalities, and the consumers; and (iv) prevent conflicts in the international management of water resources. Ten strategic guidelines were set: (i) designate the watershed approach as the appropriate framework for the planning, mobilization, management, and protection of water resources; (ii) promote inter-regional and international cooperation; (iii) improve the effectiveness and management capabilities of ministerial departments involved in the implementation of national water policy; (iv) implement the sanitation strategy and the resource protection measures; (v) put in place a water quality monitoring network and promote the development of a national service consisting of experts capable of designing, implementing, operating, and maintaining resource monitoring and supply systems in order to establish a reliable source of information; (vi) place the responsibility for water infrastructure maintenance into the hands of user management structures to the fullest extent possible as part of an incentive-based fiscal policy; (vii) give priority to the rehabilitation and improvement of water infrastructures in order to make previous investments profitable or viable; (viii) make investment profitability and effectiveness a priority; (ix) reduce maintenance costs and increase the lifespan of systems and structures; and (x) reduce water-related risks by improving knowledge of these risks and implementing preventive measures while improving crisis management.

30. **Drafted in 2002 as part of the implementation of the Local Development Project (PDL) and more specifically that of the second National Land Management Program (PNGT 2), the Decentralized Rural Development Policy Document (LPDRD) announced the government's overall vision for rural areas for 2010. Its purpose was to provide a framework for all multi-sectoral interventions in rural areas.** It was specifically designed to promote the harmonization of the actions of the various programs and projects and to describe the mechanisms the government intended to implement together with its partners to ensure the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of decentralized development activities.

31. **The purpose of the National Strategy for Food Security (SNSA)** developed in 2003 was to create the conditions for sustainable food security and structurally contribute to reducing inequality and poverty in Burkina Faso by 2015. Complying with the recommendations of the World Food Summit held in Rome in 1996, the government's main objective was to reduce by half the number of people suffering from hunger and malnutrition by 2015. The specific objectives are: (i) increasing national food production and its added value in a sustainable manner; (ii) strengthening market capacity in order to improve the population's access to food; (iii) sustainably improving the economic and nutritional conditions of poor populations and vulnerable groups; (iv) improving the prevention and management of cyclical crises in conjunction with the building of structural food security; and (v) strengthening the capacities of stakeholders and promoting good food security governance. Major SNSA policy guidelines include water management, the sustainable management of soil fertility, the development of grazing, fisheries, forestry, and wildlife resources, the promotion of domestic and alternative energies, the development of key industries, the development of market and information systems, the promotion of income-generating activities, and cross-partner consultation.

32. **Also adopted in 2003, the Rural Development Strategy (SDR) for 2015 created the frame of reference for all public interventions in rural development during the PRSF**

period. Its overall objective was to ensure sustained growth in the rural sector in order to contribute to the fight against poverty, strengthen food security, and promote sustainable development. Some of the SDR's specific objectives were: (i) increasing agricultural, grazing, forestry, wildlife, and fisheries production by improving productivity; (ii) increasing incomes by diversifying economic activities in rural areas; (iii) strengthening the production-market relationship; (iv) ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources; (v) improving the economic situation and social status of women and young people in rural areas; (vi) giving rural populations greater responsibility by involving them in development; and (vii) improving the drinking water supply and sanitation. The SDR was transposed into a specific document for each ministry involved in the rural sector, resulting in PISA, PAPISE, and PDA/ECV.

33. **For the MAHRH, the overall objective of the Investment Program for Agriculture (PISA), which was finalized in 2008, was to build a modern, professional, competitive and market-oriented agricultural sector.** It specific objectives for 2015 were: (i) strengthening stakeholders' capacities and the production-market relationship; (ii) modernizing the production system and agricultural input distribution networks; (iii) increasing water and soil productivity; and (iv) promoting a gender approach.

34. **For the MRA, the 2015 objectives of the Action Plan and Investment Program for the Livestock Sector (PAPISE) adopted in 2000 and updated in 2008 were to strengthen the role of livestock in poverty reduction, food security, and national economic growth.** Its four specific objectives were: (i) strengthening the capacities of the sector's stakeholders; (ii) increasing animal productivity by improving animal feed, genetics, and health; (iii) improving the competitiveness of animal products by strengthening the production-market relationship; and (iv) encouraging the sustainable management of pastoral resources.

35. **For the Ministry of the Environment and Living Conditions (MECV, the predecessor of the MEDD, see Section 1.2), the 2015 objective of the Ten-Year Action Plan (PDA/ECV) drafted in 2006 was to reduce environmental degradation and promote the contribution of the environment sector to the national economy and the socioeconomic well-being of the population as part of the fight against poverty.** Its specific objectives were: (i) increasing key forest and wildlife production by 10% and support productivity; (ii) strengthening the production-market relationship by creating 350 community storage and marketing centers and 13 production wholesale centers per industry; (iii) increasing and diversifying sources of income by encouraging income-generating activities for 100,000 stakeholders; (iv) practicing gender parity in political decision-making and creating at least 1,000 jobs per year for women; (v) increasing production and stimulating productivity by providing healthier living conditions; (vi) improving living conditions and fighting poverty by promoting at least five industries and career options in the sector; (vii) ensuring compliance to Burkina Faso's environmental standards; (viii) strengthening the sector's institutional and political capacities and ensuring the proper operation of institutions; (ix) strengthening legislative and regulatory capacities; and (x) improving human and material capacities by providing sufficient funding and raising staff skills in both qualitative and quantitative terms.

36. **The regional operationalization of the SDR was carried out through the elaboration of thirteen Regional Specialization Programs (PROSPER) between 2006 and 2008, the purpose of which was to provide each region in the country with a productive rural sector planning document for 2015.** All PROSPERs use the SDR set of objectives as a foundation for determining the specialization of each region through the development of its specific assets and potential according to their comparative advantages and in a manner

coherent and complementary with the other regions.

37. **Finally, in conjunction with the operationalization of the SDR and to accelerate agricultural modernization, the Green Revolution Guidebook was drafted in 2008.** It expresses its vision as follows:

> Burkina Faso's economic growth and food security are ensured in a sustainable manner and are based on competitive agricultural and agro-industrial products that are integrated into the market, resulting in the sustainable improvement of agro-sylvo-pastoral productivity.

The objective of the Guidebook is to increase, diversify, and intensify agricultural, pastoral, forestry, wildlife, and fisheries production by: (i) strengthening the production-market relationship; (ii) improving land security in rural areas; (iii) improving the mobilization and sustainable development of water resources; and (iv) building stakeholders' capacities and establishing a favorable institutional framework. In the crop production sector, the designated strategic industries are: (i) traditional cereals (sorghum and corn), (ii) rice, (iii) cowpeas, (iv) fruit and vegetables (tomatoes, onions, and mangoes), and (v) cotton. In the fisheries sector, the designated strategic industry is the aquaculture industry, which given the limited growth margins of capture fishing, is a viable alternative for reducing the gap between supply and demand. As for animal resources, the industries to be promoted include: (i) livestock and meat (cattle and small ruminants, bovine, ovine, and porcine meat); (ii) milk; and (iii) poultry farming. In the forestry sector, the designated industries are: (i) plant production; (ii) timber; and (iii) gums and resins. Finally, in the wildlife sector, the two designated strategic industries are: (i) ecotourism in preservation areas; and (ii) wildlife farming.

38. **A large number of additional strategies and sub-sectoral policy guidelines were also produced during the PRSF implementation period:**

i. **The overall objective of the National Strategy for Fisheries Resources Development and Management** adopted in 2003 is to contribute to poverty reduction and food security in a sustainable manner through the rational development and use of fisheries resources. Its specific objectives are to: (i) sustainably increase capture fishing production by 15% by 2010; (ii) promote the aquaculture industry; (iii) contribute to the conservation and restoration of aquatic ecosystems; (iv) promote the quality and optimal use of fish production; and (v) create jobs and stable sources of income in rural areas.

ii. **The Action Plan for the Integrated Management of Water Resources (PAGIRE)** adopted in 2003 aims to contribute to establishing an integrated management of the country's water resources that matches the national context and complies with the guidelines defined by the Burkina Faso government as well as internationally recognized principles for the sustainable and environmentally sound management of water resources.

iii. **The National Policy for the Sustainable Development of Irrigated Agriculture (PNDDAI)** ratified in 2004 but not published until 2006 forms the general framework for the irrigated agriculture sub-sector. The program provides for increases in: (i) surface water storage; (ii) water control areas; and (iii) the share of irrigated production in agricultural production as a whole. The following actions are to be taken: (i) coordination of irrigation development; (ii) development and rehabilitation of irrigated and low-lying land; (iii) development of small hydraulic structures; (iv) promotion of innovative irrigation technologies; (v) management of hydro-agricultural developments; and (vi) mobilization of surface water resources.

iv. **The National Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Program (PNAEPA)**[10] adopted in 2006 aims to halve by 2015 the number of people who in 2005 lacked sufficient access to drinking water and sanitation. In rural areas, this objective meant providing proper access to drinking water for 4 million people so as to increase the access rate from 60% in 2005 to 80% in 2015. It also meant providing sufficient access to sanitation for 5.7 million people in order to increase the access rate from 10% in 2005 to 54% in 2015. In urban areas, this meant providing 1.8 million people with access to drinking water, increasing the access rate from 74% in 2005 to 87% in 2015 while providing proper access to sanitation for 2.1 million people in order to increase the access rate from 14% in 2005 to 57% in 2015. The PNAEPA exemplifies the program approach selected by the government with the aim of reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the water and sanitation area and is an integral part of the national Integrated Water Resources Management strategy (GIRE).

v. **The objective of the National Policy for Secured Rural Land Tenure (PNSFMR)** adopted in 2007 is to provide all rural stakeholders with equal access to land, guarantee their investments, and effectively manage land disputes in order to fight poverty, secure social peace, and build sustainable development.

vi. **The objectives of the National Environment Policy (PNE)** adopted in 2007 are to preserve the country's resources and promote their integrated management, fight poverty, and contribute to the national economy. Its priorities were defined as follows: (i) promoting good governance; (ii) developing of human capital; (iii) strengthening the decentralization process; (iv) integrating the gender approach; (v) take regional differences into consideration; (vi) redefining the State's role; (vii) devolving powers; and (viii) developing partnerships between the State and private partners and local authorities.

vii. **The National Sanitation Policy and Strategy (PSNA)**[11] adopted in 2007 aims to contribute to sustainable development by providing appropriate solutions to sanitation-related problems with a view to improving the population's living conditions and housing, safeguard public health, and protect natural resources.

viii. **The National Policy for Sustainable Livestock Development (PNDEL)** adopted in 2010 envisions for 2025 "a competitive and environment-friendly livestock production that serves as a foundation for market-oriented value chains supported by professional industries and contributes to food security and to improvement in the well-being of the Burkina Faso population". Its operational tool is the Action Plan and Investment Program for the Livestock Sector (PAPISE).

39. Other relevant policies include:

i. The Burkina Faso National Strategy and Action Plan for Biodiversity (2001);

ii. The National Strategy for Environmental Education (2001);

iii. The National Strategy for the Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (2001);

[10]The PNAEPA comes under the authority of the MAH; see Section 1.2.
[11]The MAH is responsible for sanitation; see Section 1.2.

iv. The Livestock, Poverty, and Growth Initiative (IEPC) (proposals for a national document, 2004);

v. The National Strategy and Action Plan for the Charcoal Industry (2005);

vi. The National Strategy for the Monitoring and Protection of Natural Resources (2007);

vii. The National Action Program for Adaptation (PANA) to Climatic Variability and Change (2007);

viii. The National Program for the Management of Wildlife and Protected Areas (PNGFAP) (2007);

ix. The Strategy for the Development, Security, and Improvement of Natural Areas and Pastoral Facilities (2008);

x. The Emergency Plan for Nutritional and Food Security (2008);

xi. The National Strategy for Agricultural Outreach and Consulting Services (SNVACA) (provisional document, 2008);

xii. The National Policy for Genetic Improvement (PNAG) (2009);

xiii. The National Program for Food Security (PNSA) (provisional document, 2009).

40. Finally, a large number of Action Plans on specific topics should be mentioned, including the Integrated Management of Soil Fertility (PAGIFS), Food and Nutritional Security (PASAN), Rural Financing (PA/FMR), Agricultural Mechanization (PAMA), promotion of improved seeds, the emergence of professional agricultural organizations, Information System for Food Security (PA-SISA), decentralization of the forestry sector, and most types of crop production, including rice (PA/FR), cereals (PAC), cowpeas, tubers, oilseeds, fruit and vegetables, and livestock (pork, milk, cattle/beef, small ruminants, traditional poultry farming).

41. **As underlined by the evaluation of Burkina Faso's rural policies and strategies for 1995–2009 conducted by the SP/CPSA in 2009 (MAH 2009b), the rural sector was marked by a multitude of policy statements during the PRSF implementation period. Among the positive developments to be noted is the fact that the livestock, forestry, wildlife, and fisheries sub-sectors were the object of specific policies and that the concepts of gender equality, youth employment, the sustainable management of natural resources, capacity building, decentralization, diversification, and the integration of production into the market were taken into consideration early on in the process.**

42. **Among the negative aspects to be noted is the limited consideration given to research, education, and funding.** In particular, while micro-credit is supervised by the MEF, it is unfortunate that the technical ministries did not collaborate with the MEF in building sectoral strategies that would facilitate access to financial services by the relevant populations. Given that each project follows its own methodology, attention should be drawn to the lack of harmonization of local investment funds (from both public and private sources).

43. **Furthermore, there is little harmonization between sectoral policy documents.** Possible areas of harmonization and common themes are not addressed (for example the harmonization of pastoral, hydro-agricultural, and forestry developments or of agriculture, livestock, and the environment).

44. **Moreover, recent documents do not always draw on the experience of previously implemented programs, and actions proposed do not sufficiently take into account the international, regional, and sub-regional context.**

45. **Finally, besides increasing the difficulty involved in governing the sector, this proliferation in directives reveals a lack of planning and long-term vision.** The planning effort appears to be excessively contingent on cyclical crises, institutional changes, and the agenda of the DPs, which means that the departments concerned are not deeply involved.

46. **For all of the reasons mentioned above, these strategy documents generally received a low level of support from foreign and national partners, and since they are generally not binding,[12] the level of project implementation is lower than could be expected.** Several of these programs and action plans did not receive significant funding, with the exception of the PA/FR, PA/FMR, PAC, AP/ATA, and PNAEPA. Except for the water and sanitation sub-sector, for which the program approach is more developed, the low level of involvement and the lack of interest among DPs combined with strong dependence on external resources and the fragmentation of public action into a large number of projects created an unfavorable context for the implementation of strong sectoral policies.

47. **In general, it must be stressed that besides considerably complicating budget programming and activity planning, supervision, coordination, monitoring, and evaluation, the current project-based[13] operational organization represents a major obstacle to the implementation of the program approach because it causes divisions rather than harmonization.** Moreover, these difficulties are exacerbated by weak human resources and the lack of central administrative control in the three ministries involved. This approach makes an immediate and complete estimation of the operating and staff resources available to public services impossible since part of these resources are handled by projects and thus do not appear in ministerial budgets (see Section 3.1).

48. **In 2012, the elaboration of the National Rural Sector Program (PNSR) 2011–2015 illustrated the government's determination to put in place a unique planning and implementation framework for public action in rural development in order to improve project coordination while creating the sectoral programming base required for the transition to a program budget.** The PNSR thus encompasses all missions of the Ministries in charge of the rural sector and incorporates the orientations provided in the SDR and its sub-sectoral variations (PISA, PAPISE, PDA/ECV). The PNSR sets an objective composed of three interdependent dimensions: (i) contributing to food and nutritional security in a sustainable manner; (ii) encouraging strong economic growth; and (iii) reducing poverty. It thus constitutes the new operationalization framework of the SDR and the rural development section of SCADD.

49. **In compliance with the demands of a program budget, the PNSR is organized into 5 main pillars and 13 sub-programs, which are subdivided into activities and actions, as follows:**

i. **Pillar 1: Enhanced food security and sovereignty.** This pillar includes the five following sub-programs:

[12]This is especially true of those that were not officially adopted by the Council of Ministers (notably PISA, PDA/ECV, and the Green Revolution Guidebook).

[13]Even investments from national resources are implemented as projects, and the MAH currently operates a total of approximately 100 national projects from external or combined resources.

- **1.1 Sustainable development of agricultural production**
- **1.2 Improved productivity and competitiveness in animal production**
- **1.3 Improved animal health and enhanced veterinarian public health**
- **1.4 Sustainable development of agricultural hydraulics**
- **1.5 Prevention and management of food and nutrition crises**

ii. **Pillar 2: Increasing rural incomes.** This consists of a single sub-program:

- **2.1 Promoting the agricultural economy or access to markets**

iii. **Pillar 3: Sustainable development of natural resources.** This includes four sub-programs:

- **3.1 Environment governance and sustainable development**
- **3.2 Sustainable soil and water management and land tenure security in rural areas**
- **3.3 Security and management of pastoral resources**
- **3.4 Improved forestry, fauna, and fisheries production**

iv. **Pillar 4: Improving access to drinking water and the living environment.** This consists of two sub-programs:

- **4.1 Drinking water and sanitation**
- **4.2 Environmental sanitation and improved living environment**

v. **Pillar 5: Develop partnerships between stakeholders in rural areas.** This consists of a single sub-program:

- **5.1 Steering and assistance**

50. **The total cost of the PNSR is estimated at approximately CFAF 1,376.8 billion for 2011–2015 (Table 1), which represents 18.4% of the global cost of SCADD.** The annual cost is projected to increase gradually from CFAF 191.4 billion in the first year to CFAF 328.2 billion in the fifth year. The State's contribution to the total cost was estimated at CFAF 326.1 billion (24%), that of NGOs and other civil organizations at CFAF 35.6 billion (3%), that of the private sector and financing institutions at CFAF 83.0 billion (6%), and that of the beneficiaries at CFAF 11.9 billion (1%). In May 2012, the external resources mobilized through existing agreements between the Burkina Faso government and its DPs were estimated at CFAF 390.9 billion (28%), leaving a shortfall of CFAF 529.5 billion (38%) to be closed.

Table 1: Detailed cost of the PNSR, 2011–2015 (in CFAF billions)

Sub-programs	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2011–2015**	**%**
1.1 Sustainable development of agricultural production	21.3	24.2	37.4	40.5	42.3	165.7	12%

1.2 Improved productivity and competitiveness in animal production	8.0	23.8	24.4	24.4	24.7	105.3	8%
1.3 Improved animal health and enhanced veterinarian public health	2.8	6.2	5.0	6.0	6.7	26.6	2%
1.4 Sustainable development of agricultural hydraulics	52.2	48.0	49.8	48.7	49.2	248.0	18%
1.5 Prevention and management of food and nutrition crises	1.7	8.6	9.7	10.0	10.2	40.1	3%
2.1 Promoting the agricultural economy or access to markets	10.5	16.6	20.0	20.5	19.9	87.4	6%
3.1 Environmental governance and sustainable development	1.4	1.0	2.0	2.0	2.1	8.5	1%
3.2 Sustainable soil and water management and land tenure security in rural areas	4.0	7.1	8.2	6.0	6.0	31.3	2%
3.3 Security and management of pastoral resources	2.8	12.4	47.7	47.7	47.7	158.3	11%
3.4 Improved forestry, fauna, and fisheries production	4.4	13.5	13.6	13.9	16.9	62.3	5%
4.1 Drinking water and sanitation	51.6	39.7	64.6	61.1	68.4	285.5	21%
4.2 Environmental sanitation and improved living environment	1.0	3.3	3.3	3.4	3.5	14.5	1%
5.1 Steering and assistance	29.9	28.1	29.2	25.6	30.6	143.4	10%
Total PNSR	**191.4**	**232.4**	**314.8**	**309.9**	**328.2**	**1,376.8**	**100%**

Source: MAH 2012

1.2. Institutional Setting

51. **Organizationally, the rural sector is involved in the work of three ministries: the Ministry of Agriculture and Hydraulics (MAH), the Ministry of Animal Resources (MRA), and the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD).** The MRA became an independent ministerial department in 1997 (Table 2). The Ministry of the Environment and Living Conditions (MECV) became the MEDD in late 2011. Finally, fisheries resources were transferred to the MEDD in 2011 (in 2012 for its budget).

52. **It is important to note that the MAH oversees the supply of drinking water and sanitation, even in urban areas, whereas the cotton industry comes under the authority of the Ministry of Trade, Enterprise Promotion, and Crafts (MCPEA), which houses a Permanent Secretariat for the Monitoring of the Cotton Industry.**

53. **Each of the three rural development ministries is organized into general and central directorates, affiliated and mission structures, 13 regional directorates, 45 provincial directorates, and a varying number of support zones and departmental services.**

Table 2: Institutional evolution of rural development ministerial departments

Period	Designation
Agriculture	
1995–1997	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Resources
1997–2002	Ministry of Agriculture

2002–2011	Ministry of Agriculture, Hydraulics, and Fisheries (MAHRH)
Since 2012	Ministry of Agriculture and Water (MAH)
Livestock	
1995–1997	Ministry Delegate for Animal Resources
Since 1997	Ministry of Animal Resources (MRA)
Environment	
1995–2002	Ministry of the Environment and Water
2002–2011	Ministry of the Environment and Living Conditions (MECV)
Since 2012	Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development (MEDD)

Source: MAH 2009b, updated by the authors

54. **In addition to the three rural sector ministries and the MCPEA, other ministerial departments participate in the sector** through such activities as agricultural research, until 2011, the Ministry of Secondary and Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESSES) and now the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (MRSI), funding (MEF), youth support through the Ministry of Youth, Professional Training, and Employment (MJFPE), and project management. For example, the Office of the Prime Minister supervises the important agricultural program financed by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and the Bagré Growth Pole Project. The agricultural development initiatives of other ministries are listed in Section 2.1.2.

55. **The devolution process has given local communities (both in cities and in regions) greater authority in the implementation of development actions and the management of their resources** (see Section 1.1.1).

56. **Among non-governmental stakeholders in rural development, the private sector has taken on an increasingly active role.** There are also numerous producers' organizations, some of which consist of unions, federations, cooperatives, and inter-professional organizations, with the majority of the latter belonging to the Faso Farmers' Union (CPF). A significant number of NGOs and associations are playing an increasingly important role in the rural sector. Finally, Regional Chambers of Agriculture were created in 2003–2004 in each of the 13 regions and were federated into a National Chamber of Agriculture).

57. **Two official forums for dialogue exist for rural development cooperation between the government and the DPs, namely the Rural Sector and Food Security group, and the Rural Sector and Water and Sanitation group.**

2. PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN AGRICULTURE

2.1. Expenditures Included in the National Budget

58. **Note: The data used in this section are considered reliable for budget estimates and executions from internal resources (IR) but not for executions from external resources (ER).**

59. **The budget estimates are those included in the initial finance laws. Expenditures executed from IRs (personnel, operation, current transfers, and part of the investments funded from IRs) are supplied by the Computerized Expenditure System (CES)** and are not subject to dispute since the CES is fully operational under the control of the Directorate General of the Budget (DGB) of the MEF, the authorizing unit by delegation for the national budget. Furthermore, from 2004 to 2006, the MAH and MRA received funding from the Special Fund for Economic and Social Growth and Poverty Reduction (*Fonds Spécial de Croissance Économique et Sociale et de Réduction de la Pauvreté*),[14] held in the Treasury and closed in 2006. These resources, which were not formally part of the national budget, were nonetheless considered included in the national budget to the extent that the projected and executed expenditures from this fund were the subject of a presentation attached to the finance laws and budget review laws for the other special accounts held in the Treasury.

60. Executions from ERs were not subjected to any accounting treatment during the study period but rather to a non-accounting compilation by two different departments of the MEF: the Directorate General of Cooperation (DGCOOP) and the Directorate of Project Evaluation and Investment Monitoring (DEPSI). The DGCOOP was officially the authorizing officer by delegation for these expenditures until March 2011, at which point it was replaced in this function by the Directorate General of the Treasury and Public Accounting (DGTCP, MEF), even if a significant portion of disbursements remained beyond its control as a result of some projects and donors not following national procedures.[15] For its part, the DEPSI records expenditures for projects included in the Public Investment Program (PIP) based on questionnaires sent to the various project and program coordinating units. Although it is also likely to contain errors, the DEPSI database is considered more complete and was used here to estimate the expenditures executed from ERs by the various ministries concerned. Note that the DEPSI figures for 2011 should be considered provisional because as of October 31, 2012, the date of publication of this report, not all projects had sent in their data. However, the data still to reach the DEPSI is not likely to fundamentally change the order of magnitude of the figures presented here.

61. This significant gap in the accounting for executions of external funding should be adjusted when the Integrated External Financing System (IEFS) goes into operation, which will allow for an accounting treatment of executions from ERs, just as the CES does for IRs (see Box 6).

2.1.1. Projected and Executed Budgets of the MAH, MRA, and MEDD

62. **If we exclude a 2006 peak, the total projected budget of the MAH underwent a**

[14]From 2004 to 2006, the MAH received CFAF 9.2 billion from the Special Fund for Economic and Social Growth and Poverty Reduction, and the MRA received CFAF 2.7 billion (see detailed data in Annex 2).

[15]The DGCOOP estimates that the share of ERs included under Heading V (investments) of the finance law that were paid out directly by the DPs to projects and programs without going through it was around 11% in 2007, 23% in 2008, and 30% in 2009 (with the proportion not estimated for other years). Source: Reports on implementation of external funding annexed to the budget execution reports in the draft budget review laws for the years 2004 to 2010, which can be consulted on the DGB's website: www.dgb.bf.org

moderate increase from CFAF 96 billion in 2004 to CFAF 119 billion in 2010 (or a 24% increase over the period), and then increased sharply from 2011 on (+ 20% in 2011 over 2010 and + 21% in 2012 over 2011), to reach CFAF 173 billion in 2012 (Figure 1). The 2006 peak is associated with an allocation of CFAF 21 billion to bring drinking water to Ziga.[16] The executed budget increased by 61% in current terms and by 33% in real terms from 2004 (CFAF 61 billion) to 2011 (CFAF 98 billion, or CFAF 81 billion in constant terms from a 2004 base).

Figure 1: MAH, evolution of the projected and executed budget in current and real terms (2004 base), 2004–2012, CFAF billions



Sources: CES (DGB) for projections and executions from IRs; DGTCP for projections and executions under the Special Fund for Economic and Social Growth and Poverty Reduction (2004–2006); DEPSI for executions from ERs (projected figures for 2011); http://data.worldbank.org/ for the growth rate of the GDP deflator used in calculating real budgets; see detailed data in Annex 2.

63. **The dependence of the MAH total projected budget on external financing declined steadily over the period, dropping from 81% in 2004 to 56% in 2012 (Figure 2), with an average of 71% over the period. However, it has always been much higher than that of the MRA (48% on average, 33% in 2012), the MEDD (45% on average, 33% in 2012), or the national budget (30% on average, 26% in 2012, Figure 1).**[17] We also see a sharp rise in the IRs allocated to the MAH starting in 2010 (+ 43% in 2010 over the previous year, + 29% in 2011, and + 44% in 2012, in nominal terms).[18] It should be noted that in 2011, the increase in IRs was responsible for 49% of the increase in the MAH's total projected budget, reaching 77% in 2012. In particular, the IRs allocated to the MAH's investment budget rose by a factor of 6.5 over the study period, going from below CFAF 10 billion in 2004 (or 11% of total allocations categorized as investments) to over CFAF 64 billion in 2012 (or 40% of total allocations categorized as investments).

[16]CFAF 7 billion from the European Union (EU) and 1CFAF 4 billion from IDA funds.

[17]National and sectoral budget supports were booked as IRs. Only project loans and grants were booked as ERs. National and sectoral budget supports received by Burkina Faso rose by CFAF 101 billion in 2005 to CFAF 190 billion in 2010. Source: 2005-2010 budget review law, available on the DGB's website: www.dgb.bf.org

[18]This increase in IRs made available to the sector should be seen in terms of the end of the EU's rural development projects and its reorientation toward budget support, booked as IRs.

Figure 2: Share of IRs and ERs in total projected MAH budgets (all allocations), 2004–2012, CFAF billions, %



Source: CES (DGB); see detailed data in Annex 2

64. **Throughout the study period, the MAH was among the best-financed ministries (Figure 3). Like the recent increase in the IRs allocated to it, this shows the priority assigned by the government to rural development.** In 2012 in particular, the MAH had the biggest projected budget (Figure 4), ahead of the Ministry of Infrastructures and Improved Access (MID), the Ministry of National Education and Literacy (MENA, formerly the Ministry of Basic Education and Literacy – MEBA), and the Ministry of Health (MS). The MAH is also the second-largest recipient of ERs (27%), behind the MID (Figure 5) and the third-largest recipient of IRs (8%) behind the MENA and the MS (Figure 6), with these last two ministries being greater users of IRs because of the staffing levels in their budgets.

Figure 3: Evolution of the total projected budget (including all allocations) of the five largest sections of the national budget, 2004–2012, CFAF billions



Source: Finance laws (DGB)

Figure 4: Projected budget of the main ministries, 2012, CFAF billions



NB: Heading II: personnel; Heading III: operations; Heading IV: current transfers; Heading V: investments

Source: 2012 finance law, available on the DGB's website: www.dgb.bf.org

Figure 5: Share of the various ministries in the allocation of total ERs, 2012 projected budget, %



Source: 2012 finance law, available on the DGB's website: www.dgb.bf.org

Figure 6: Share of the various ministries in the allocation of total IRs, 2012 projected budget, %



Source: 2012 finance law, available on the DGB's website: www.dgb.bf.org

65. **Over the study period, 35% of the total executed budgets of the MAH (all headings combined) were funded by the government, with the remaining 65% being funded by a very large number of DPs, of which only the IDA's contribution exceeded 10% (Figure 7).** Although many projects and programs receive co-funding from multiple DPs, this situation has resulted—and continues to result—in a large number of projects in the agricultural sector (around 100 in 2012), especially as the government's own investments are also organized into projects while some DP funded projects are either included in the budget of other ministries (see Section 2.1.2) or are off the national budget (see Section 2.2), and hence in either case are not taken into account in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Sources of funding for all executed budgets of the MAH (all headings combined), 2004-2011, CFAF billions, %



Sources: CID (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

66. **At less than one-tenth the size of the MAH's budget, the MRA's projected budget was relatively steady at around CFAF 8 billion from 2004 to 2008, if we exclude a peak of CFAF 15 billion in 2007, then steady at CFAF 10–11 billion from 2009 to 2011, finally increasing sharply to over CFAF 16 billion in 2012 (Figure 8).** However, there was less consistency in the evolution of the projected and the executed budgets than was the case for the MAH, revealing great variability in execution rates within the MRA. Overall, executions remained around CFAF 5–6 billion, bottoming out at slightly over CFAF 4 billion in 2007 (whereas the projected budget hit a peak), with two peaks of almost CFAF 9 billion in 2009 and CFAF 8 billion in 2011 and increasing by 48% in current and 22% in real terms from 2004 (CFAF 5.4 billion) to 2011 (CFAF 8.0 billion, or CFAF 6.6 billion in constant terms on a 2004 base).

Figure 8: Evolution of the projected and executed MRA budgets in current and real terms (2004 base), 2004–2012, CFAF billions



Sources: CES (DGB) for projections and executions from IRs; DGTCP for projections and executions from the Special Fund for Economic and Social Growth and Poverty Reduction (2004–2006); DEPSI for executions from ERs (projected figures for 2011); http://data.worldbank.org/ for the growth rate of the GDP deflator used in calculating the real budgets; see detailed data in Annex 2.

67. **The variability in the MRA budget was attributable to the high variability in the ERs made available to it, even though these resources always accounted for a lower percentage of its budget than in the MAH's case (Figures 9 and 14).** In particular, the sharp rise (+ 58% in nominal terms) in the MRA's total projected budget in 2012 was due exclusively to the growth in internal funding made available as IRs to the ministry, which had been relatively steady at around CFAF 5 billion from 2004 to 2011 and more than doubled in 2012, reaching CFAF 11 billion and leading to a marked dominance of IRs in the MRA's projected budget (56% of investment allocations and 67% of the total budget).

Figure 9: Share of IRs and ERs in total projected MRA budgets (all headings combined), 2004–2012, CFAF billions, %



Source: CES (DGB); see detailed data in Annex 2

68. **Over the study period, the total executed budgets of the MRA (all headings included) were 61% funded by the government, 25% by the AfDB, 8% by the IDB, and the rest by a small number of other donors (Figure 10).**

Figure 10: Sources of funding for all executed budgets of the MRA (all headings combined), 2004–2011, CFAF billions, %



Sources: CES (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

69. Though only **slightly more modest than the MRA's, the total projected budget of the MEDD underwent ups and downs, mainly because of the great variability in the ERs to which it has access.** It went from a low of CFAF 6 to 7 billion in 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2010, to peaks of CFAF 9–10 billion in 2005, 2007, and 2008. Since 2011, the MEDD's total projected budget has once again been increasing (CFAF 9 billion in 2012). However, this upward trend is less marked than for the other two ministries. Executions show less variability, growing from around CFAF 4.5 billion in 2004 to almost CFAF 7 billion in 2008, then declining steadily to just over CFAF 5 billion in 2010 and rising to CFAF 6 billion in 2011. Executions thus increased 33% in current terms, though only 9% in real terms, from 2004 (CFAF 4.5 billion) to 2011 (CFAF 6.0 billion, or CFAF 4.9 billion in constant terms on a 2004 base).

Figure 11: MEDD, evolution of the projected and executed budget in current and real

terms (2004 base), 2004–2012, CFAF billions



Sources: CES (DGB) for projections and executions from IRs; DEPSI for executions from ERs (projected figures for 2011); http://data.worldbank.org/ for the growth rate of the GDP deflator used in calculating the real budgets; see detailed data in Annex 2.

70. **As with the MAH and the MRA, the recent rise in the MEDD's total projected budget is largely due to the increase in IRs made available to it.** These allocations, which had been relatively stable between CFAF 4 and 5 billion between 2004 and 2011, increased by 35% in 2012, surpassing CFAF 6 billion. In 2012, IRs represented 33% of all investment allocations and 67% of the MEDD's total projected budget.

Figure 12: Share of IRs and ERs in total projected MEDD budgets (all headings combined), 2004–2012, CFAF billions, %



Source: CES (DGB); see detailed data in Annex 2

71. **Over the study period, the MRA's total executed budgets (all headings combined) were 65% financed by the government, 11% by AfDB, 8% by the GEF, 8% by Luxembourg, and the rest by a fairly large number of other donors (Figure 13).**

Figure 13: Sources of funding for all executed budgets of the MEDD (all headings combined), 2004–2011, CFAF billions, %



Sources: CES (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

Figure 14: Share of IRs in total projected budgets (all allocations combined) of the MAH, MRA, MEDD, and the government, 2004–2012, %



Note: The IRs in the overall national budget include general and sectoral budget supports, booked as IRs for that financial year.

Source: CES (DGB); see detailed data in Annex 2

71. **For the 2004–2012 period, only the MRA's budget increased by a greater amount than the overall national budget. Consequently, the share of the three ministries in charge of rural development in the government's projected budget declined (Figure 15).** From 2004 to 2012, the government's overall projected budget underwent a 92% increase in current terms, going from CFAF 730 billion to CFAF 1,400 billion (see Annex 2), whereas during the same period, the MAH's projected budget increased by 80%, from CFAF 96 billion to CFAF 173 billion, the MRA's by 106% from CFAF 8 billion to just over CFAF 16 billion, and the MEDD's by 52% from CFAF 6 billion to just over CFAF 9 billion. The share of the initial allocations to the three ministries in charge of rural development in the national budget declined slightly, going from 15% in 2004 to 14% in 2012, though it rose again after bottoming out at less than 12% in 2010 as a result of the significant increase recorded recently in the three ministries' budgets. By contrast, the share of executions by the three ministries in the overall government executions dropped sharply, by 11.5% in 2004 to just over 8% in 2011, indicating a worsening of execution rates for the three ministries relative to the government's overall execution rate.

Figure 15: Share of the projected and executed budgets of the MAH, MRA, and MEDD in the government's general projected and executed budgets, 2004–2012, %



Sources: CES (DGB) for projections and executions from IRs; DEPSI and DGCOOP for executions from ERs (provisional figures or 2011); see detailed data in Annex 2.

2.1.2. Agricultural expenditures included in the national budget but off-budget for the MAH, MRA, and MEDD

72. **Some agricultural development efforts were conducted by ministries other than the MAH, MRA, and MEDD during the study period:**

i. **The Ministry of the Economy and Development (MEDEV),** which in 2007 was merged with the Ministry of Finance and Budget to form the current MEF, had seven local development (PDL) or similar projects,[19] which were closed out in 2006 and 2009. Although these projects mainly funded rural infrastructures, the share of support for farming population was estimated at 43% of total expenditures. Until 2007, the MEDEV also implemented the Municipality-Based Poverty Reduction Project (PRPC), which was funded by the African Development Bank (AfDB) with a national counterpart. It is estimated that 50% of the PRPC's expenditures supported initiatives in the agricultural sector. The MEDEV also implemented the Rural Micro-Enterprise Support Project (PAMER), which was funded by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and closed out in 2008. It is estimated that 65% of its beneficiaries were small business owners engaged in trading and processing agricultural products. Finally, the MEDEV began implementation, which was then pursued by the MEF until today, of the National Multifunctional Platform Program for the Fight Against Poverty (PNPTF/LCP), which was funded by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Shell Corporation, the city of Århus (Denmark), and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, with national counterpart funds. Here too, 50% of all expenditures were booked as benefiting programs aiming to develop farm production;

ii. **The MEF** continued the projects initiated by the MEDEV that were still active when it was established in 2007, namely ADELE, PAMER, and PNPTF/LCP. Since 2007, it has also been responsible for the micro-finance component of the Burkina Faso

[19]The Eastern Burkina Local Development Support Project (ADELE), funded by Switzerland, whose third phase ended in 2009; the Komandjari PDL and the Natural Resource Management Program (PGRN) in Séno-Yagha, funded by DANIDA and closed out in 2006; the Zoudwéogo, Sanguié-Boulkiemdé, Sanmatenga, and Oudalan PDL, financed by the Netherlands with a national counterpart in 2006.

Agricultural Support Program (PADAB II) funded by DANIDA, followed in 2010 by the Strategic National Micro-Finance Action Plan (PASNMF), funded by DANIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the UNDP, with national counterpart funds. A total of 70% of the expenditures in the micro-finance component of PADAB II and PASNMF were booked as benefiting the agricultural sector. The MEF also guides the formulation of the National and Regional Schemes for Territory Planning (SNAT and SRAT). However, even though this program has an impact on the agricultural sector, it was not taken into account in this review;

iii. **The Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (MRSI), formerly the Ministry of Secondary and Tertiary Education and Scientific Research (MESSRS)**, is home to the National Center for Scientific and Technical Research (CNRST), which oversees the national agricultural research institutions (INERA and IRSAT), which until 2004 received support from the National Program for Agricultural Services Development (PNDSA) funded by the World Bank, with national counterpart funds. Moreover, the permanent staff of both institutes is on the CNRST payroll, which directly meets this commitment from operating funds and occasionally contributes investments (see Box 5);

iv. Starting in 2007, **the Ministry of Youth, Professional Training, and Employment (MJFPE)** set up an Employment Promotion Support Fund (FAPE) and a Youth Initiative Support Fund (FAIJ) funded solely from IRs. It is estimated that at least 70% of the funding is used to finance new farms and in particular to support the nascent operations of young farmers and herdsmen;

v. **The Ministry of Industry, Trade, and Crafts (MICA), formerly the Ministry of Trade, Enterprise Promotion, and Crafts (MCPEA),** is home to the Permanent Secretariat for Monitoring the Deregulated Cotton Industry and carries out a limited number of actions funded exclusively from IRs with a view to promoting the development of agricultural sub-sectors (organizing regional fairs, fruit and vegetable stands, support for the Bobo-Dioulasso meat packing plant, etc.);

vi. **The Ministry for the Promotion of Women (MPF)** implemented a shea project funded by Taiwan with national counterpart funds, which closed out in 2008;

vii. **Until 2007, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD)** implemented the Séno-Yagha Local Investment Fund, with an estimated 70% of all expenditures benefiting the agricultural sector, and in 2009, a market construction program;

viii. **The MID** occasionally becomes involved in the construction of agricultural dams;

ix. Since 2009 **the Prime Minister's Office** has been home to a major program funded by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) with national counterpart funds, working in the sectors of basic education, road infrastructures, and agriculture. The share of agriculture in its total expenditures was estimated at 16%.

73. **Furthermore, a large number of IR financings in favor of the agricultural sector are booked each year as inter-ministerial expenditures (Section 99) under the finance law.**[20] Some of these expenditures are explicitly described in the projected budget. This is

[20]Each year, Section 99 represents a major part of the national budget: 20% in 2004, 18% in 2005, 16% in 2006,

particularly the case with the grants and subsidies made to the cotton companies to be passed on to producers in the form of input subsidies, allocations for dam repairs, a program aiming to develop dairy units implemented from 2008 to 2010, and equity interests taken in a number of agro-industrial enterprises. Others are decided upon during the year and funded from budget lines not made explicit in the initial budget. This is the case with the national counterpart funds for projects begun during the year and certain measures taken during the year or in emergencies. These expenditures, including those not explicitly indicated in the initial budget, were identified and taken into account in this review.

74. **Finally, since 2010, transfers have been made to the local communities to enable them to carry out the missions that were turned over to them as part of the decentralization process (Section 98 of the national budget).** The resources transferred for water and sanitation (DWSS) were taken into account since this sector falls within the authority of the MAH.

75. **Public expenditures in agriculture included in the national budget but off the MAH, MRA, and MEDD budgets represented CFAF 154.6 billion for the 2004–2011 period (Table 3).[21] Over the 2004–2011 period, these expenditures represented 21% of all expenditures executed by the three ministries in charge of rural development. Two-thirds of these expenditures (or CFAF 103.7 billion) were executed from funds booked under the Inter-ministerial expenditures section of the national budget.**

76. **The government is therefore the leading source of funding for these expenditures (79%), followed by the DPs, which fund projects with an agricultural component but placed under the aegis of ministries other than the MAH, MRA, and MEDD (Figure 16).** The main DP concerned is the MCA.

16% in 2007, 18% in 2008, 19% in 2009, 21% in 2010, and 18% in 2011. Source: Finance laws 2004-2011, DGB.

[21] Total expenditures for projects included in the budget of other ministries or under inter-ministerial expenditures and having an agricultural component rose to CFAF 270.1 billion from 2004 to 2011, compared to CFAF 165.2 billion for the other ministries, including MESSRS/MRSI's contribution of CFAF 10.5 billion to the staffing and operating costs of INERA and IRSAT, and CFAF 104.9 billion for inter-ministerial expenditures. However, the projects of the other ministries also included major non-agricultural components that were deducted (CFAF 33.5 billion for rural feeder roads and CFAF 82.0 billion for other non-agricultural works). See detailed data in Annex 2.

Table 3: Public expenditures executed in agriculture included in the national budget but off the MAH, MRA and MEDD budgets, 2004–2011, billion CFAF

	MEDEV/ MEF	MESSRS/ MRSI	MJFPE	MCPEA/ MICA	MPF	MATD	MID	Prime Minister's Office	Transfers to local communities	Inter-ministerial expenditures	Total	% Executed expenditures MAH+MRA+MEDD
2004	5.2	4.5	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.5	14.5	20%
2005	5.6	1.2	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	1.0	0.0	0.0	4.4	12.5	16%
2006	5.5	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.9	0.0	0.0	4.9	12.6	12%
2007	2.4	1.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	29.4	33.5	36%
2008	0.5	1.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.0	10.9	13.1	16%
2009	0.9	1.1	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	36.6	39.7	54%
2010	0.5	1.3	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.2	0.8	4.6	10.7	11%
2011	0.3	1.7	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.1	1.2	8.4	18.0	16%
Total	**21.0**	**13.0**	**0.7**	**1.4**	**0.4**	**0.2**	**2.7**	**9.5**	**2.0**	**103.7**	**154.6**	**21%**

Sources: DGB, DEPSI, INERA, IRSAT

Figure 16: Sources of funding for public expenditures executed in agriculture included in the national budget but off the MAH, MRA, and MEDD budgets, 2004–2011, CFAF billion, %



Sources: CES (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

2.2. Expenditures Not Included in the National Budget

77. **A comparison of the databases of DGCOOP, which is responsible for following up on agreements signed with the DPs, DEPSI, which is itself responsible for monitoring investments included in the PIP, and of the initial and corrective finance laws reveals that for the 2004–2011 period, a large number of projects in the area of rural development were not included in the national budget**. These projects represented CFAF 229 billion in implementations (Table 4), an amount equivalent to 32% of project implementations included in the budget of the three rural development ministries and 26% of the implementations of all agricultural projects included in the finance law for the same period, with all ministries combined. However, an analysis of the sectors covered by projects not included in the national budget reveals no clear trend in any of the sub-sectors concerned.

78. **Projects implemented off the national budget were funded by a broad spectrum of DPs (Figure 17).** While for some of these DPs, these represented a minor portion of their operations (DANIDA, AfDB, IDA, USAID/MCA, IDB, etc.), for others, they represented a substantial share (EU, France, Germany, Taiwan, etc.), or even all or almost all of their portfolio (Japan, India, UNDP, etc.).

Table 4: Investments in the agricultural sector included and not included in the national budget, 2004–2011, CFAF billions

	Implementations of investments included in the finance laws, MAH-MRA-MEDD (A)	Implementations of investments included in finance laws, all ministries combined (B)	Implementations of investments not included in the finance laws (C)	Investments included and not included, MAH-MRA-MEDD (C/A)	Investments included and not included, all ministries combined (C/B)
2004	73.7	88.3	19.4	26%	22%
2005	78.7	91.2	20.1	26%	22%
2006	108.1	120.6	16.2	15%	13%
2007	93.0	126.5	45.0	48%	36%
2008	82.6	95.8	35.5	43%	37%
2009	73.6	113.3	39.0	53%	34%
2010	98.0	108.6	24.4	25%	22%
2011	111.6	129.6	29.2	26%	23%
Total	**719.3**	**874.0**	**228.8**	**32%**	**26%**

Sources: CES (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

Figure 17: Sources of funding for agricultural projects implemented off the national budget, 2004–2011, CFAF billions, %



Sources: CES (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

79. **To these off-budget expenditures we also need to add the expenditures made by certain government agencies from revenues not included in the national budget, which concern mainly agricultural research institutions and to a lesser extent the National Livestock Fund (FODEL).** For their part, the research institutes (INERA, IRSAT, and the National Tree Seed Center – CNSF) manage their own resources as well as the proceeds from the research agreements they sign with third parties (Box 5). These revenues are not included in national revenues. Such additional public revenues not included in the national budget

declined until 2008 and then increased, and were estimated at CFAF 3.9 billion in 2004, CFAF 2.2 billion in 2005, CFAF 2.1 billion in 2006, CFAF 1.5 billion in 2007, CFAF 1.4 billion in 2008, CFAF 2.3 billion in 2009, CFAF 2.8 billion in 2010, and CFAF 3.7 billion in 2011.[22]

80. The FODEL (see Box 1) is funded in part by a portion (40%) of the Contribution to the Livestock Sector (CSE), which is not included in the government's revenues. The amounts received by the FODEL and the CSE remain modest, at CFAF 100 to 200 million per year.

2.3. Analysis of the Level of Support for the Agricultural Sector Using the COFOG Methodology

81. Under the Maputo Declaration of 2003, African governments committed to increasing the share of their national budgets devoted to agriculture, with a target of at least 10% so as to achieve agricultural growth of at least 6% per year. To monitor progress on the implementation of this commitment, NEPAD spelled out how to calculate the share of agricultural expenditures in national budgets (AU/NEPAD 2005) as executed public expenditures, not allocated budgets, as defined by the United Nations Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) in the expanded agricultural sector, including the areas of plant and animal production, and forestry, hunting (including forestry products other than wood) and fishing. Expenditures on applied research in each of these sectors are also to be taken into account. However, expenditures on rural feeder roads and social infrastructures are not part of the expenditures covered by NEPAD/COFOG.

82. In keeping with NEPAD's directives, all DWSS investments, representing 26% of the budgets in question (see Table 8 and Section 3.2), rural feeder roads (1%), and other "non-productive" infrastructures (schools, health centers, etc.), implemented as part of the PDRIs (or 3%) were excluded from the budgets of the MAH, the MRA, and the MEDD as well as projects funded by other ministries involved in rural development and projects implemented off budget. Also excluded were expenditures for managing non-agricultural water and the environment not directly related to agricultural activity. [23]

[22]Revenues from agreements signed with governments or projects whose financing already appears in the national budget were deducted, with only additional public revenues taken into account in order to avoid accounting duplications.

[23]Expenditures on the management of non-agricultural water and the environment not directly associated with agriculture (biodiversity, national parks, etc.) were estimated at a flat 20% of expenditures executed as part of SPs 3.1, 3.2, and 3.4 of the PNSR (see Section 3.2).

Box 1: FODEL: An Interesting Experiment in Self-Financing by a Sector

The National Livestock Fund (FODEL) grants loans to herdsmen and has been funded since 1996 by a tax known as the Livestock Sector Contribution (CSE), which is levied by the Customs Services on livestock exports. The CSE is then paid to the Treasury up to the amount of 60%, with the remaining 40% going directly into the Fund and not being included in the government's revenues, unlike the portion paid to the Treasury. In some years, the FODEL also receives a government subsidy amounting to CFAF 150 million in 2010 and CFAF 300 million in 2012.

Based on the health certificates it issues for livestock exports, the MRA estimates that the CSE should generate more resources for the FODEL (Table 5). The FODEL apparently received only 16% of the theoretical share of the CSE it was entitled to in 2009 and 2010, and 33% in 2011. Collection of the CSE by the Customs Services seems therefore to be subject to omissions and irregularities.

Table 5: Theoretical and real contribution of the CSE to FODEL, CFAF billions

	Cattle exports (head)	Collection rate, CFAF /head	Theoretical CSE, cattle	Exports of small ruminant (head)	Collection rate, CFAF /head	Theoretical CSE, small ruminants	Exports of poultry (head)	Collection rate, CFAF /head	Theoretical CSE, poultry	Total theoretical CSE	Theoretical FODEL share	FODEL amount received	Amount received/theoretical share	
2008	652,043	3,000	2.0	990,958	250	0.2		50	0.0	2.2	0.9	-	-	-
2009	509,717	3,000	1.5	982,238	250	0.2	520,859	50	0.0	1.8	0.7	0.1	0.1	16.1%
2010	488,200	3,000	1.5	1,466,700	250	0.4	519,500	50	0.0	1.9	0.7	0.1	0.1	15.6%
2011	376,967	3,000	1.1	1,353,711	250	0.3	1,091,740	50	0.1	1.5	0.6	0.2	0.2	32.6%

Note: Although the CSE on exports of leather and hides (at CFAF 100/kg) should be included, these data are not available.

Source: MRA

Moreover, the MRA complains that the payment to FODEL of 40% of the CSE actually collected involves delays that are harmful to the Fund's successful operation.

It is unfortunate that such self-financing initiative by a sector that costs the government nothing and even earns it revenues is

not better handled. The MRA believes that the FODEL is potentially a powerful financing tool for the sector, especially in favor of women, when there is a shortage of credit in rural areas. The process of collecting the CSE by the Customs Services should be reviewed and improved. Furthermore, given the importance of the livestock sub-sector to the rural economy, its potential in terms of economic development for the poor (see Box 4) is at the heart of the SCADD targets. Moreover, as this sub-sector has been relatively neglected up to now (see Section 3.2), it would be legitimate to consider increasing the share paid into the FODEL (for example, by doubling it to 80%). This experiment could also be usefully extended to other exporting sectors.

83. **Calculations show that for the 2004–2011 period, expenditures in the agricultural sector as defined by NEPAD accounted for 10.2% of the executed national budget, or slightly over the target set by the Maputo Declaration (Table 6 and Figure 18). In fact,** the target was exceed by an especially wide margin from 2007 to 2009. In contrast, we note a decline to 8.7% in 2010 followed by a rise to 9.5% in 2011. In reality these figures almost certainly suffer from an underestimation of the execution of expenditures from external funding, as noted above. Clearly, Burkina Faso can be said to have met its Maputo commitment for the entire period under study.

Table 6: Executed expenditures in agriculture according to the NEPAD/COFOG methodology, 2004–2011, CFAF billions

	MAH - MRA - MEDD	Other ministries and inter-ministerial expenditures	Project off national budget	Other[1]	COFOG total expenditures	National budget executions[2]	% Maputo
2004	40.2	12.2	8.8	4.0	65.3	640.3	10.2%
2005	42.7	11.1	9.8	2.3	66.0	716.7	9.2%
2006	56.2	11.3	11.8	2.2	81.5	835.1	9.8%
2007	53.5	32.3	34.7	1.6	122.0	944.2	12.9%
2008	59.2	11.1	25.7	1.5	97.6	886.1	11.0%
2009	56.5	38.3	21.0	2.3	118.0	1083.1	10.9%
2010	71.2	8.0	15.1	2.9	97.2	1,121.1	8.7%
2011	89.1	14.2	22.1	3.8	129.2	1,357.1	9.5%
Total	**468.7**	**138.5**	**148.9**	**20.8**	**776.9**	**7,583.7**	**10.2%**

[1] Share of FODEL funded by the CSE and revenues of the research institutes not included in the national budget.
[2] Executions on special Treasury accounts included.
Source: Authors' calculation based on data provided by DGB, DEPSI, DGCOOP, MRA, INERA, IRSAT, etc.

84. Agricultural expenditures estimated according to the NEPAD/COFOG methodology practically doubled during the period, going from CFAF 65 billion in 2004 to CFAF 129 billion in 2011. Over the period, 60% of public expenditures implemented in agriculture were part of the budgets of the three ministries in charge of rural development, 18% were under the aegis of other ministries, and 22% were implemented off the national budget.

Figure 18: Evolution of agricultural expenditures estimated according to the NEPAD/COFOG methodology, 2004–2011, CFAF billions, % of the executed national budget



Source: Table 6.

85. **Expenditures executed in the agricultural sector and estimated according to the NEPAD/COFOG methodology accounted for 8.2% of agricultural GDP on average for the 2004–2011 period, which puts Burkina Faso among the Sub-Saharan countries that best support their agriculture (Table 7).**

Table 7: International comparison of budget transfers to agriculture, 2002–2011

Country/Region	Share of agriculture in GDP	Share of agricultural budget expenditures in national GDP	Share of agricultural budget expenditures in agricultural GDP
High-income			
Australia	3.0%	0.3%	10%
Canada	2.3%	0.5%	22%
EU	2.3%	0.7%	28%
USA	1.6%	0.7%	46%
Middle-income			
Turkey	13.0%	2.0%	15%
Mexico	4.0%	0.7%	18%
Venezuela	5.0%	0.5%	12%
China	15.0%	1.2%	8%
Brazil	9.3%	0.7%	8%
Russia	6.0%	1.0%	16%
Ukraine	11.6%	1.3%	11%
Low-income			
Burkina Faso	33%	2.7%	8.2%
Uganda	32%	1.5%	5%
Tanzania	45%	1.2%	3%
Ethiopia	44%	2.7%	6%
Kenya	29%	1.3%	4%
Togo	41%	1.9%	3.9%

Note: The data presented here concern different years from country to country, all between 2002 and 2011 and 2004–2011 for Burkina Faso.

Sources: World Bank 2010, 2012; authors' calculation for Burkina Faso; DGEP/MEF for GDP and agricultural GDP for Burkina Faso (see detailed data in Annex 2).

2.4. Evaluation of Agricultural Expenditure by NGOs and as Part of Decentralized Development Aid

86. A significant number of local and international NGOs are working in rural areas of

Burkina Faso.[24] Furthermore, many twin-city programs link local Burkina communities and European communities, whose development efforts mainly concern the areas of education, health, and DWSS and to a lesser extent agriculture and natural resource management. However, the actions carried out by the NGOs as part of decentralized development aid remain poorly documented and their financial scale is not known precisely.

87. Expenditures in support of agricultural development by NGOs acting as implementing agencies for projects included in the national budget or that are the subject of an agreement with Burkina Faso recorded by the DGCOOP were taken into account in public agricultural expenditures presented in the previous sections. NGOs' contributions outside of these projects were evaluated based on a survey of 34 NGOs involved in agricultural development, including 90% of the most important NGOs.

88. **Based on this survey, it is estimated that agricultural expenditures implemented by the NGOs and not taken into account in the preceding sections represented around CFAF 100 billion over the 2004–2011 period, or around 13% of public agricultural expenditures estimated according to NEPAD/COFOG.**

2.5 Expenditures on Rural Feeder Roads

89. **Studies[25] show the importance of investing in public assets such as rural infrastructures, agricultural research, and basic education as a key driver of rural development.** In particular, and although this area is not part of the terms of reference of this review, it would be worthwhile to briefly compare the budgets Burkina Faso devotes to improving access to rural areas with the budgets allocated to agricultural development.

90. **Achievements in the area of restoring feeder roads appear relatively weak by comparison with expenditures on agricultural development.** On average for the 2004–2011 period, the MID spent CFAF 6.8 billion per year on improving feeder roads, with less than 10% of the feeder road network restored during the period (or 4,500 km out of 46,000 km inventoried in 1999). To this total should be added roads completed as part of rural development projects, with expenditures estimated at CFAF 5.6 billion annually on average over the period (see Annex 2), about which we have little information.

91. **Furthermore, the funds intended for the periodic maintenance of feeder roads remain far from adequate:** The Road Maintenance Fund (FER) has an annual budget of CFAF 1 billion, enough to maintain around 2,000 km, whereas a third of the entire network should be maintained each year. Nor are the mechanisms needed for a possible devolution to the local communities of regular manual maintenance work in place. Ultimately, the lack of regular maintenance leads to faster deterioration and to the need for restoration work by the government.

92. **By adding together the investments made by the MID, those made by projects, and the sums allocated for maintenance, we reach an executed feeder road budget of the order of CFAF 13 billion per year for the period 2004–2011, whereas over the same period, average expenditures executed in support of agriculture approaches CFAF 100 billion per year (Table 6). Although this would need to be confirmed by a more detailed study of the subject, the issue of poor rural access does not currently appear to be receiving adequate attention or funding consistent with the amounts invested in support**

[24] According to the NGO Monitoring Office (DSONG, MEF/DGCOOP), 754 NGOs were operating in Burkina Faso in 2012, with 62 of these active primarily in the agricultural sector.
[25] Particularly Fan and Saurkar (2006) and Fan and Brzeska (2007).

of agricultural development and with the importance of road infrastructures in developing these investments, especially with regard to access to inputs and markets.

3. REGIONAL COMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN AGRICULTURE (ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY)

Box 2: Allocative and Technical Efficiency: Definitions

- ✓ Evaluating the **allocative efficiency** of public expenditure in agriculture consists of answering the following question:

  Are the expenditures being made in agriculture best able to meet the objectives set out by the country's agricultural policies? That is, are these the *right* expenditures?

Allocative efficiency will therefore be shaped above all by sustained effort during the budget drafting process to bring the budget in line with agricultural objectives. Evaluating allocative efficiency requires, in particular, the following analyses:

- ✓ Economic composition of expenditures: Operational expenditures salary and non-salary), and investment expenditures (capital and current expenditure);
- ✓ Functional composition of expenditures: Distribution among various sub-sectors (agriculture, livestock, research, etc.);
- ✓ Regional distribution of expenditures.

- ✓ In contrast, evaluating the **technical efficiency** of public expenditures consists of trying to answer the following question:

  Are available resources being employed effectively so as to maximize production? In other words: Are expenditures well executed?

Technical efficiency is therefore shaped above all by the effectiveness of the process of preparing and executing the budget. Methods for evaluating technical efficiency include measuring consistency between allocated funds and their actual use, the budget execution rate, and the cost-effectiveness of programs implemented.

Source: World Bank 2011

3.1. Economic Composition of the MAH, MRA, and MEDD Budgets

93. **The official economic composition of the three rural development ministries' overall budget as set forth in budget laws (Figure 19) provides a misleading picture of reality since Heading V (investments) contains the total annual amounts for projects and programs, including personnel costs and operating expenditures, a practice commonly found in many Sub-Saharan African countries.** In these countries, the investments and development expenditures budget headings include projects financed by the DPs with or without national counterparts, whereas in Burkina Faso, budget Heading V contains even those actions financed entirely from internal resources, even though these are budgeted as projects.

94. **The personnel costs and operating expenditures paid for by project funds therefore supplement ministries' official resources listed under Headings II and III.** Incidentally,

for the three ministries, funds allocated to operations listed under budget Heading III decreased over the period (from CFAF 2.6 billion in 2004 to CFAF 1.8 billion in 2012), whereas investments listed under Heading V (internal and external resources) increased by 86% from CFAF 95.8 billion in 2004 to CFAF 178.4 billion in 2012.

Figure 19: Official composition of projected overall budgets of MAH, MRA, and MEDD, 2004–2012



Sources: Budget laws (General Directorate of the Budget, DGB).

95. **The actual share of current expenditures (personnel and operations) in the total budget for the three ministries was estimated at between 20% and 25%.** The improper use in the past of non-detailed budget headings (especially Article 62: Purchase of goods and services and Heading 97: Project expenditures) in listing projects expenditures under Heading V made it difficult to quantify the actual share of personnel costs and operating expenses in the three ministries' budgets. An in-depth analysis was conducted on a representative sample of projects, representing 24% of Heading V executions over the period in question, for which the economic distribution of expenditures was obtained from the relevant management units. Based on this sample, it was estimated that current expenditures represented 16% of total expenses executed, for which personnel costs and other operating expenditures could not be distinguished. This figure was consistent with MAH estimates, which, based on a similar review of project budgets, resulted in the following percentages, which were then used for costing the National Rural Sector Program and the 2012–2014 program budget: personnel: 5%, operations: 7%, and investments and transfers: 88%.[26] The total share of recurrent costs in the budget of the rural development ministries was therefore estimated at 20–25%, of which 8–9% was listed under Headings II and III and the remainder covered by projects listed under Headings V.

96. **Although the share of recurrent costs seems reasonable, the fact that two-thirds of allocated costs are borne by projects and do not officially appear in the ministries' budgets poses two fundamental questions:**

i. **First, this situation prevents these ministries from effectively managing their recurrent costs** since they lack a clear picture of those costs and have only a few

[26]The initial results of a project review conducted in September 2012 by the MAH prior to drafting the 2013-2015 program budget yielded the following results: personnel: 4%; operations: 10%; investments and transfers: 86%.

levers for controlling them, which may allow them to take advantage of economies of scale. Truthful budgeting needs to be reestablished in order to lay a foundation for an effective and sustainable approach within the sector in collaboration with the DPs;

ii. **Second, this situation begs the question of the sustainability of actions**: What happens to the provisions needed to supervise and maintain the investments made once the project that supported them comes to an end? At present, this question does not appear to be addressed systematically.

97. **Overall, consideration of recurrent costs for maintaining investments is one of the weakest links in the budget planning of the rural development ministries.** No systematic mechanism currently exists for addressing this question, whether for equipment made available to government entities, public infrastructure built, or infrastructure transferred to beneficiaries. The long-term durability of irrigated perimeters is therefore threatened especially by the absence of clearly defined responsibilities for the government and users concerning maintenance. Even when responsibilities are defined, oversight of compliance with specifications by the parties involved is poor. A number of studies are being conducted by the DADI and MCA projects to provide perspectives and recommendations on current practices as well as possible solutions to this issue (see the working document on Hydro-Agricultural Developments – HAD). That said, the rural development ministries are not the only ones to neglect this essential dimension of public investment. As stated earlier, costly investments made in restoring feeder roads are not currently accompanied by any substantial strategy for maintenance, leading to rapid degradation of these roads following heavy tropical rainfall.

98. **Under the transition to program budgets, it would therefore be desirable to modify budgetary nomenclature** or at least change its current use in order to put in place a more precise analytical accounting of expenditure by economic category, namely personnel costs, operational expenses, and investment. It would also be useful to begin making a distinction between investments made on behalf of government entities (e.g., office building, vehicle purchases, computer equipment, provision of training, etc.), and investments made in the field (e.g., productive and social infrastructure, training and equipment of beneficiaries, etc.) in order to measure more precisely the impact and effectiveness of programs. A more precise accounting of capital formation at the different levels should also highlight the issue of recurring costs of operation and maintenance—which has been mostly neglected until now—for equipment made available to government entities, public infrastructure implemented, and infrastructure transferred to beneficiaries.

99. **Personnel costs directly linked to the three ministries (excluding project personnel) increased significantly over the period (Figure 20) in an effort to compensate for the dramatic decrease in personnel that occurred over the previous decade as a result of the structural adjustment program.** From 2004 to 2012, the personnel costs of the MEDD grew by a factor of 2.8, those of the MRA by 2.4, and those of the MAH by 80% at current values.

100. **However, the MAH's[27] human resources remain characterized by a relatively older workforce, concentration in Ouagadougou and regional capitals, and a shortage of**

[27]Due to a lack of time, it was not possible to collect equivalent indicators for the MRA and MEDD. However, available data show a pyramidal demographic structure for MEDD personnel that is more favorable overall (61% of personnel are below 40 years old) but worrisome at management level (levels A, P, and 1), where 71% of managers are over 46 years old (see forestry working document).

field agents (Box 3).

Figure 20: MAH, MRA and, MEDD personnel costs (Heading II), 2004–2011 executions and 2012 allocations, in CFAF billions



Source: CES and 2012 budget laws (DGB).

Box 3: MAH Human Resources: An Aging Workforce, Understaffed in the Field and Concentrated in Urban Centers

In 2011, the MAH's human resources (excluding projects) consisted of 3,048 persons, with a ratio of tenured to contract personnel of 61:39 and a ratio of men to women of 82:18.

Despite recent recruitment campaigns, the Ministry's workforce is aging, with more than 50% of personnel older than 46 years (Figure 21) and understaffed at levels C (tenured) and 3 (contract), corresponding to field agents) (Figure 22).

Figure 21: Distribution of MAH personnel by age group, 2011



Source: MAH 2011

Figure 22: Distribution of MAH personnel by category, 2011



Note: Categories A-B-C-D-E for tenured personnel, 1-2-3-4-5 for contract personnel
Source: MAH 2011

The predominant localization of MAH personnel in urban centers is linked to the age and category distribution. In 2011, 35% of personnel held posts in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso, 35% in other regional capitals, and only 30% in rural areas (Figure 23).

Box 3: MAH Human Resources: An Aging Workforce, Understaffed in the Field and Concentrated in Urban Centers

Figure 23: Distribution of MAH personnel by geographic zone, 2011



Note: Urban zones: Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso; Semi-urban zones: Koudougou, Banfora, Ouahigouya, Fada N'Gourma, Dori, Tenkodogo, Pô, Dédougou, Koupéla, Gaoua, Kaya.
Source: MAH 2011

In 2011, personnel based in rural zones numbered fewer than 1,000 even though decentralized entities include 45 provincial directorates, 353 technical facilitation zones, and 954 technical support units in addition to the 13 regional directorates. Based on 4.9 million agricultural producers (2010/2011 DGPER/DPSAA estimate), the agent-producer ratio was 1:5,000.

Source: MAH 2011

3.2. Functional Composition of Expenditures in Agriculture

101. **In order to set reference points for implementing the National Rural Sector Program, expenditures in agriculture over the 2004–2011 period were classified according to the 13 National Rural Sector Program sub-programs (Table 8). This** classification included expenditures executed by the MAH, MRA, and MEDD (i.e., personnel costs, operating expenditures, and current transfers and investments) as well as those executed by other ministries and non-budgeted expenses. It was possible to classify 96% of expenditures in this way.

102. **Around 26% of expenditures for rural development were related to water and sanitation (DWSS) sub-projects (SPs 4.1 and 4.2), 3% to social infrastructure (e.g., health centers, schools, etc.), and 1% to the development of feeder roads.** In all, 30% of expenditures did not relate to agricultural development activities in the traditional meaning of the term.

103. **DWSS expenditures represented the largest spending item (26%), followed by crops (17%) (SP 1.1), and HADs (17%) (SP 1.4), while the marketing and strengthening of various sectors accounted for 10% of expenditures (see SP 2.1).** However, it should be noted that the share of spending on DWSS fell during the period from 39% in 2004 to 15% in 2011, whereas spending on crops and on HADs increased from 13% in 2004 to 22% in 2011,

and from 13% to 29% in 2011, respectively).

104. **Beyond the fact that some actions accounted for as support for crops also benefit livestock (e.g., the construction of water detention structures for irrigation, increased availability of crop residue as a result of increased production, etc.) direct support to the livestock sub-sector remains low (4% of expenditures for the period), contrasting significantly with its importance in the Burkina Faso economy and to the resilience strategies of rural households (Box 4).** The three sub-programs related to the livestock sub-sector, namely the productivity of livestock production (SP 1.2), animal health and veterinary public health (SP 1.3), and the management of grazing resources (SP 3.3), including resources dedicated to livestock spent by the MAH,[28] received only 4%–8% of funding depending on the year, or an average of 4% for the period. If calculations exclude expenditures not traditionally included in agricultural development (e.g., DWSS, feeder roads, social infrastructure; Table 9) and taking into account the fact that crops are also beneficiaries of SP 1.4 (HAD) and SP 2.1 (development of marketing and sectors)[29], crops (food and cash crops) and livestock received 63% and 7%, respectively, of public agricultural funding for the period, whereas they contributed 55% and 35%, respectively, to the primary sector's share of GDP over the same period (Figure 24). Despite its importance, low funding levels for the livestock sub-sector are observed regularly in most Sub-Saharan African countries.

Figure 24: Comparing sub-sectors relative to their contribution to the primary sector's share of GDP and agricultural expenditures (excluding DWSS, feeder roads, and social infrastructure)



Sources: DGEP/MEF for contributions to GDP (see Annex 2) and Table 9 for the share of expenditure.

105. **Forestry development (SP 3.4, including hunting and fishing activities) received relatively stable support during the period, or around 3% of total expenditures and 4% of agricultural expenditures on average. These figures are also non-representative of the sector's weight in the rural economy since it contributes 10% to the primary sector's share of GDP for the 2004–2011 period.**

106. **Expenditures for the marketing and development of sectors (SP 2.1) experienced wide variation, influenced notably by actions in support of cotton production, especially**

[28]Over the 2004-2011 period, CFAF 10.7 billion in funding was spent by the MAH on livestock projects and programs, representing 34% of investment expenditures executed from the MRA's budget over the same period (CFAF 31.4 billion).

[29]The issues of the marketing and development of sectors in the livestock sub-sector are included in SP 1.2 and SP 1.3.

the implementation of price buffer funds in 2008, representing 10% of overall expenditures and 15% of purely agricultural expenditures for the period.

107. **Expenditure related to supporting the cotton sector, estimated at CFAF 88.2 billion from 2004 to 2011, or 8% of total expenditures and 11% of purely agricultural expenditures for the period, may be considered relatively consistent given the importance of this crop in Burkina Faso's rural economy (with cash crops representing 12% on average of agriculture's share of GDP from 2004 to 2011 and cotton representing 7%), especially since these expenditures consisted mainly of heavy one-time investments (i.e., recapitalization of SOFITEX, creation of a price buffer fund) during the 2007–2009 period (Figure 25).** These expenditures, which are included in SP 1.1 and SP 2.1 in Tables 8 and 9, break down as follows: SOFITEX recapitalization:[30] CFAF 38.9 billion (44%); fertilizer subsidies: CFAF 30.8 billion (35%); price buffer fund: CFAF 11.8 billion (13%); sectoral support projects:[31] CFAF 5.8 billion (7%); miscellaneous: CFAF 0.9 billion (1%).

Figure 25: Support for the cotton sector 2004–2011, in CFAF billions



Sources: CID (DGB), DEPSI, DGCOOP

108. **As regards crop fertilizer subsidies provided from the 2008/2009 crop year onward, their cost was relatively modest compared to the total amount of funding designated for agriculture each year.** The total cost of the operation was estimated at around CFAF 23 billion for the 2008–2011 period, or less than CFAF 6 billion on average per crop year (see Section 5.2). Taking into account the revenues generated from the sale of fertilizer, the net cost of the subsidy to the government was estimated at around CFAF 9 billion for the four crop years, or around CFAF 2.3 billion on average per crop year. This was equivalent to 2% of the funding designated for agriculture each year for the 2008–2011 period (or around CFAF 110 billion on average per year) and 4% of the funding designated for crop

[30] Capital injection only; short- and long-term loans from the government to SOFITEX were not taken into account.

[31] Support Project for the Professionalization of Cotton Producers' Organizations (PAPOPC); completed in 2006, Strengthening Project for the Cotton Sub-Sector in Burkina Faso (PRFCB), launched in 2007; Support Project for the Cotton Sub-Sector (PAFICOT), launched in 2010.

development (SP 1.1 and SP 1.4) for the same period.

109. **Finally, although this does not directly appear in Tables 8 and 9 since agricultural research is not considered a sub-program under the National Rural Sector Program, agricultural research and development (R&D) was significantly underfunded during the period of study.** After the end of the National Program for Agricultural Services Development (PNDSA) in 2004, agricultural R&D received no support from any specific program and very little funding from projects implemented in the rural development sector (Box 5). A number of recent studies have shown that chronically underfunded agricultural R&D in a large number of African countries has been highly damaging to the sector's development.[32]

[32]Notably, Mogues et al. (2012) showed by compiling a large number of existing studies that compared to other types of expenditures in the sector, public funding allocated to agricultural R&D (especially on crops) has the greatest impact on agricultural growth and poverty reduction and generated the most consistent long-term effects.

Table 8: Distribution of expenditures on rural development under PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011

	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	FR	Others	Total (%)	Classified amount (CFAF billions)	Non-classified amount (CFAF billions)	Total amount (CFAF billions)	Classified (%)
2004	13%	4%	2%	13%	2%	3%	7%	1%	2%	3%	39%	0%	8%	1%	5%	100	94.7	10.9	**105.7**	90
2005	10%	4%	1%	17%	2%	4%	6%	1%	2%	2%	38%	0%	7%	1%	5%	100	100.3	9.5	**109.7**	91
2006	11%	3%	2%	18%	2%	4%	6%	1%	2%	4%	35%	0%	6%	1%	5%	100	128.9	6.7	**135.5**	95
2007	19%	2%	1%	15%	2%	20%	3%	1%	1%	2%	25%	0%	6%	1%	2%	100	162.5	6.2	**168.7**	96
2008	14%	2%	2%	11%	3%	19%	3%	1%	1%	3%	21%	0%	16%	2%	2%	100	129.3	0.9	**130.3**	99
2009	19%	2%	2%	12%	11%	16%	2%	1%	2%	2%	19%	0%	9%	1%	1%	100	144.2	4.1	**148.3**	97
2010	20%	3%	1%	23%	2%	4%	5%	4%	1%	2%	23%	0%	10%	0%	2%	100	128.7	2	**130.7**	98
2011	22%	2%	2%	29%	5%	6%	4%	1%	1%	3%	15%	0%	10%	1%	0%	100	147.9	3.3	**151.2**	98
Total	**17%**	**2%**	**1%**	**17%**	**4%**	**10%**	**4%**	**1%**	**1%**	**3%**	**26%**	**0%**	**9%**	**1%**	**3%**	**100**	**1.036.5**	**43.5**	**1.080.0**	**96**

Note:
SP 1.1: Sustainable development of agricultural production
SP 1.2: Increasing productivity and competitiveness of livestock production
SP 1.3: Improving animal health and veterinary public health
SP 1.4: Sustainable development of agricultural water supply
SP 1.5: Prevention and management of food and nutritional crises
SP 2.1: Promotion of the agricultural economy
SP 3.1: Environmental governance and promotion of sustainable development
SP 3.2: Sustainable water and soil management and secure land tenure in rural areas
SP 3.3: Secure and sustainable management of grazing resources
SP 3.4: Development of forestry, hunting, and fishing production
SP 4.1: Drinking water and sanitation
SP 4.2: Environmental sanitation and improvement of the living environment
SP 5.1: Management and support
FR: Feeder roads
Others: General social infrastructure (school, health centers) and literacy campaigns
Source: Author's calculations based on project documents and information collected from management units; see detailed data in Annex 2.

Table 9: Distribution of expenditures on rural development under PNSR sub-programs, excluding DWSS, feeder roads, and non-agricultural expenditures, 2004–2011

	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 5.1	Total	Total amount (CFAF)
2004	24%	7%	3%	23%	3%	5%	12%	2%	3%	5%	14%	100%	**63.3**
2005	18%	8%	2%	31%	4%	7%	11%	3%	3%	3%	13%	100%	**65.5**
2006	19%	5%	3%	30%	3%	7%	10%	2%	3%	7%	11%	100%	**82**
2007	27%	2%	1%	21%	3%	29%	4%	1%	1%	3%	9%	100%	**122.3**
2008	19%	2%	2%	15%	4%	26%	4%	2%	1%	4%	21%	100%	**98.1**
2009	24%	3%	2%	15%	14%	20%	3%	2%	3%	3%	11%	100%	**117.4**
2010	27%	3%	2%	32%	2%	5%	7%	5%	1%	2%	13%	100%	**97**
2011	27%	2%	2%	35%	5%	7%	5%	1%	1%	3%	12%	100%	**127.6**
Total	**24%**	**3%**	**2%**	**25%**	**5%**	**15%**	**6%**	**2%**	**2%**	**4%**	**13%**	**100%**	**773.3**

Note: Expenditures on DWSS (SP 4.1 and SP 4.2), feeder roads, and social infrastructure were excluded
SP 1.1: Sustainable development of agricultural production
SP 1.2: Increasing productivity and competitiveness of livestock production
SP 1.3: Improving animal health and veterinary public health
SP 1.4: Sustainable development of agricultural water supply
SP 1.5: Prevention and management of food and nutritional crises
SP 2.1: Promotion of the agricultural economy
SP 3.1: Environmental governance and promotion of sustainable development
SP 3.2: Sustainable water and soil management and secure land tenure in rural areas
SP 3.3: Secure and sustainable management of grazing resources
SP 3.4: Development of forestry, hunting and fishing productions
SP 5.1: Management and support
Source: Author's calculations based on project documents and information collected from management units; see detailed data in Annex 2.

Box 4: The Central Role of Livestock in Burkina Faso

It was estimated that 82% of all agricultural households raise livestock, or 67% of all households. The contribution of livestock to farmers' total agricultural income (including own consumption) was estimated at 18% on average nationally (compared to 80% for crops and 2% for environmental products), though with wide regional variation, from below 10% in the Cascades and Hauts-Bassins regions to close to 40% in Sahel. Meanwhile, livestock's contribution to the agricultural incomes of rural households was estimated at 32% on average nationally, also with wide regional variations, from below 10% in the Cascades and Hauts-Bassins regions to almost 100% in Sahel (or 69% of total cash incomes). Moreover, in all 10 regions of the country, livestock was the principle source of income (41%) for the poorest households.

The sub-sector's contribution to GDP was 11% for the 2004–2011 period, compared to 14% for food production, 4% for cash crops, and 3% for fisheries and hunting, and accounted for 33% of the primary sector's share of GDP (Source: DGEP/MEF). Taking into account livestock-related activities (meat-packing, processing, sales, etc.), livestock's contribution to national GDP was even more significant, being estimated at 18–19% between 2001 and 2008. The largest related contributions were recorded during the 2003–2008 period, during which the Burkina Faso economy was severely affected by the sociopolitical crisis in Côte d'Ivoire, indicating perhaps that the livestock sub-sector can absorb external shocks relatively well compared to the economy as a whole. Livestock was also a net contributor to the trade balance, although sources differ in estimating the size of its contribution (around 2.5% of national exports according to UNCTAD in 2011, 7% according to the livestock working document).

Moreover, livestock breeding is deeply integrated into agricultural activities to the extent that it contributes to soil fertilization as much as it provides an energy source for working the land (with 52% of all land being worked by animal traction) and transporting inputs and production. In addition, livestock remains an important form of savings in a setting where formal savings and credit systems remain underdeveloped.

Finally, livestock is a decisive element in the strategy of food security for rural households: In all regions (except cotton-growing regions in the West: Sud-Ouest, Mouhoun, Hauts-Bassins, and Cascades), incomes from livestock were the primary source of funds for purchasing food products during lean periods, while at the national level, it was estimated that in 2007, 12% of incomes from the sale of agricultural products was used to purchase food and that incomes from livestock contributed 81% to these purchases, compared to 18% from crop production. Moreover, although areas traditionally devoted to livestock breeding are more vulnerable in terms of agricultural production, they generally show an incidence of food poverty that is lower than the national average as a result of own consumption of livestock products and the larger share of livestock-related incomes designated for food.

Clearly, the livestock sub-sector shows potential in terms of promoting economic growth as well as fighting poverty and therefore deserves increased support.

Sources: Livestock working document, MAH 2009a, DGEP/MEF, UNCTAD

Box 5: Agricultural Research: The Poor Relation of Rural Development in Burkina Faso

The three leading public agencies for agricultural research and development (R&D) in Burkina Faso are the National Environment and Agricultural Research Institute (INERA), the Applied Sciences and Technology Research Institute (IRSAT), and the National Forestry Seed Center (CNSF). In fact, in 2008, INERA employed 78% of the country's agricultural R&D researchers, whereas IRSAT and CNSF employed 10% and 7%, respectively. The remainder was dispersed among ten other governmental agencies[1] (ASTI-INERA 2010). In 2008, 78% of public expenditures in agricultural R&D was executed by INERA. Consequently, discussions concerning public agricultural R&D in the present report focus on the three above-mentioned agencies.

During the 2004–2011 period, public expenditures in agricultural R&D was on average CFAF 4.1 billion per year, of which INERA accounted for 75%, while IRSAT and CNSF accounted for 25% jointly. Following the conclusion in 2004 of the World Bank-funded National Program for Agricultural Services Development (PNDSA II), public expenditures on agricultural R&D plummeted by 50% from CFAF 6.1 billion in 2004 to CFAF 3.6 billion in 2005, with this drastic decrease continuing until 2008, followed by a rebound beginning in 2009 (Figure 26). This uptick can be explained by efforts by researchers to seek partnerships, which resulted in agreements and funding for research projects from bilateral and multilateral donors.

Furthermore, according to ASTI-INERA, while the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) researchers increased by 39.7% over the course of the PNDSA project (2000–2004), this number fell by 10.3% between 2004 and 2008 following the conclusion of the project in 2004.

Figure 26: Evolution of expenditures on public agricultural R&D, 2004–2011 (CFAF billions)



Sources: INERA, IRSAT and CNSF

[1] The other governmental agencies are: National Soil Agency (BUNASOL), the Directorate of Fisheries, and the National Livestock Laboratory (LNE). Agricultural R&D is also conducted in research and training units in four tertiary education institutions.

Box 5: Agricultural Research: The Poor Relation of Rural Development in Burkina Faso (cont.)

An analysis of funding sources show that between 2004 and 2011, on average 39% of expenditures in public agricultural R&D were covered by government funding, 47% by project agreements, NGOs, and private companies (including SOFITEX), and 14% from revenues generated by the institutes themselves from the sale of products and services. Whereas government funding and revenues were consistent, funding from donors through project funds and agreements showed a sustained upward trend, notably from 2008 onward (Figure 27).

Figure 27: Funding sources for public agricultural R&D, 2004–2011 (%)



Sources: INERA, IRSAT, CNSF

Concerning the economic composition of expenditures in public agricultural R&D, between 2004 and 2011, 67% on average of funding to these agencies was spent on operational expenses, 29% on personnel costs, and only 4% on investment[2] (which includes the development of experimental fields, the acquisition of special research equipment, etc.). However, since the conclusion in 2004 of the PNDSA II project, INERA and IRSAT have ceased investing, and only CNSF had an investment rate of 10% on average between 2004 and 2011.

Over the 2004–2011 period, the budget for agricultural research in Burkina Faso represented 0.3% of agriculture's share of GDP and 0.1% of GDP overall, which is far below the objective of earmarking 1% of GDP for applied agricultural research set by the Executive Council of the African Union in its Khartoum Decision regarding science and technology in 2006. Burkina Faso is one of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that allocates the least amount of resources to agricultural R&D, at around USD 0.50 per person per year (Table 10).

[2]Agricultural R&D investments for these agencies concerns designing experimental fields, purchasing specific research materials, etc.

Table 10: Funds budgeted for agricultural R&D in sub-Saharan Africa

Year	Total	Amount per	% of GDP

	studied	amount (USD millions)	capita (USD)	
Malawi	2007	180.1	12.9	1.70
Uganda	2007	359.8	11.6	1.10
South Africa	2007	4976.6	102.4	1.05
Kenya	2007	277.8	7.4	0.48
Senegal	2008	99.0	8.0	0.48
Tanzania	2007	234.6	5.8	0.48
Gabon	2008	78.7	58.3	0.47
Ghana	2007	120.1	5.0	0.38
Zambia	2008	55.3	4.6	0.37
Mali	2007	37.4	3.0	0.28
Mozambique	2007	42.9	2.0	0.25
Nigeria	2007	583.2	3.9	0.20
Burkina Faso	2004–2011	8.1	0.5	0.10
Togo	2005–2010	2.0	0.4	0.07

Notes: For most countries, these data include applied research led by the government, universities and tertiary education institutes, the private sector, and non-profit organizations. The data for other countries are in USD at purchasing power parity (PPP) (exchange rate calculated by the UNDP to account for the real value of USD 1 in the countries in question); the data for Togo is in USD.

Source: AU/NEPAD 2010; World Bank 2012; Authors' calculations for Burkina Faso

Additionally, the link between agricultural R&D and users remained weak over the period as a result of an approach to extension that was too top-down until the early 2000s, and thereafter as a result of limited financial resources for research. A new approach, known as the Multi-Actor Innovation Platform and steered by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and launched by Dissemination of New Agricultural Technologies in Africa (DONATA) of the African Development Bank, is currently being implemented in Burkina Faso as well as several other countries. This approach, which is centered on a specific product or market (e.g., rice, maize, onions, meat and livestock, black-eyed peas, shea butter, fonio, sesame, etc.) is based on demand. Furthermore, the MAH developed an individualized support and advisory approach, though this remains in its infancy at the time of writing.

Unlike PNDSA II, for which funding covered the entire domain of agricultural R&D in Burkina Faso, the West Africa Agricultural Productivity Program (WAAP), which is financed by the World Bank and in its start-up phase[3], will cover agricultural R&D only in Burkina Faso, focusing on the fruit and vegetables sector, notably for mangoes, tomatoes, and onions. The National Fruit and Vegetable Specialization Center (CNS-FL) alone, which is managed by

INERA and includes researchers from INERA and IRSAT, should therefore receive support from WAAP. However, it is clear that WAAP alone will not suffice in reviving agricultural R&D in Burkina Faso.

[3] The Burkina Faso component of the WAAP will be implemented during the 2012-2016 period, with a projected budget of CFAF 11.5 billion

3.3. Regional Distribution of Public Agricultural Expenditures

110.**It would be useful to introduce into the computerized expenditure system (CID) a system of specific codes in order to facilitate the tracking of the distribution of funds by region.**

111.**Given that data required for the geographic disaggregation of public agriculture funding were highly scattered, our analysis covered a shortened period (from 2007 to 2011), in accordance with the recommendations of the Monitoring and Steering Committee for this review.** Furthermore, the analysis examined expenditures strictly reserved for supporting agricultural production, and expenditures related to the management of natural resources (expenditures related to AEPA (SP 4.1 of the PNSR), the living environment (SP 4.2), and nutritional safety nets (SP 1.5) were excluded from the scope of analysis).

112.**For the 2007–2011 period, expenditures analyzed totaled CFAF 563 billion. Expenditures at the national level totaled CFAF 99 billion (17.5%), while expenditures at the regional level that could not be disaggregated for lack of information totaled around CFAF 39.5 billion (7%). Regional disaggregation therefore affects CFAF 425 billion.** Expenditures at the national level include: (i) expenditures executed by the central administration (e.g., ministry cabinets, general secretariats, the Directorate of Research and Planning (DEP), the Directorate of Administration and Finance (DAF), permanent secretariats, central technical directorates, etc.); (ii) the cost of drafting policies (policy documents, national action plans, etc.); (iii) cross-cutting expenditures (e.g., building up the capacities of central management, implementation of thematic regulations, national trade fairs, farmers' days, agricultural trade negotiations, agricultural census and surveys, etc.). However, around CFAF 39.5 billion (7%)[33] could not be disaggregated by region for lack of information.

113.**The breakdown of disaggregated expenditures in the 13 administrative regions showed disparate trends (Figure 28). This lack of control over expenditure is the result of the predominance of public funding in the development of public agricultural investment.** During the 2007–2011 period, public agricultural expenditures experienced a decrease in three regions (Boucle du Mouhoun: - 6%; Cascades: - 4%; and Centre-Est: - 22%, on average annually). Although the end of the Bagré Integrated Rural Development Project explains the steep drop in public agricultural investments in the Centre-Est region, this will definitely rise with the implementation of the Bagré Growth Pole Project. Meanwhile, 7 regions (Centre-Nord, Centre-Ouest, Hauts-Bassins, Nord, Plateau Central, Sahel, and Sud-Ouest) received increased levels of public funding in the agricultural sector for the 2007–2011 period. In these regions, the average annual growth rate of expenditures fluctuated

[33] The analysis of regional distribution therefore covers 93% of expenditure, which represents a major improvement over the 2009 review (Savadogo et al. 2009), in which only 54% of expenditures could be disaggregated by region.

between 6% in Centre-Ouest and 20% in Sahel, while agricultural expenditures in the Centre, Centre-Sud, and Est regions have been erratic.

Figure 28: Change in agricultural expenditures by region, 2007–2011, (CFAF billions)



Source: Authors' calculations based on: CID (DGB), PIP (DEPSI), DGCOOP, DEP/MAH, DAF/MAH, DADI/MAH, DVRD/MAH, DIMA/MAH, DEP/MRA, DAF/MRA, DEP/MEDD, project activity reports

114. **Our analysis indicates that the regional distribution of expenditures was consistent with the agricultural potential of each region.** When the regional distribution of public investment was compared with each region's contributions to the total crop value for the 2002–2006 period, the overall trend that emerged was that regions with strong agricultural potential were those that also received the largest share of public funding (Figure 29), with the country's western and southwestern regions (Boucle du Mouhoun, Hauts-Bassins, Cascades, and Sud-Ouest) producing 46% of the country's crops for the 2002–2006 period and receiving 47% of total public agricultural funding for the 2007–2011 period. The Gini coefficient[34] calculated from regional distributions of crop production and public funds was close to zero (or 0.059), confirming the equitable distribution of public agricultural funding based on regions' agricultural potential. Moreover, integrating livestock in the analysis does not change the results because the agricultural and livestock potential is similar in regions (except for the Sahel region). However, under-investment in Centre-Nord was noted (with a share of agricultural production of 7% as compared to 3% of public funding) and in Boucle du Mouhoun (19% compared to 14%), as against over-investment in Hauts-Bassins (18% compared to 22%), Centre-Est (7% compared to 11%) and Centre (1% compared to 3%).This over-investment in Hauts-Bassins and Centre-Est is explained by development projects launched in Samendéni and Bagré.

Figure 29: Regional distribution of agricultural production (2002–2006) vs. regional distribution of public agricultural funding (2007–2011)

[34]The Gini coefficient is an indicator of (in)equality.



Source: Authors' calculations based on: DPSAA (DGPER), SIM (SONAGESS), CES (DGB), PIP (DEPSI), DGCOOP, DEP/MAH, DAF/MAH, DADI/MAH, DVRD/MAH, DIMA/MAH, DEP/MRA, DAF/MRA, DEP/MEDD, project activity reports

115. **However, our analysis indicates that the regional distribution of expenditures is only moderately pro-poor.** In particular, the distribution of agricultural expenditures relative to that of the total number of the poor[35] in each region revealed an allocation of public resources that was comparatively unequal based on agricultural potential (Figure 30), with the Gini coefficient reached 0.22, or around 4 times its previous level. For example, in 2003, 32% of the country's poor lived in the Centre-Nord, Centre-Sud, Nord, and Plateau Central regions, whereas these regions received only 17% of public agricultural funding from 2001 to 2011. For the same periods, 11% of the country's poor lived in the Cascades and Hauts-Bassins regions, whereas these regions received 28% of agricultural funds. However, these statements should be qualified since the objectives of fairness and effectiveness are for the most part incompatible. The fact that the allocation of public agricultural funds, which is in principle guided by the objective of effectiveness (since the previous Gini coefficient was only 0.06), leads to minor inequality from the perspective of fairness (with a Gini coefficient of 0.22 demonstrating low inequality), is a positive result.

Figure 30: Regional distribution of the poor (2003) vs. regional distribution of public agricultural funding (2007–2011)

[35] Data taken from the survey of households' living conditions conducted in 2003 by the National Statistical and Demographic Institute (INSD). The reasoning behind this analysis is based on the fact that 92% of the poor live in rural areas and therefore participate in the agricultural economy since agriculture predominates in these areas



Source: Authors' calculations based on: DPSAA (DGPER), INSD, SIM (SONAGESS), CES (DGB), PIP (DEPSI), DGCOOP, DEP/MAH, DAF/MAH, DADI/MAH, DVRD/MAH, DIMA/MAH, DEP/MRA, DAF/MRA, DEP/MEDD, project activity reports

116. **Expenditures on AHA (SP 1.4 of PNSR) executed during the 2007–2011 period were concentrated in a number of regions (Figure 31),**[36] with Hauts-Bassins (31%), Centre-Est (19%), Nord (18%), Centre-Ouest (8%), and Sahel (8%) accounting for 84% of investments made during the period. This result is explained by major construction projects for dam building and APEA in progress or completed, such as the Samendéni integrated development project in Hauts-Bassins, the Bagré integrated rural development project (completed), the water recovery project in Nord, the Soum/Boulkiemdé hydro-agricultural development project in Centre-Ouest, and the Bambakari Tinakoff dam building project in Sahel.

Figure 31: Regional distribution of expenditures on hydro-agricultural projects

[36]Disaggregation covers 70% of investments made. The multi-regional projects in which the AEPA component represented less than 25% of total expenditures was not included. Taking into account all AEPA-related investments could lower the concentration observed.



Source: Authors' calculations based on: CES (DGB), PIP (DEPSI), DGCOOP, DADI/MAH, project activity reports.

117. **Our analysis of public funding for inputs granted to crop producers during the past four years (2008–2011) reveals an unequal distribution between regions compared to their crop output during the 2002–2006 period (with cotton excluded from the analysis).** Around CFAF 32 billion was spent by the government in the form of input subsidies for 2008 (the year of rocketing food prices) to 2011 in order to increase the supply of food products. These public funds were made available through the cash or credit sale[37] of fertilizer at a subsidized price and through the almost free distribution of improved seeds. The previously observed Gini coefficient of 0.06 for the distribution of total agricultural funding increased more than threefold to 0.2. Compared with all regions, the share of funding for inputs in the of Nord, Est, Centre-Ouest, Centre-Nord, and Sahel regions was on average less than half of these regions' contribution to crop production. Other regions (excluding Boucle du Mouhoun) received a share of subsidies for inputs that was higher than their share of crop production (Figure 32). This unequal distribution was in part the result of the priority given to the developed perimeters in terms of the availability of fertilizer and seeds. The relative size of the developed areas in the Hauts-Bassins, Cascades, Sud-Ouest, and Centre-Est regions explains why these regions received 53% of subsidies, whereas their share of total crop production was around 29% during the aforementioned periods. The distribution of inputs, which appears unequal at first glance, was thus motivated by the pursuit of efficiency in public funding since these inputs were used more efficiently on the developed perimeters.

Figure 32: Regional distribution of crop production (2002–2006) vs. regional distribution of input subsidies (2008–2011)

[37] The figure of CFAF 32 billion does not include loan repayments for fertilizer due to a lack of information.



Source: Authors' calculations based on: DPSAA (DGPER), SIM (SONAGESS), CES (DGB), PIP (DEPSI), DGCOOP, DAF/MAH, DVRD/MAH, DIMA/MAH, project activity reports

4. TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY OF AGRICULTURAL BUDGET PREPARATION, EXECUTION, AND MONITORING AND EVALUATION

4.1. Technical Efficiency of Budget Planning and Execution

118. **The many reforms carried out during the 2000s (see Section 1.1.1) have had a noticeably positive effect on execution rates[38] from MAH and MRA internal resources (Figures 33 and 34) for both operating and capital expenditures.** The execution rate of Headings II, III, and IV by the MAH came to 74% for 2004–2005, 92% for 2006–2008, and 92% 2009–2011. For the MRA, the rates were 67%, 88%, and 99%, respectively. With regard to the internal resources portion of Heading V, the performance of the MAH reached 76% for 2004–2005, 66% for 2006–2008, and 95% for 2009–2011. The improvement in the performance of the MRA was even more spectacular, with execution rates of capital expenditures from internal resources of 25% for 2004–2005, 52% for 2006–2008, and 93% for 2009–2011.

Figure 33: MAH budget execution rates, internal (IR) and external (ER) resources, 2004–2011, %



Sources: CIS (DGB), DEPSI; see detailed data in Annex 2

Figure 34: MRA budget execution rates, internal and external resources, 2004–2011, %

[38]The execution rates shown here consist of the ratio of actual expenditures to approved expenditures enacted by the initial budget laws. They do not take into account actual expenditures over revisions of expenditure forecasts made during the preparation of supplementary budget laws. This is because the goal of this revision, which takes place over the course of the fiscal year, is to take account of the execution performance in the first half of the year in order to adjust forecasts and obtain a better match between the provisional (revised) budget and the executed budget at the end of the year and therefore higher execution rates in principle, even this would be a less accurate indicator of the ability of the government to plan its initial budgets and execute them over the full year.



Sources: CIS (DGB), DEPSI; see detailed data in Annex 2

119. **However, although the MEDD has improved the execution rate of its operating expenditures, it has encountered difficulties in executing investments from internal resources (Figure 35).** The execution rate of Headings II, III, and IV of the MEDD reached 70% for 2004–2005, 103% for 2006–2008, and 101% for 2009–2011. With regard to the IR portion of Heading V, the MEDD's performance fell from 73% in 2004–2005 to 71% in 2006–2008 and 57% in 2009–2011. This most recent period was affected in particular by a very poor execution rate of 20% in 2011.

Figure 35: MEDD budget execution rates, internal and external resources, 2004–2011, %



Sources: CIS (DGB), DEPSI; see detailed data in Annex 2

120. **The three ministries show quite low execution rates from external resources, though without any clear trend. However, this observation should be qualified by the absence of a reliable accounting system for these expenditures (see Section 2.1.1).** The average execution rate of Heading V from external resources in 2004–2011 was 59% for the MAH, 48% for the MRA, and 55% for the MEDD. Although it had yet to take effect at the level of the rural development ministries in 2012, the start-up of the Integrated External

Financing System (IEFS) in 2011 will provide a more accurate picture of actual execution rates of investment from external resources (Box 6).

121. **The programming of external resources and therefore the monitoring of their execution suffers from a lag between the scheduling of the preparation of the government's budget and project schedules.** Projects are required to provide a definitive program in May/June of year *(n)* for the budget law of year *(n+1)* even as projects continue to develop their projected budget until the end of the year before submitting this program to their steering committee. The IEFS should also help improve this situation by making it possible to include these changes in supplementary budget laws.

122. **Although the absence of an accurate execution rate for investments from external resources complicates the analysis, discussions with the heads of the three ministries lead us to conclude that the three most significant problems affecting the execution of these expenditures are cumbersome procurement procedures, poor communication with donors and project managers, and in some cases the cumbersome procedures of donors themselves.** With regard to procurement, many improvements have been made under the SRFP (see Section 1.1.1). However, the process still takes at least three months, even when conducted in the most efficient manner possible, which penalizes investments scheduled early in the fiscal year before the onset of the rainy season.

4.2. State of Progress in the Transition to a Budget Program

123. **Whereas the MTEF seems well established, the budget program approach has reached a pivotal moment for the three rural development ministries.** Although considerable efforts have been made to establish its programmatic basis (the PNSR), it is already apparent that the 13 defined sub-programs (SP) were excessively shaped by existing structures, which resulted in overlaps and crossovers that will probably have to be rationalized over time (for example, soil management is included under SP 1.1, SP 3.1, SP 3.2, and to a degree even SP 3.4, while agricultural trade associations are covered by SP 1.1, SP 1.2, SP 1.4, and SP 2.1).

124. **In terms of appropriation of interventions and of improving their impact, the process will only be fully realized if the defined sub-programs really become vehicles used by the government to implement its rural development strategy.** This will require appointing sub-program leaders with authority over all of the services and projects within the scope of their sub-program and, by definition, specifying a vision and a clear strategy for each of the sub-programs, accompanied by performance indicators.

125. **On the government side, the effective implementation of results-based management through the budget program therefore requires ambitious institutional reform. With regard to the DPs, implementation will rely on their acceptance of the fact that their financial support will be much more effective, efficient, and sustainable if it is part of a process owned and guaranteed by the national authorities.** Through the significant reforms it has undertaken since the 2000s in the areas of the civil service, the management of the public finances, and decentralization, the Burkina Faso government has demonstrated—and continues to demonstrate—both its willingness and its ability to modernize. At this pivotal moment for the operationalization of the budget program, strong support at the highest level—both from the government and the DPs—is vital if the process, which is already well advanced, is to become irreversible and for the budget program to become a definitive tool for accelerating development and not a mere exercise in style, leading to frustration.

4.3. Monitoring and Evaluation

126. **Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) is currently severely deficient both at the central (DEP) level and at the level of departments and projects.** Very little information is available on the cost, incidence, and impact of interventions, which generally are not measured against a benchmark. As a result, there is very little capitalizing on positive experiments with a view to their replication (see an example in Chapter 5).

127 **The implementation of the budget program must go hand in hand with a significant strategic reflection on the future reinforcement of M&E capacities at all levels, both in terms of personnel and training and management methods**. This reflection must include the question of storing and disseminating information for which no systematic mechanism is in place today.

Box 6: Integrated External Financing System (IEFS): Procedure and Challenges

The IEFS became officially operational in 2011 under the supervision of the Directorate General of the Treasury and Public Accounting (DGTCP), which replaced the DGCOOP as the authorizing department for expenditures from external funds in March 2011. **However, in 2012, it was not yet operational at the level of the rural development ministries.**

The IEFS will enable the tracking of expenditures from external funds in the same way as the CES operates in relation to expenditures from national funds. A link to the CES is also planned for the preparation of budget laws, supplementary budget laws, and settlement laws by the DGB. Provisional allocations can at any time be revised upward by project managers in the event of more rapid disbursement than expected. Links are also planned with the Aid Management Platform (PGA) and the Integrated Public Procurement System (SIMP), a first in the WAEMU zone.

In principle, all external funding known to the DGCOOP, that is, which led to an agreement between the donor and the Burkina Faso government, should result in a new line being opened in the IEFS. Most projects and programs that until now were executed off-budget (see Section 2.2) should eventually be integrated into the national accounts. Only projects that have not been the subject of an agreement with the government will be excluded from the IEFS (as in the case of donor directly financing an NGO, association, or local authority).

The fact remains that information on executed expenditures will continue to rely on the willingness of donors to provide statements of their disbursements. Although some DPs, such as the World Bank, have implemented interfaces with recipient countries that allow them to monitor in real time the execution of the funding at their disposal, a large number of DPs are yet to provide such a system. The resulting opacity makes it impossible to calculate reliable execution rates in real time and therefore severely impedes the implementation and monitoring of corrective measures where needed.

Once again, it should be emphasized that resolving the serious problem posed by the lack of tracking of expenditures from external resources, which is weighing on the effectiveness and efficiency of public development aid, is now in principle made possible by the IEFS but will depend on increased cooperation from the DPs.

It is also essential that the IEFS become operational at the level of the rural

development ministries.

Source: DGTCP

4.4. Appropriation of Interventions at All Levels

128. **In general, we note a low level of appropriation of policies and strategies (see Section 1.1.2) as well as activities. This low level of appropriation can be explained in particular by excessive fragmentation.**

i. **Too many projects, which sometimes appear to respond more to the agenda of the DPs than that of the country.**[39] The proliferation of projects reduces the clarity of the government's strategy and makes it difficult to manage, complicates the budget planning process, significantly increases the transaction costs of development aid, creates an additional workload (meetings, missions, etc.) that prevents managers from dedicating sufficient time to the core functions of their ministry (in particular in terms of strategic reflection and M&E), accelerates personnel turnover, weakens public services by diverting already scarce human resources to largely independent management units, dilutes responsibilities, and creates overlaps and in some cases contradictions. In addition, as stated above, it gives rise to a problem over capitalizing on experiments and of the sustainability of interventions, as the records, responsibilities, and financial resources needed to continue activities and maintain investments generally disappear at the same time as the project. In the words of the Minister of the Economy and Finances in his preface to the 2010 Report on Cooperation and Development (MEF 2011): "The contribution of projects and programs to development remains a challenge to be resolved."

ii. **Departments' roles are too fragmented.** Our discussions with technical directorates often gave the impression of highly diluted roles, with financial aspects left to the DAF or the Public Procurement Directorate, while aspects of practical implementation are left to the regional directorates, and aspects of M&E are left to the DEP. On many matters (crop fertilizer, cotton fertilizer, seeds, animal feed, etc.), it is difficult to find anyone capable of delivering a strong and exhaustive message, such as: "We did this, it cost this much, it had this incidence and that impact, its sustainability is ensured by such a measure, we will repeat the experiment but adjust such or such an aspect, etc."

129. **The appropriation of activities at the local level is hampered by the highly centralized nature of responsibilities and resources.** Whereas regional directorates account for a large share of the payroll of the three ministries (44% on average in the period 2010–2012 for the MAH, 46% for the MRA, and 50% for the MEDD), they receive very modest operating budgets[40] and are assigned very few investment credits.[41] Although the regional

[39]The budget of the MAH comprises 80 to 100 projects each year.

[40]In the period 2010-2012, the operating budget allocated to the DRAHs represented 32% of total MAH allocations (or CFAF 22 million per year on average), those allocated to the DRRA 19% of MRA allocations (or CFAF 5 million per year on average), and those allocated to the DRECV/DREDD 16% of MECV/MEDD allocations (or CFAF 6 million per year on average). Source: 2010-2012 budget laws, DGB.

[41]Only the DRAHs receive investment credits, which in the period 2010-2012, represented 5% of total MAH investment allocations. These credits stem from sectoral budget support for DWSS, which the DRAHs pass on to implementing agencies. The DRAHs are also coordinators and administrators of credits for the Decentralized Rural Development component of the PADAB, which includes a private window (financing of investment by private operators – PO) and a public window (financing of investment by local authorities).

directorates supplement these allocations by signing agreements with local partners that require their services (local authorities, projects, NGOs), their resources remain limited. Regional directorates are also under-staffed in terms of field agents (Box 3). It is therefore legitimate to question whether it is optimal to use these decentralized human resources, which are supposed to support young local authorities in their investments in agriculture and natural resource management (which themselves remain limited, see Box 7) and are as a result of their proximity and knowledge of the field, more likely to ensure that development intervention matches local priorities. For example, it is possible that the Ouagadougou-based Bagré Contracting Project (MOB) may have been more effective, in particular in terms of the organization of the users of the area and its maintenance, had they been placed in the hands of the Centre-Est DRAH. It would be advisable to give additional resources to the regional directorates so as to enable them to design and implement the regional rollout of the PNSR and support decentralization and to extend the approach developed by projects such as PADAB and PNGT, which give resources and responsibilities to local authorities and developers with support from decentralized technical services.

130. **The problem of fragmented roles is also found at the level of the regional directorates**, in this case between the managerial entities of the various ministries as MAH and MRA agents do not always communicate with each other despite the fact that 80% of rural households engage in both crop and livestock farming and many issues concern them both (manure pits, animal traction, animal feed crops, etc.). Greater coordination is required, especially in light of the shortage of means of transportation.

131. **Finally, appropriation by operators in the sector is often curbed by excessive government intervention.** Examples abound of public departments deciding to intervene in an economic activity under the assumption that the private sector will subsequently take the reins (as in the production and storage of animal feed, the supply of fertilizers and seeds, dairy facilities, etc.). This approach seldom succeeds because government interventions generally create distortions in competition that drive away private operators from the sector concerned. In addition, when public services try to pull out and hand over the reins to the private sector, they tend to impose public service requirements (service to isolated areas, pre-set target populations, transparency, etc.) that are not necessarily compatible with the operating environment of a competitive market. The rural development ministries should restrict their interventions in economic activities to cases of blatant market failure and favor non-confined intervention by the private sector in all other cases.

Box 7: Agricultural Development and Decentralization: A Central Role for the Regional Directorates in the Future?

A recent survey by the Project for the Strengthening of Local and Regional Governance (PRGLA, financed by the UNDP under MATD supervision) showed that a large number of rural municipalities carry out investments in the agricultural sector (manure pits, development of lowlands, boulis, slaughter areas, etc.), in DWSS, and to a lesser degree in environmental preservation, but that the monetary values of these investments remain extremely limited to date (Table 11).

Table 11: Investments made by sector and by administrative division, 2010–2011, CFAF billion

Investment categories	Rural municipalities				Urban municipalities				Regions			
	2010		2011		2010		2011		2010		2011	
	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%	Amount	%
Education	3.2	21.6%	5.9	31.9%	1.7	11.0%	2.3	30.9%	0.2	7.4%	0.2	16.1%
Healthcare	0.8	5.6%	1.6	8.7%	0.1	0.8%	0.4	5.6%	0.0	0.3%	0.0	1.3%
DWSS	3.3	22.1%	5.0	27.0%	1.0	6.6%	1.4	18.1%	0.2	4.9%	0.1	5.8%
Crop and livestock farming	3.2	21.6%	1.8	9.9%	0.1	0.3%	0.4	5.0%	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
Environment	0.3	2.4%	0.2	0.9%	0.1	0.4%	0.0	0.5%	0.0	0.0%	0.0	1.6%
Infrastructure and plant	1.9	12.7%	1.9	10.2%	5.5	35.0%	1.1	14.5%	0.8	24.9%	0.6	50.0%
Transport	0.5	3.2%	0.2	1.2%	3.5	22.2%	0.3	4.6%	1.7	53.9%	0.1	4.9%
Commerce	0.8	5.5%	1.0	5.4%	1.6	10.1%	0.8	11.1%	0.0	0.0%	0.0	2.2%
Other	0.8	5.3%	0.9	4.9%	2.2	13.7%	0.7	9.8%	0.3	8.4%	0.2	18.2%
N/A	0.0	0.1%	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0.0	0.0%
TOTAL	**14.9**	**100%**	**18.5**	**100%**	**15.8**	**100%**	**7.5**	**100%**	**3.1**	**100%**	**1.3**	**100%**

Source: PRGLA 2012

As emphasized in the 2009 Public Expenditure Review (Savadogo et al. 2009), decentralization in agricultural development involves a very different set of issues compared to social sectors such as education, health, and DWSS. In the case of social sectors, the question is how to manage public goods so as to improve the living standards of the population as a whole, delivered by professionals according to fairly standard procedures set at the national level. It is therefore possible to imagine local authorities undertaking the full provision of such services with support from competent decentralized administrations. However, in the case of agricultural development, we are dealing with both public goods (markets, roads, findings of R&D, etc.) and private goods (inputs, credit, etc.) delivered to only part of the population in order to enhance the performance of its economic activity, with in some cases smaller or larger and positive or negative externalities for other segments of the population.

Moreover, this mix of public and private goods entails technically complex specifications and needs to be consistent with the policy guidelines at the national level for each of the agricultural sub-sectors. Finally, much more so than in the social sectors, the challenges posed by agricultural development often exceed the capacities of the local authorities, especially over issues of commercialization, supply of inputs, road infrastructure,

slaughter areas, or markets serving several municipalities, the management of grazing lands or hydro-agricultural development (HAD) shared by several municipalities, natural resource management (water, forests), or the management of natural disasters and diseases.

Taken together, these factors argue in favor of strengthening the regional directorates—especially in terms of logistical resources—so that they can play a full role in supporting agricultural development in the service of local authorities and sector operators and in favor of stepping up and homogenizing ongoing experiments (PNGT, PADAB, budget credits, miscellaneous funds) in allocating budget credits to both local authorities and regional directorates.

5. INCIDENCE, IMPACT, AND SUSTAINABILITY OF AGRICULTURAL EXPENDITURES: THE SPECIAL CASES OF HYDRO-AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENTS, FOOD CROP INPUT SUBSIDIES, AND EXPENDITURES IN THE LIVESTOCK AND FORESTRY SUB-SECTORS

132. **This chapter is based on the observations and conclusions of the working papers prepared on the topics of hydro-agricultural developments (HAD), agricultural inputs, and livestock and forestry attached to this report. However, we should note the difficulty involved in precisely determining the link between public expenditures and outcomes given the limited time and resources available for this study. Establishing a cause-and-effect link would require much more thorough on-the-ground surveys and analyses.**

5.1. The Special Case of Hydro-Agricultural Developments (HAD)[42]

133. **Overall, the data for HADs carried out between 2004 and 2011 point to a strong development dynamic (+ 68% in 8 years, Table 12). However, this remains modest compared to the potential.** This increase in developed areas is a direct consequence of the development of lowland projects (79% of increases in area) and of small-scale irrigation[43] (17% of increases in land area under irrigation). The potential in irrigated land is estimated at 233,500 ha.[44] The area currently irrigated (54,275 ha) therefore corresponds to only 23% of the potential. Moreover, less than 10% of the potential was developed over the 2004–2011 period.

Table 12: HAD projects completed before 2004 and in 2004–2011, ha

Type of project	Developed area (ha)		
	Up to 2004	2004–2011	Total as of 2011
Large perimeters	12,058	735	12,793
of which: SOSUCO	3,900	-	
of which: other perimeters	8,158		
Medium-sized perimeters	3,000	237	3,237
Small-scale irrigation	10,000	3700	13,700

[42]Source for this section: Working paper on HADs.

[43]The following typology was used: large perimeters: several hundred or thousand hectares held by a single landholder; medium-sized perimeters: an area of between 20 and 100 hectares; small-scale irrigation: perimeters of less than 1 to 20 hectares (even though these are undelimited spaces where producers settle in a scattered and disorderly manner, the term "perimeter" is retained); developed lowlands: developments involving partial water control, with farms generally of less than 1 hectare.

[44]Based on inventories of lowlands and plains conducted from 1999 to 2002 in the various regions, the potential of developable lowlands and plains is estimated at around 1,900,000 ha, with 500,000 ha of that considered easily developable according to the socioeconomic criteria developed by INERA (population presence and distance to the site; existence of traditional farming and magnitude of production; presence of conflicts; holy sites; site accessibility). SNAT 2010 mentions 663,000 ha of farmable lowlands. Part of the 500,000 ha is included in the irrigable 233,500 ha. For the remainder, waster as limiting factor remains to be evaluated.

Total irrigated perimeters	**25,058**	**4,672**	**29,730**
Total	**32,258**	**22,017**	**54,275**
Restoration of large perimeters		1,431	

Source: Working paper on HADs

134 **The distribution of expenditures in the sub-programs of the National Rural Sector Program (PNSR) (Table 8) showed that SP 1.4 (HAD) cost around CFAF 181 billion from 2004 to 2011, a relatively high unit cost for the projects over this period at CFAF 8.2 million per hectare. However, it should be noted that this cost includes the building of reservoirs**. Excluding reservoirs, the unit project cost was estimated in 2004 at CFAF 7 to 10 million for large perimeters, CFAF 6 to 7 million for medium-sized perimeters, CFAF 0.5 to 1.8 million for small perimeters, and CFAF 1.4 to 3.5 million for lowlands. The costs for large and medium-sized perimeters are considered too high compared to regional and international averages[45] as a result of: (i) standards for the design and construction of works that are too high in relation to the users' technical skills and the economic viability of the projects; (ii) a lack of economies of scale because of implementation in small tranches; (iii) problems with transparency in the implementation of the projects; and (iv) the beneficiaries' lack of involvement in carrying out the works (in some cases, even single-plot projects were included).

135. **It is estimated that the increase in irrigated area over the 2004–2011 period benefited 5% of the rural population.** Although there are no reliable data on the population affected by this irrigation, if we start with the fact that the plots assigned to the farmers (one plot per household) average 0.50 ha for large perimeters, 0.25 ha for medium-sized perimeters, 0.20 ha for small-scale irrigation, and 0.25 ha in the lowlands, and the fact that the average household has between 6 and 8 members, we can infer that irrigation in Burkina Faso directly employs from 1.2 to 1.6 million people. The increase in irrigated area between 2004 and 2011 therefore affected around 650,000 people, or about 5% of the rural population.

136. **Irrigated rice accounts for over 55% of the irrigated area, and its production has more than doubled since the early 2000s (Table 13). However,** it should be stressed that upland rice production also increased significantly so that the share of irrigated rice in total domestic production varied little over the period, at around 50%.

Table 13: Origin of domestic paddy rice production, 2001–2011, tons

Years	Upland rice	Developed lowland rice and perimeters	Total	% Irrigated rice
2001	65,714	44,154	109,868	40%
2002	42,931	46,172	89,104	52%
2003	39,050	56,444	95,494	59%

[45]This should be compared to investment costs on large perimeters in Mali (Office du Niger), which are of the order of CFAF 2.6 million/ha, to which should be added CFAF 300,000 to 400,000/ha for the beneficiaries' financial participation. As regards small-scale irrigation, also in Mali, costs vary between CFAF 1.3 million and 3.5 million/ha. More generally, past studies (e.g., by the World Bank in 1995) found that the cost of developing an irrigation project in the region was excessively high, or on average CFAF 9 million/ha (or USD 18,000) compared to a worldwide average of CFAF 2.25 million/ha (USD 4,500). Source: HAD working paper.

2004	n.d.	n.d.	74,501	-
2005	42,897	50,619	93,516	54%
2006	55,952	57,772	113,724	51%
2007	24,579	44,337	68,916	64%
2008	94,796	100,306	195,102	51%
2009	92,358	121,226	213,584	57%
2010	127,732	142,926	270,658	53%
2011	127,494	113,372	240,866	47%

Source: Working paper on HADs based on DGPSA/MAH

137. **There are no reliable data on the rate of utilization of developed perimeters.** Cropping intensity was estimated at between 120% and 180% on large and medium perimeters and 70–100% for small-scale irrigation. Although these figures remain highly approximate, they do reveal an underutilization of the developed perimeters, which could be due to the poor design and execution of certain HADs, which makes them partly unusable, to the lack of water, especially in the dry season, which leads farmers to reduce the areas sown, or to noncompliance with the two-crops-per-year requirement by some farmers.

138. **Management and maintenance issues are among the leading constraints on irrigated perimeters.** After the State effectively disengaged from the productive sectors in 1992 (PASA), the operating capacity and effectiveness of agricultural services were greatly reduced. Farmers' organizations have been increasingly involved in managing, operating, and maintaining the perimeters, though without being ready to do so. Major maintenance (primary canals and associated structures, drains, runoff canals, and main roads) is conducted by private service providers. However, this maintenance is generally deficient, which leads to serious damage to the channels, plots, structures, and equipment. Current minor maintenance of the system (dredging runoff and secondary canals, maintenance of service roads and pathways, etc.) is performed by the farmers, who are supposed to organize themselves for this purpose. This is also subject to lapses, especially when it comes to communal works. Specifications are not followed, and generally no measures are taken against violators.

139. **In addition, on most perimeters, the concept of fees representing the farmer's contribution to the cost of the water (pumping charge and amortization of the pumping installations) and to maintenance costs and the Agricultural Trade Association's (ATA) operating costs does not yet appear to be well understood. Moreover, the ATAs experience major difficulties in collecting fees, with late payments and low collection rates.** A study of farmers' ability to pay the water fees is under way as part of the MCA's agriculture development program (PDA). An analytical study on this topic is also being conducted by the Directorate General of Irrigation Management and Development (DGADI).

140. There are many different causes of these lapses in maintenance and fee payment: (i) the beneficiaries of irrigated plots do not always understand the logic of how development works, the type of organization they should join in order to manage the works, or in particular, the concept of collective responsibility. These difficulties are magnified when the beneficiaries and communities come from different regions and find themselves side by side having to manage the plots collectively; (ii) institutionally, infrastructure maintenance responsibilities are not always well defined from the start; consequently, the farmers think that the public authorities are responsible not only for creating and developing these infrastructures but also for maintaining them; (iii) as independent structures, the farmers' organizations are often in a precarious financial situation because of marketing problems, low returns on the perimeters, their inability to mobilize financial resources, and difficulties in

accessing agricultural credit; and (iv) the educational level among management committee members is low, as is the literacy rate among the farmers.

141 This situation has serious consequences, including: (i) accelerated deterioration of the investments; (ii) waste and inefficiency in water use; (iii) lack of monitoring of the resource and its consumption, i.e., the parameters are not quantified (pumping hours, length of irrigation time, flows, rainfall, etc.); (iv) unequal distribution between upstream and downstream; (v) drainage problems; (vi) inadequate exchange of information between cooperative managers and farmers; and (vii) more generally, lack of capitalization of experience in water management.

142. On medium irrigated perimeters, small irrigated perimeters, and the lowlands, there are also problems with land insecurity and access.

143. **Furthermore, there is a great deal of variability in the level of economic and financial return for HADs depending on the type of development and the crop combination (see details in the HAD working paper). The investments with the best rate of return are small-scale perimeters and lowlands, where cowpeas and vegetables (onions) are grown.**

144. **Although lowland projects are less costly, less water-intensive, and less restrictive organizationally, their rate of return varies greatly depending on their location.** Average yields are of the order of 3.2 tons/ha of paddy rice, though the situation varies greatly countrywide. South of the 800 mm isohyet, with favorable agro-climatic conditions and a good level of intensification, yields reach 3.8 t/ha, while north of this isohyet, there is a risk of no water being available for rainfed lowland rice growing, which leads to yields being more random (about 2.2 tons on average). The technical support structure consists of the local offices of the MAH, national projects and programs, including the Rice Sector Action Plan (PAFR), the Food Security Special Program (PSSA), the Rural Equipment and Water Fund (FEER), and the Second National Rural Development Program (PNGTII), regional and local programs, including Rural Development Projects (PDR), VARENA, PEBASO, and PABSO, and the NGOs. Lowland development standards need to be improved to ensure a better cost/continuity balance as some lowlands have been developed at low cost but with insufficient continuity.

145. **The good performance of small-scale irrigation is undeniable.** This type of irrigation is spreading along the shores of bodies of water or in areas where the water table is shallow (lowlands) and where there is demand for vegetable crops. This form of irrigation is often coupled with lowland farming practiced in the rainy season before giving way to small-scale irrigation in the dry season. This is done most often by private promoters or by a community. However, the project's design and construction do not always follow professional standards, and the dewatering equipment (pumps) is chosen based on its availability in the marketplace rather than on the technical features required by the project, leading to numerous problems with operating and maintaining the installations as well as with their operating costs. The technical support structure relies on the local offices of the MAH (which are often deficient), the NGOs, and the private service providers, especially equipment vendors. However, this structure has been complemented by the implementation of the Professional Association for Private Irrigation and Associated Activities (DIPAC) and the Private Irrigation and Associated Activities Development Project (APIPAC), the Small-Scale Village Irrigation Project under DGADI, and, finally, through integrated regional or local rural development projects. It should also be noted that private-sector projects carried out by small-scale farmers with inexpensive technologies in the sub-region have also yielded

good results. This is the case with the Niger Private Irrigation Pilot Project, which promoted various mechanized and manual small-scale irrigation technologies and doubled the cultivated land area, achieving very good rates of return.

146. **Regarding large perimeters, their economic performance has often fallen below expectations, and their productivity remains low. However, it is possible to significantly improve the performance of these irrigation systems, as was done in Mali,** where the restoration and expansion of the irrigated perimeters of the Office du Niger and the promotion of small-scale irrigation (PIV, controlled submersion, market-garden perimeters) formed the basis for the recent growth in irrigation. Within of the Office du Niger, which is one of the oldest (1932) and largest irrigation projects managed by small farmers, with 60,000 ha farmed in 1982 out of a potential of more than 1 million ha, much of the area was no longer functioning due to a lack of maintenance, and average rice yields had collapsed to 1.6 tons/ha. The project's restoration achieved success when the necessary physical investments coincided with the appropriate institutional reforms, which included: (i) improvement and modernization of the irrigation system; (ii) improved water monitoring and management; (iii) improved technologies (high-yield varieties, fertilizer, improved livestock practices); (iv) marketing deregulation, facilitated by an improved macro-economic climate; (v) institutional reorganization, including the privatization of most commercial functions and the outsourcing of maintenance tasks to the private sector; and (vi) adoption of more participatory approaches involving farmers in management decisions such as fees, etc. Average rice yields increased, reaching 6 tons/ha, and the fee collection rate reached 97%.

147. **Finally, as noted above, the weakness of the HADs' M&E should be stressed, the primary cause of which being the lack of resources allocated to the MAH's DEP (human resources, vehicles, computer and office equipment, etc.).** Setting up an effective M&E system requires a methodological framework adapted to each situation, with monitoring of control areas outside of the project in addition to a baseline. In most cases, projects are started without a baseline having been set.

148. **In conclusion, Burkina Faso has the necessary potential to develop irrigation,** including: (i) significant potential in irrigable land still not developed; (ii) potential for increasing production with the same level of water and land resources; (iii) a diversity of development models whose experience should be capitalized upon; (iv) a high percentage of producers who understand production techniques; and (v) financially and economically beneficial irrigation with high variability in levels of return depending on the type of development, the production season, and the crop combination.

149. **This potential should be developed by: (i) approaching projects based on considerations of economic viability and return in terms of agricultural production and sustainability; (ii) giving a dominant role in their implementation to farmers' organizations; (iii) promoting simple, adapted, and inexpensive HADs; (iv) developing intensified rice growing in order to meet the country's demand for rice; and (v) promoting out-of-season diversification for medium-sized perimeters and small-scale irrigation as a way to develop irrigated farming.**

150. **The following priority actions should be considered:**

i. Regarding HAD planning:

- ✓ Restore deteriorated projects and recover areas lying fallow;

- ✓ Take land issues into account in implementing HAD projects;
- ✓ Favor a demand-based approach in carrying out small-scale irrigation projects in order to ensure the deliberate involvement of the beneficiaries, thereby guaranteeing that they can sustainably run these projects;
- ✓ Do away with centralized and standardized planning and move toward local projects: (i) that are initiated by the beneficiaries and carried out at their own pace under conditions close to their actual situations and with financial commitments on their part; and (ii) to which the State contributes only part of the project's budget. However, this approach requires greater flexibility in DP procedures in terms of implementation schedules;
- ✓ Focus resources on low-cost physical investments in small-scale irrigation and thoroughly review the policy on large projects that must be made to yield a good return on investment;
- ✓ Promote water-saving irrigation techniques and less costly small-scale irrigation technologies that will occupy the greatest number of producers;
- ✓ Develop a specific program of actions designed to mitigate irrigation constraints and threats;
- ✓ Boost project M&E.

ii. Regarding producer supervision and HAD operation:

- ✓ Reorganize HAD management (especially in large and medium-sized perimeters) through an institutional and financial clean-up of the cooperatives in order to professionalize their production and marketing functions and by privatizing water management;
- ✓ Establish supervisory networks for the irrigated perimeters, support the emergence of private support and consultancy structures, and privatize maintenance;
- ✓ Ensure that the specifications for which farmers are responsible are effectively applied;
- ✓ Improve producers' technical effectiveness;
- ✓ Promote the use of suitable technical itineraries for major irrigated crops by distributing simplified technology packages;
- ✓ Promote economically and financially beneficial cultural combinations by encouraging crop intensification and diversification;
- ✓ Favor the development of local entrepreneurs to supply small-scale irrigation equipment; and
- ✓ Favor the acquisition of farming and irrigation equipment suited to local conditions.

5.2. The Special Case of Food Crop Input Subsidies[46]

151. **Given the persistence of the food crisis that occurred in the 2007–2008 crop year and the spike in food prices that followed, the government set up and, starting with the 2008/09 crop year, has pursued a price subsidy operation for food crop fertilizers and improved seed.** The purpose of the operation is to increase farm yields and production through the efficient and large-scale use of these inputs. Aimed mainly at increasing rice and corn production, as the seasons passed, the operation was expanded to other lines of production such as cowpeas, millet, sorghum, groundnuts, soy, sesame, and even cassava.

152. **Regarding fertilizers, 52,461 tons were purchased by the State for the 2008/2009, 2009/2010, 2010/2011 and 2011/2012 crop years (Table 14) to be resold to producers at subsidized prices.** To avoid the many cases of default occurring with sales on credit during the first season in which the subsidized fertilizers were distributed, payment in cash is now the most widespread practice.

Table 14: Quantities of subsidized fertilizers purchased by the State, 2008–2011, tons

Farming season	NPK	Urea	Total
2008/2009	6,986	2,991	**9,977**
2009/2010	8,259	5,907	**14,166**
2010/2011	6,492	5,109	**11,601**
2011/2012	12,775	3,940	**16,716**
TOTAL	**34,513**	**17,948**	**52,461**

Note: For the 2012/2013 crop year, the quantities of fertilizer bought by the State were: 10,911 tons of NPK and 4,199 tons of urea, for a total of 15,110 tons.
Source: Agricultural Inputs working paper

153. **Calculated on the basis of the cost of the operation borne by the State, the subsidy level decreased by 52% for the 2008/2009 crop year to 39% for 2009/2010, 34% 2011/2012, and 31% for 2012/2013. However, if the market price of fertilizers is taken as reference, the subsidy level is estimated at 40%, 31%, 24%, and 27%, respectively, for each of the aforementioned crop years.** It remains to be determined whether the fertilizers available in the marketplace and those distributed by the State were of comparable quality.[47]

154. **The cost of the food crop fertilizer subsidy operation is modest in relation to the annual amounts devoted to agriculture, which totaled around CFAF 110 billion per year on average over the 2008–2011 period (Table 6).** The operation's total cost is estimated at around CFAF 23 billion over the 2008–2011 period, or just under CFAF 6 billion per crop year on average.[48] Although the net cost of the subsidy to the State taking

[46]Source for this section: Agricultural Inputs working paper.

[47]A study conducted by the International Fertilizer Development Center (IFDC) on the quality of the fertilizer distributed by retailers based on 49 fertilizer samples collected from 22 retailers of agricultural inputs in 14 towns in Burkina Faso resulted in the following findings: (i) deliberate cheating on the stated weight of 250g/kg by 57% of the retailers; (ii) cheating on the mineral components, especially 15 15 15 fertilizers, over 2 to 3 major components, and a potassium deficiency in NPKSB cotton fertilizer involving 80% of cotton fertilizer samples.

[48]The cost of the operation for each crop year was as follows: 2008/2009: CFAF 5.2 billion; 2009/2010: CFAF 5.9 billion; 2011/2012: CFAF 6.7 billion. The cost of the operation 2010/2011 could not be determined precisely but was estimated at around CFAF 5 billion. In 2012/2013, the operation cost CFAF 5.8 billion.

into account the revenues generated by the sale of fertilizers is not known precisely, based on a 52% subsidy rate for the 2009/2010 crop year, 34% for 2011/2012, and a hypothetical 35% for 2010/2011 (for which data are lacking), it can be estimated at around CFAF 9 billion for the four years, or around CFAF 2.3 billion per crop year on average, or barely 2% of the allocation devoted to agriculture each year over the period.

155. **Although the direct distribution of fertilizer by the State raised a number of issues during the first crop year (2008/2009), these issues appear on their way to being resolved:**

i. **First, the cost of purchasing and distributing fertilizer by the State as part of its implementation of the subsidy was quite high in 2008/2009.** During that crop year, the average cost of purchasing and delivering a ton of fertilizer to the DRAH warehouse rose to CFAF 517,000, whereas in that same year, delivery by the cotton companies of a ton of fertilizer to the cotton producer groups (GPC) cost CFAF 347,000, an additional cost of nearly 50%. Moreover, the GPC warehouses are generally found in more remote locations than are those of the DRAH. However, it would seem that this problem subsequently became less acute as the additional cost was over 7% in 2009 but less than 3% in 2011.

ii. **Second, deliveries of subsidized food crop fertilizer in 2008/2009 arrived too late for optimum use by producers.** During that crop year, only 30% of the imported fertilizer was used during the main crop season because of delays in application. However, the rate of use rose to 72% for the 2009/2010 crop year, and the dates by which the fertilizers are applied now seem satisfactory.

156. **On the other hand, the mechanism used by the State to help vulnerable producers acquire the fertilizers (direct distribution) has an impact on the business operations of fertilizer distributors. In fact, the subsidized fertilizer is being substituted for the fertilizer that had previously been purchased at the full price, and the subsidy did not increase the quantities of food crop fertilizer used (Table 15).** Although information concerning the supply and distribution of fertilizer in Burkina Faso is scare and incomplete, the data provided by the Cotton Companies Association (APROCOP) and the Directorate of Agricultural and Food Forecasting and Statistics (DPSAA) (Ongoing Agricultural Survey – EPA) make it possible to estimate that in 2008 and 2009, the quantities of fertilizer used in cotton and food crop production were virtually identical, hovering around 60–70,000 tons per year each. During the 2008/2009 crop year, the 61,000 tons of food crop fertilizer used consisted of virtually identical shares from the cotton companies (45%) and input suppliers (51%), while subsidized fertilizer distributed by the State accounted for less than 3,000 tons (5%) that year. During the 2009/2010 crop year, the fertilizer used for food crops still totaled 61,000 tons and consisted of almost equal (though smaller) shares between the cotton companies (40%) and the input suppliers (38%), while the subsidized fertilizers distributed by the State increased to 13,000 tons (22%).

157. **These estimates indicate that the fertilizer distributed by the cotton companies and used on food crops represented 29% of the total fertilizer distributed by the cotton companies in 2008 and 2009, a net decline from previous years (59% in 2008 and 52% in 2009).**

Table 15: Sources of supply and use of fertilizers in Burkina Faso, 1993–2010, tons

Year	Imports	Use					Supplied by Cotton companies (E)	Source of food crop fertilizers		
		Cereals (A)	Other food crops (B)	Cash crops (C)	Of which: cotton (D)	Total (A+B+C)		Cotton companies (F=E-D)	Subsidized by the State (G)	Other (A+B-F-G)
1993	-	20,017	210	15,653	15,405	35,880	-	-	0	-
1994	-	20,635	273	27,948	27,642	48,856	-	-	0	-
1995	67,102	21,153	192	22,047	21,691	43,391	-	-	0	-
1996	56,319	20,049	163	28,931	28,778	49,143	-	-	0	-
1997	94,404	25,960	211	40,140	39,922	66,312	-	-	0	-
1998	105,793	31,698	551	47,840	47,668	80,090	-	-	0	-
1999	102,803	31,483	311	31,467	31,048	63,260	-	-	0	-
2000	42,585								0	
2001	6,823								0	
2002	11,009	42,176	597	55,018	-	97,791	-	-	0	-
2003	129,527	52,809	908	64,070	63,123	117,787	-	-	0	-
2004	149,425	47,842	798	78,715	78,005	127,355	-	-	0	-
2005	145,381	76,178	1,242	94,875	91,555	172,295	-	-	0	-
2006	175,508	48,487	1,872	69195	66,746	119,554	161,200	94,454	0	-
2007	124,971	41,453	732	42,188	41,176	84,373	85,120	43,944	0	-
2008	85,944	59,708	1,400	68,934	67,381	130,042	94,580	27,199	2,991	30,918
2009	109,893	59,629	1,060	60,703	59,551	121,392	83,880	24,329	13,065	23,295
2010	167,188	-	-	-	-	-	74,320	-	-	

Sources: Imports: UN-STAT, IFDC, Customs Office (MEF)
Use: EPA (DGPER/DPSAA)
Supplies by cotton companies: APROCOP
Origin of food crop fertilizes: DGPV and authors' calculations
See details in Agricultural Inputs working paper

158. **During the emergency caused by the spike in food prices in 2008, the fertilizer subsidy program was launched with no appropriate M&E mechanism and without establishing a baseline for the beneficiaries.** Consequently, we have little information on the program's actual impact. Were the beneficiaries already using fertilizers? With what application rate? What yields were they achieving? These are all questions without answers. According to the reports prepared by the DIMA, the program benefited 163,754 producers in 2008/2009, 345,589 in 2009/2010, and 143,709 in 2011/2012, or 3 to 7% of the total number of producers.[49] These reports indicate that the best yields obtained among farmers who purchased subsidized fertilizers reached 2.8 to 3 tons/ha for corn, 3 to 3.75 tons/ha for rice, and 700 kg/for cowpeas and sorghum, but they provide no information on the earlier situation. However, the data do show an appreciable rise in yields of corn and rice on irrigated perimeters and developed lowlands (Figure 36), which benefited heavily from subsidized fertilizer.

Figure 36: Change in rice and corn yields on irrigated perimeters and developed lowlands, 2006–2010, kg/ha



[49]Estimated at 4.9 million in 2010/2011 (DGPER/DPSAA).

Source: Agricultural Input working paper, EPA (DGPER/DPSAA)

159. **Moreover, an analysis of the history of fertilizer use on food crops indicates that these subsidies curbed the decline noted in the use of these inputs following the spike in their prices (Figure 37).**

160. **On the other hand, while the application rate for fertilizer used on cereals increased, the portion of plots benefiting from fertilizer declined slightly (Figure 38).** It can be deduced from this that the fertilizer price subsidy was effective in increasing the use of mineral fertilizer by some farmers but did not manage to expand access to it by all farmers. While one group of farmers (those who had access to the program) increased their consumption of fertilizer, the others reduced theirs, thus reducing the fairness of the program.

Figure 37: Application rates for mineral fertilizer applied by crop type, 1993–2009, kg/ha



Source: Agricultural Input working paper, EPA (DGPER/DPSAA)

Figure 38: Change in average application rates of fertilizer used and proportion of plots benefiting from mineral fertilizer, 2007–2009, kg/ha, %



Source: Agricultural Input working paper, EPA (DGPER/DPSAA)

161. **In tandem with the fertilizer subsidy program, beginning with the 2008/2009 crop year, the government instituted a subsidized distribution program for improved-variety seed.** The seed, which involves several lines of production depending on the agro-ecological area (corn, cowpeas, sesame, sorghum, groundnuts, millet, rice, and cassava cuttings), is purchased by the MAH and the DPs that fund the operation from the National Union of Seed Producers (UNPSB), which coordinates seed collection among its members. Total seed quantities purchased varied between 6,000 and 7,000 tons per crop year.

162. **The subsidy rate in relation to the price paid to the seed producers is much higher than for fertilizer,** reaching over 90% in 2008/2009 (for seed purchased at between CFAF 500 and 700/kg and resold at CFAF 40/kg), and slightly below 90% in the following years (with the resale price raised to CFAF 67/kg).

163. **This program more than doubles the land area planted with improved seed, which went from less than 4% in 2007/2008 to 10% in 2008/2009. However,** the rate of use of improved seed remains modest. According to the reports prepared by the DIMA, the program benefited 300,000 producers in 2008/2009, 268,000 in 2009/2010, and 407,762 in 2011/2012.

164. **However, this intervention in the seed markets by the State and its partners leads to distortions that disadvantage the development of a viable seed market.** The State buys the seed at prices greatly above the market price, thus reducing the possibilities of supply for input distributors (for example, cowpea and sorghum seed is bought by the State from seed manufacturers at CFAF 700 and 500/kg, respectively, whereas input distributors buy it at CFAF 425 and 300/kg and resell it retail at CFAF 500 and 425, respectively). However, the quantities bought by the State sometimes exceed its certification capacity, which in some cases leads to seed of doubtful quality being put on the market.

165. **In conclusion, despite the absence of appropriate M&E for these programs, the information gathered for this review indicates that subsidized seed and fertilizer distribution had a positive impact on the beneficiaries, who increased their use of these inputs as well as their yields. However, because of their very low incidence (fewer than 10% of farmers were involved), these programs have not had any impact on domestic agricultural production, especially as non-beneficiary producers reduced their consumption of fertilizer. As a result,** we see no significantly positive change in average domestic yields nationally for most of the main food crops since the start of subsidy programs (Table 16).

Table 16: Change in yields for main food crops, 2005–2011, tons/ha

	2005	2006	2007	**Average 2005–2007**	2008	2009	2010	2011	**Average 2008–2011**
Millet	0.91	0.96	0.82	**0.90**	0.80	0.77	0.84	0.72	**0.78**
Corn	1.81	1.94	1.13	**1.63**	1.67	1.53	1.43	1.54	**1.54**
Rice	1.78	2.58	1.70	**2.02**	2.27	2.32	2.02	1.77	**2.09**
Sesame	0.54	0.48	0.34	**0.46**	0.56	0.60	0.72	0.70	**0.65**
Groundnut	0.80	0.69	0.59	**0.70**	0.94	0.72	0.83	0.68	**0.79**
Soy	1.70	1.14	0.80	**1.21**	2.73	1.45	1.26	0.89	**1.58**
Cowpea	0.68	0.72	0.48	**0.63**	0.79	0.65	0.79	0.69	**0.73**

Sorghum	1.09	1.14	0.94	**1.06**	0.99	0.92	1.00	0.90	**0.95**

Source: Agricultural Input working paper, EPA (DGPER/DPSAA)

166. **We therefore need to evaluate how these programs could be expanded while improving their efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability even in the event of the gradual disappearance of the subsidy in the future, especially by involving more private distributors and strengthening the State's sovereign regulatory functions.**

167. **For food crop fertilizer, the following measures aiming at improvement might be considered:** (i) centralizing purchases through an institution combining the private sector and the State in order to achieve economies of scale on purchases and logistics, buying fertilizer in the international markets at the most opportune time and guaranteeing the quality of the products marketed; (ii) gradually leaving the distribution of these fertilizers to the private sector by subsidizing them at source (at the level of the selling price to distributors as a blanket subsidy) and/or by adopting a system of coupons distributed to targeted producers (as a targeted subsidy); (iii) strengthening the M&E for the entire system, and especially the monitoring of the targeted producers if this option is chosen; and (iv) enhancing quality control over all fertilizers present in the market place.

168. **For improved seed:** (i) building seed producers' capacity in order to increase their productivity; (ii) leaving seed distribution to the private sector while subsidizing the sector (as with fertilizers), either through a subsidy to the distributors or through a system of coupons distributed to the targeted producers; and (iii) increasing the State's certification capacity as well as its ability to monitor so-called "improved" seed in the market place.

5.3. The Special Case of Interventions in Support of Livestock Farmers[50]

169. **Although many actions have been taken on behalf of this sector, here too, the weakness of the overall coordination, the local agencies, and M&E limits their impact in terms of growth as well as the sustainability of the investments.** The Working Paper on Livestock lists many actions implemented during the study period by the MRA and the NGOs in terms of capacity building among the sector's operators, the development of cattle feed resources such as crop residue, natural fodder, fodder crops, agro-industrial by-products (AIBP), the development of pastoral areas and infrastructure, genetic progress, improvement of animal health, support for production and processing units, and marketing support. However, the lack of an appropriate M&E system makes it impossible to know the precise impact these actions are having and harms the capitalization and duplication of successful initiatives just as it prevents less successful actions from being adjusted. Nor is adequate attention paid to getting the beneficiary and resident populations to appropriate these actions, which limits the sustainability of the investments (e.g., pastoral areas invaded by migrant or indigenous populations). Consequently, the sector's great potential to contribute to growth is far from being exploited.

170. **In particular, the incidence and impact of subsidies on livestock feed are poorly documented and require an additional study.** These subsidies went to the following AIBP inputs: cottonseed cakes and cake chips, wheat bran and molasses, and salt licks and concentrated feed imported from Côte d'Ivoire. These products are currently sold for cash, primarily to livestock breeder associations (OPE), at subsidized prices that are 30 to 50% of their price on the market. In 2012, for example, the subsidy made it possible to deliver

[50]Source for this section: Livestock working paper.

concentrated feed to producers at a standard price of CFAF 4,500 per 50 kg sack, whereas on the market, the same product cost between CFAF 6,500 and 10,000 depending on the region and locality. However, the quantities covered by the subsidy, the reasons for major variation from one crop year to another, what they represent in terms of supply and demand,[51] the number, type, and location of the beneficiaries, and the total cost of the operation could not be determined precisely in this study in the absence of readily accessible information. Hence, it is difficult to make specific recommendations for upgrading this system.

171. **The State's intervention in the AIBP market was motivated by economic crisis (emergencies associated with rainfall shortages and locust invasions along with the risks of conflict these create) and by the structural deficiencies of the market for these products. Being in need of contacts dealing in large volumes in order to sell their by-products, the agro-industries placed oil and flour merchants in a monopolistic situation in terms of AIBPs whereas the goal of maximum financial development by these traders added to their lack of interest in serving areas far from the urban centers penalize the breeders, especially in lean periods.** There is also the problem of monitoring the quality of the various by-products on the market as the origin and composition of these feeds are generally unknown, which raises issues with the dissemination and application of the efficient rations determined by research. Moreover, the promotion of semi-intensive and intensive breeding, and in particular the gradual introduction of improved breeds, highlight the need for feed supplements.

172. **The relevance of a long-term strategy based in large part—even in non-crisis times—on a subsidy involving a very limited proportion of the supply and demand rather than on remedying the failures found in the marketplace is questionable. Together with appropriate investments in storage and improving the accessibility of stock-raising areas,** a strengthened producers' organization would be better able to provide a sustainable solution and give breeders access to AIBPs at competitive prices. Consideration could be given to an additional study with the aim of clarifying the conditions and costs of the subsidy operation and analyzing the feasibility of alternative or complementary solutions, especially the possibility of federating the breeders involved with AIBPs so that, with the support of the State and the DPs, they could become valid partners of the processing industries and buy their products.

173. **We should also question the viability of some initiatives taken by the State to attempt to partly resolve the structural defects of the above-mentioned market to the extent that these initiatives are marked by an interventionist bias and do not call for involving the private sector in a second phase, in particular, the construction now under way of a cattle feed production plant by SOFAB, and a project involving the construction of a 50,000-ton storage facility, both with public funding.**

174. **More generally, the following recommendations are intended to ensure the efficient implementation of PAPISE (Action Plan and Investment Program for the Livestock Sub-Sector) and PNDEL (National Policy for Sustainable Livestock Development):**

i. **Increase the budget and improve the effectiveness of disbursement**

[51] Interviews with stakeholders in the field indicated that the subsidy operation does not affect the cost of animal feed in the markets, probably because the quantities of AIBPs falling within the scope of the subsidy remain insignificant in relation to the supply available from the plants and the needs of users. Moreover, State subsidies would have allowed coverage of barely 20% of the supplementary needs expressed by the OPEs.

mechanisms, especially in terms of investments, in order to better account for the position and potential of the livestock sub-sector within the national economy;

ii. **Increase allocations to the implementing institutions** to enable them to build their capacity to operate and support the stakeholders;

iii. **Emphasize M&E** for the implementation of PAPISE in order to regularly assess the results obtained and make any adjustments, and especially enhance the operational capacities of the MRA in terms of data sampling, collection, processing, and storage through the creation of a database and the dissemination of the data;

iv. **Improve consultancy and support services by increasing the MRA's operational capacities and improving the quality of the services available to breeders.** To this end, it will be necessary to increase and train technical personnel and increase the material and logistical resources needed to ensure good coverage of stock-raising areas;

v. **Have the OPEs** become more involved in knowledge and technology transfer and the organization needed to supply livestock inputs;

vi. **Develop a strong partnership between the public agencies, the private sector, and professionals in the various animal and associated industries.** In particular, involve the private sector in defining and implementing breeder support services (consultancy and support services, input supply, capacity building, etc.);

vii. **Make greater efforts to improve access to livestock-raising areas,** in partnership with the MID and the MATD.

viii. **Commission a specific study to evaluate the impact of animal-feed subsidy operations** in order to institute a more suitable and viable process for supplying breeders with AIBPs;

ix. **As soon as possible, conduct an in-depth study of the economic and financial return on feed crops** as part of the specialization of certain producers or certain regions for the purpose of proposing a technical and economic benchmark for feed crops that takes into account the potential of the regions in question.

175. **In the forestry sub-sector (forests, hunting, aquaculture), Burkina Faso has already achieved a series of results, especially in terms of the sustainable management of forests and participation by communities and the private sector in exploiting and managing resources,** including forestry management groups, village-based hunting zones (ZOVIC), and wildlife concessions.

176. **However, the study revealed a number of significant weaknesses:**

i. The good practices developed have not often been subjected to M&E or to appropriate documentation. They are therefore not well known to the stakeholders themselves and have not been suitably replicated;

ii. The MEDD's weakness in the field, which is due to a lack of personnel and

resources, has been partly offset by the significant effort of the NGOs, which often play a forerunner and R&D role in environmental matters, in direct association with local populations and communities. However, the work of these NGOs is insufficiently recognized, coordinated, and utilized by the government, which in some cases competes with them;

iii. The actions carried out up to now have primarily involved the SP 3.1 sub-program of the PNSR (environmental governance) rather than the SP 3.4 sub-program (development of forestry, wildlife, and fishery production). This trend needs to be reversed, as called for by the PNSR. In particular, the potential in terms of domestication and production of non-timber forestry products (NTFP) and aquaculture, especially in association with rice growing, remains underexploited in relation to the possible outlets and management of the wildlife resource in concession areas, which does not seem to be adequately monitored;

iv. The MEDD is also too disengaged in matters that are potentially of great interest for the country, such as renewable energy (solar, biodigester, etc.) and pastoral area management;

v. Coordination with the DPs has not been sufficiently exploited despite the fact that these have formed a task force dedicated to environmental issues;

vi. In general, MEDD staffing levels are inadequate in terms of both personnel and training, and its mission is too focused on environmental policing to the detriment of sustainable development of the contribution of natural resources to economic growth and poverty reduction.

5.4. The Special Case of Interventions in Forestry[52]

177. **It is therefore desirable to redefine environmental priorities and re-establish and organize the MEDD and its relations with its partners (local populations and communities, private operators, NGOs, DPs, research institutions, etc.).** This would help clarify the role of each actor as well as any needs in terms of upgrading the legislative and regulatory framework. Such environmental partnerships would also offer opportunities to assess needs in terms of capacity-building for the various actors, and especially the resources the MEDD needs to fulfill its sovereign role in setting guidelines, conducting M&E and coordinating initiatives, promoting good practices, supporting decentralization, resolving conflicts, and implementing the regulatory framework and monitoring compliance by all operators.

178. **As natural resources constitute the basis for development of the entire primary sector and hence all PNSR sub-programs, its successful implementation necessarily requires increased attention to environmental issues. The forestry sub-sector has as yet under-used potential in terms of economic growth and poverty reduction for rural populations, which could be realized if appropriate support were to be given to production and diversification.**

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

[52] Source for this section: Forestry working paper.

179. **Public expenditures in the agricultural sector attained or exceeded the target of 10% of the national budget set by the Maputo Declaration for the majority of the period under consideration. It is also rising, thanks in particular to a strong increase in national funding earmarked for the sector.** This reflects the priority the government ascribes to this sector, whose central role in the economy and potential in terms of growth and poverty reduction it recognizes.

180. **In addition, the country has implemented a large number of reforms in the civil service and in public finance management. These reforms paved the way for a significant increase in efficiency in terms of budget planning and execution.** Other, very important reforms are ongoing, such as the implementation of the budget program and the decentralization process.

181. **However, despite the significant resources made available to the sector and the continual improvement in budget planning and execution and despite the occasional positive experience in a large number of areas of rural development, it must be said that the overall outcomes in terms of the sector's contribution to growth and poverty reduction was disappointing over the period considered.** Average annual agricultural growth was only 3.5% in real terms from 2004 to 2011 (see Annex 2) and was largely due to the expansion in the cultivated land area that resulted not from an increase in average farm size but from vigorous population growth (3.1%).[53] As shown above (Table 16), average yields of most food crops did not increase significantly, and the vulnerability of the sector—and therefore of the national economy—to climatic risks has not diminished. Agricultural growth contributed only 29% to overall growth in current terms over the period, which is highly insufficient for a sector that sustains 86% of the country's population. As a result, rural poverty decreased only marginally during the period, from 52.3% in 2003 to 50.7% in 2009 (MEF 2010c).

182. **Consequently, the "Burkinabe paradox" concept already used to describe the health and education sectors (World Bank 2009) can be applied to the agricultural sector to describe the considerable government resources allocated to the sector and the significant effort made to improve budget planning and execution processes accompanied by disappointing results in terms of growth and poverty reduction due to the poor quality of the public expenditures.**

183. **As was underscored in the 2009 Agriculture Public Expenditure Review (Savadogo et al. 2009), the case of Burkina Faso therefore provides a clear illustration of the fact that considerable public expenditures are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for improving the standard of living of rural households. The quality of the public expenditures in terms of content, organization, and M&E is also vital.**

184. **The failure of the agricultural sector to contribute sufficiently to national growth was one of the reasons behind the switch from PRSF to SAGSD in 2010,** with the latter adopting a poverty reduction policy more focused on developing production capacity and setting an ambitious target for the primary sector of 9.5% annual average growth in real terms over the period 2011–2015.

185. **The key question today is therefore how to improve the quality of public agricultural expenditures over the previous decade to meet the targets set in the SAGSD.**

[53] For example, from 2000 to 2006, total farmed land area increased by 28%, or 4.3% per year on average, while farmed land per farmer varied little around an average of 0.66 ha/farmer. Source: DGPER/ReSAKSS 2008.

If this question is not addressed, the same mixed results may well be found when evaluating the SAGSD as in the PRSF, for the same reasons.

186. **One of the main findings of this review is that the large number of initiatives and projects, the lack of overall vision and coordination, the near-complete lack of M&E, the low level of R&D, and the lack of resources available to the decentralized public services available to the decentralized authorities are the main factors behind the poor quality of public expenditure in agriculture,** preventing in particular the accumulation and dissemination of successful experiments and adjustments to those that are less successful. Accordingly, the impact of agricultural expenditures has a long way to go before it can be maximized.

187. **For better-quality public expenditures in agriculture that generate a greater degree of ownership, incidence, impact, and sustainability, the authors recommend the following broad policy lines:**

i. **Rationalization and increased efficiency at the central level:**

- ✓ **Effective switch to the budget program, a precondition for successful implementation of the PNSR**. In particular, this requires: (a) Appointment of sub-program leaders with a strong hierarchical status that gives them authority over all activities in their sub-program, including projects, and makes them accountable for achieving the sub-program targets; (b) Restructuring of personnel in order to align with PNSR sub-programs; and (c) Definition of a vision and a clear strategy for each sub-sector, accompanied by performance indicators. The rural sector ministries are at a pivotal phase in their effective switch to the budget program, requiring clear political commitment at the highest level and the support of DPs;

- ✓ **Increased alignment of DPs with national strategies and procedures,** in particular effective cooperation with MEF on IEFS;

- ✓ **Operationalization of IEFS for the rural development ministries** in order to enable the accounting treatment and monitoring of external resources;

- ✓ **Increase in the number of basket funds, trust funds, and sectoral budget support** in order to put an end to the excessive number of projects and reduce the transactions costs of public development aid;

- ✓ **Alignment of provisional budgets for projects included in the initial and supplementary budget laws, with amounts actually adopted by projects in their work programs and annual budgets;**

- ✓ **Inclusion of all agricultural development projects in the budget of the rural sector ministries,** including the agricultural sections of projects managed by other ministries, agricultural expenditures financed under inter-ministerial expenditures and off-budget projects, in order to improve the visibility of the projects and relevant ministries' ability to run the sector and to promote their empowerment through results-based management. Agricultural projects financed under inter-ministerial expenditures during the fiscal year (including unforeseen expenditures when the initial budget law was drafted) should be included in the supervisory ministry's budget in the supplementary budget law or settlement law. Likewise, the livestock breeding section of

multi-sector projects under the MAH budget should be included in the MRA budget;

- ✓ **Better functional distribution of expenditures, in particular, increased support for livestock breeding, R&D, and forestry** (including freshwater fisheries and fauna). For the livestock breeding sub-sector in particular, the source of financing of FODEL—which is a very interesting experiment in self-financing by a sub-sector—should be optimized. R&D cannot rely solely on WAAPP support, which is still at the start-up stage and is limited in time as well as in terms of the sectors concerned (fruit and vegetables). In the absence of sufficient private funding, it needs to be able to draw on substantial national public financing guaranteed over the long term. The link between research and production should also be optimized;

- ✓ **Improved cost accounting,** with better separation of operating costs, including those borne by projects, better monitoring of investments made at the level of support services and of beneficiaries, and better monitoring of the regional distribution of expenditures;

- ✓ **Setting up systematic budgeting mechanisms for the recurrent costs of investment maintenance** at the level of public services, public infrastructures, and infrastructures transferred to beneficiaries;

- ✓ **Implementation at all levels of an effective M&E system** coupled with an efficient information archiving and dissemination mechanism;

- ✓ **Additional effort to reduce delays in procurement procedures;**

- ✓ **Closer and more systematic involvement of sector actors (such as agricultural trade associations and the private sector) in general policy formation and implementation,** with reduced intervention from the government and the acknowledgement that public service targets and operating methods should not be imposed on private operators but that their involvement remains vital to the sustainability and large-scale replication of positive initiatives, which is a precondition for meeting the SAGSD objectives and targets;

- ✓ **Strategic reorientation of irrigation development toward simple, adapted, and inexpensive HADs, carried out at the request and with maximum involvement of private sector farmers' associations.**

- ✓ **Improvement in farm input and livestock feed subsidy programs in order** to increase their efficiency and effectiveness as well as their impact on the national economy, on the basis in particular of greater involvement of agricultural trade associations and of the private sector, and search for possible appropriate alternative strategies in order to resolve imperfections in the markets targeted by the subsidies;

- ✓ **Clarification of priorities, the role of the various operators, and the resources needed in terms of capacity building in the forestry sector and, more broadly, in natural resource management;**

- ✓ **Elsewhere, greater investment in order to improve access to rural areas,** and implementation of a scheme designed to involve local communities in the maintenance of rural feeder roads (MID).

ii. Rationalization and increased efficiency at the decentralized level:

- ✓ **Increased resources and responsibilities (through gradual delegation of more loans) for the regional directorates** so that they may play their rightful role in the regional deployment of the PNSR and increase their support to decentralized authorities and local initiatives;

- ✓ **Rationalization (covering donor and government basket funds) and increase in the resources granted to financing facilities for local initiatives (public and private),** with active involvement of decentralized public services drawing on the experience acquired from projects such as PADAB and PNGT;

- ✓ **Better coordination and pooling of resources between decentralized rural development public services.**

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ANNEX 1: METHODS

1. Period under Review

The Terms of Reference for the analysis prescribed a review period of 10 years, that is, from 2002 to 2011. Given that new budgetary nomenclature was introduced along with the 2004 fiscal year, the Monitoring and Steering Committee (MSC) decided that the review would cover only the 2004–2011 period.

2. Data Sources

2.1 Computerized Expenditure System (CES) of the Directorate General of the Budget (DGB)

The sample taken from the CES captures expenditures (personnel costs, operational expenses, and transfers and investments) funded from internal resources.

2.2 Initial and adjusted budget laws

2.3 Directorate of Project Evaluation and Investment Monitoring (DEPSI) program

TA Public Investment Program (PIP) accompanies public investments independently of the source of financing. More specifically, DEPSI creates the PIP by collecting information from the technical directorates and project units.

2.4 Directorate General of Cooperation (DGCOOP)

Data from the DGCOOP were limited to investments funded from external resources. The sample is composed of disbursements of external resources for which the DGCOOP was account manager until 2011.

2.5 Program and project activity reports

In addition to these sources, additional data were drawn from approximately 120 reports issued by project implementation units, the research and planning directorates of rural development ministries, and DPs. Reports included project development reports, annual project activity reports, evaluation reports, and end-of-project reports. They were used to break down agricultural expenditure under the National Rural Sector Program's sub-programs.

3. Projected Budgets and Budget Executions Funded from Internal Resources of the Central Government and Rural Development Ministries (MAH, MRA, MEDD)

3.1 The projected budgets of the central government and the rural development ministries (MDR) were obtained from the DGB/MEF (personnel costs, operational expenses, transfer, and investments). In addition, information was also obtained concerning the

special accounts for specific operations but executed through the expenditure circuit of the central budget.

3.2 Executions funded by internal resources as well as expenditures from special accounts were also provided by the DGB/MEF through the integrated expenditure system.

4. Executions Funded from External Resources

Expenditures funded from external resources were not subject to accounting treatment during the review period but formed part of a non-accounting compilation by two different MEF departments, the Directorate General of Cooperation (DGCOOP), and the Directorate of Project Evaluation and Investment Monitoring (DEPSI).

4.1 The DGCOOP was the official delegated authorizing agency for these expenditures until March 2011, when it was replaced by the Treasury. However, a significant portion of disbursements bypassed the DGCOOP due to non-compliance with national procedures by some projects and DPs.

4.2 The DEPSI records expenditures by projects included in the Public Investment Program (PIP) based on questionnaires sent to various coordination units through the directorates of research and planning of the MDR.

Although it is likely to contain numerous errors, the DEPSI database is considered more complete and was used here to estimate expenditures executed from external resources by the various ministries in question.

5. Analysis of Support Level to the Agricultural Sector Using the COFOG Method

5.1 In the Maputo declaration in 2003, African governments made the commitment to increase the share of their national budgets going to agriculture, with an objective of at least 10%. Following this declaration, NEPAD detailed the terms and conditions for calculating the share of agricultural expenditure in national budgets by issuing a methodology document (AA/NEPAD 2005). This document defined effective public expenditures (not allocated budgets) following the United Nation's Classification of the Functions of Government (COFOG) in the extended agricultural sector, which includes the domains of agriculture (crop and animal productions), forestry (including silviculture other than timber production), and hunting and fishing. Expenditures for applied research in each of these sectors was taken into account. However, expenditures for supplying drinking water and feeder roads as well as purely environmental expenses were not taken into consideration as expenditures, following NEPAD procedures.

5.2 To calculate the level of support to agriculture in Burkina Faso as defined by NEPAD, the following elements were collected from the organizations in question and added to expenditures executed by the MDRs, excluding drinking water, feeder roads, and purely environmental actions.

5.2.1 Public agricultural expenditures not included in the national budget and implemented with some support from the MDRs:

- ✓ **Projects identified in the PIP but not included in the budget law**

Agricultural expenditures executed under these projects amounted to CFAF 46.6 billion for the 2004–2011 period, or 8% of total agricultural expenditure included in the budget law.

- ✓ **Projects identified by the DGCOOP but not included in the PIP or in the budget law**

Agricultural expenditures executed under these projects and financed by traditional donors amounted to CFAF 96 billion for the 2004–2011 period, or 17% of total expenditures allocated to agriculture under the budget law. It is important to note that some DPs (EU, Sweden, Japan, Switzerland, UNDP) enlisted the aid of NGOs in executing these projects. This represented CFAF 24 billion for the same period.

5.2.2 Actions benefitting rural development carried out by other ministries

Actions benefitting agriculture carried out by other ministries totaled CFAF 37.5 billion for the 2004–2011 period, or 6.6% of agricultural expenditures included under the budget law.

- ✓ **The Ministry of the Economy and Development (MEDEV),** which merged in 2007 with the Ministry of Finance and of the Budget to form the current Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), oversaw seven local development projects (PDL) or equivalent[54], including the Municipality-Based Poverty Reduction Project (PRPC), Rural Micro-Enterprise Support Projects (PAMER), National Multifunctional Platform Program for the Fight Against Poverty (PN-PTF/LCP), and the agriculture windows of the micro-finance component of the Burkina Faso Agricultural Support Program (PADAB II) and the National Strategic Micro-Finance Action Plan (PASNMF), for which agricultural expenditures were estimated at 43%, 50%, 65%, 50%, and 70% for both PADAB II and PASNMF of executed expenditures, respectively.

- ✓ **The Ministry of Secondary and Higher Education and Scientific Research (MESSRS)**, now split into the Ministry of Secondary and Higher Education (MESS) and the Ministry of Scientific Research and Innovation (MRSI), oversaw the national institutes for agricultural research (National Agricultural and Environmental Research Institute – INERA, and Applied Sciences and Technological Research Institute – IRSAT). These institutes benefitted until 2004 from support from the National Program for Agricultural Services Development (PNDSA), which in turn was financed by the World Bank in addition to national counterpart financing.

- ✓ **The Ministry of Youth, Professional Training, and Employment (MJFPE)** implemented from 2007 onward the Employment Support Fund (FAPE) and the Youth Initiative Support Fund (FAIJ), which were financed exclusively from internal resources, for which at least 70% of funding was considered to have financed agricultural firms and especially to have assisted young crop and livestock farmers to set up their operations.

- ✓ **The Ministry of Trade, Enterprise Promotion, and Crafts (MCPEA),** superintends the Permanent Secretariat for the Monitoring of the Cotton Industry and conducts a limited number of actions financed exclusively from internal resources benefiting the development of agricultural sub-sectors (e.g., organization of regional fairs, fruit and vegetables trading posts, Bobo-Dioulasso slaughterhouse, etc.);

[54]The Eastern Burkina Local Development Support Project (ADELE), financed by Switzerland and for which Phase 3 was completed in 2009; Komandjari PDL and the Séno-Yagha Natural Resources Management Program (PGRN), financed by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) and completed in 2006; the Zoudwéogo, Sanguié-Boulkiemdé, Sanmatenga, and Oudalan PDLs, funded by The Netherlands with national counterpart financing and completed in 2006.

- ✓ **The Ministry for the Promotion of Women (MPF) implemented a Shea Butter** project financed by Taiwan with national counterpart financing and completed in 2008;

- ✓ **The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD)** implemented until 2007 the local Séno-Yagha Investment Fund, for which 70% of expenditures was estimated to have benefitted the agricultural sector, and in 2009, a construction program for markets;

- ✓ **The Ministry of Infrastructure and Improved Access (MID)** occasionally intervenes in the construction of dams with an agricultural purpose;

- ✓ **The Prime Minister's Office** superintends since 2009 a large program financed by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) with national counterpart financing and targeting early education, roads, and agricultural infrastructure. Agriculture's share of total expenditures was estimated at 16%.

5.2.3 Agricultural expenditures executed under Section 99 (Inter-ministerial Joint Expenditures)

- ✓ **A significant number of expenditures funded from internal resources and benefiting the agricultural sector were executed each year under Section 99 (Joint Inter-ministerial Expenditures) of the budget law.** This included subsidies to cotton firms and passed on to producers in the form of input subsidies, recapitalization of cotton firms, public funding for the creation or development of other agro-industrial firms, emergency operations for combating the food crisis (e.g., subsidies for food products and agricultural inputs, repairs to dams, etc.), funds released as part of the national counterpart financing of projects not initially listed in the budget act, and the discharge of unpaid debt from previous financial years. All of these expenditures for the 2004–2011 period totaled CFAF 100 billion.

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ANNEX 2: BASE DATA

Table A1: MAH, provisional and executed budgets, 2004–2012, billion FCFA

	Personnel (Heading II)		Operations (Heading III)		Current Transfers (Heading IV)		IR Investments (Heading V)		ER Investments (Heading V)		Total	
	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures
2004	5.6	4.1	1.3	0.6	1.4	1.4	9.9	10.2	77.6	47.6	95.9	63.8
2005	6.2	4.1	1.3	1.0	2.1	2.1	9.8	8.6	84.3	53.3	103.6	69.1
2006	5.1	5.3	1.2	1.1	2.3	1.7	15.1	12.0	101.3	75.7	125.0	95.8
2007	5.0	4.8	1.4	1.0	2.3	1.8	17.9	10.4	91.2	64.2	117.7	82.3
2008	4.7	4.7	1.1	0.7	2.0	1.7	23.4	18.2	78.4	44.3	109.5	69.5
2009	5.0	5.1	0.9	0.7	2.0	1.8	20.6	18.9	82.4	32.3	110.9	58.8
2010	5.8	5.5	0.9	0.7	2.3	1.9	31.9	30.6	77.9	47.9	118.7	86.6
2011	6.4	5.9	0.9	0.7	2.3	2.0	42.9	46.7	90.1	42.3	142.6	97.6
2012	7.4		0.9		2.8		64.4		97.1		172.7	
Total	51.2	39.5	9.7	6.4	19.5	14.5	235.9	155.7	780.2	407.6	1,096.6	623.5

Note: Contributions from the *Fonds Spécial de Croissance Economique et Sociale et Réduction de la Pauvreté* for the 2004–2006 period inclusive.
Sources: CES (DGB) for IR projections and expenditures; DEPSI for ER expenditures (provisional data for 2011).

Table A2: Provisional and executed budgets, 2004–2012, billion FCFA

	Personnel (Heading II)		Operations (Heading III)		Current Transfers (Heading IV)		IR Investments (Heading V)		ER Investments (Heading V)		Total	
	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures
2004	1.6	1.3	0.8	0.5	0.3	0.2	2.1	1.6	3.0	1.9	7.9	5.4
2005	1.5	1.1	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.3	2.0	0.7	3.1	2.2	7.8	4.7
2006	1.3	1.4	0.7	0.4	0.4	0.3	1.8	1.1	3.6	3.1	7.8	6.3
2007	1.8	1.7	0.7	0.3	0.5	0.3	2.4	0.9	9.6	1.2	14.9	4.4
2008	1.5	1.8	0.6	0.4	0.4	0.4	2.1	1.7	3.8	2.2	8.4	6.4
2009	1.6	2.0	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.9	1.8	6.5	4.4	10.9	8.8
2010	2.3	2.2	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.5	2.3	4.9	1.0	10.4	6.1
2011	2.1	2.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	2.1	1.9	5.5	3.3	10.4	8.0
2012	3.1		0.3		0.6		6.8		5.4		16.3	
Total	16.9	13.8	5.1	2.7	3.8	2.4	23.7	12.0	45.4	19.4	94.9	50.2

Note: Contributions from the *Fonds Spécial de Croissance Economique et Sociale et Réduction de la Pauvreté* for the 2004–2006 period inclusive.
Sources: CES (DGB) for IR projections and expenditures; DEPSI for ER expenditures (provisional data for 2011).

Table A3: Contributions from the *Fonds Spécial de Croissance Economique et Sociale et Réduction de la Pauvreté* to the MAH and MRA budgets, 2004–2006, thousands of FCFA

Initial Allocations

YEAR	MAH		Total MAH	MRA			Total MRA	Total MAH + MRA
	Title 3	Title 5		Title 2	Title 3	Title 5		
2004	676,375	2,863,625	3,540,000	30,000	440,000	1,300,000	1,770,000	5,310,000
2005	534,500	2,875,400	3,409,900	40,000	444,000	1,270,000	1,754,000	5,163,900
2006	250,000	2,230,000	2,480,000	30,000	337,000	873,000	1,240,000	3,720,000
Total	1,460,875	7,969,025	9,429,900	100,000	1,221,000	3,443,000	4,764,000	14,193,900

Expenditures

YEAR	MAH		Total MAH	MRA			Total MRA	Total MAH+MRA
	Title 3	Title 5		Title 2	Title 3	Title 5		
2004	82,092	3,662,036	3,744,128	0	212,082	1,184,778	1,396,860	5,140,988
2005	450,780	2,353,820	2,804,600	39,750	97,435	366,338	503,524	3,308,124
2006	533,096	2,124,835	2,657,931	29,912	216,716	527,346	773,973	3,431,904
Total	1,065,968	8,140,690	9,206,659	69,662	526,234	2,078,461	2,674,357	11,881,016

Source: MEF

Table A4: MEDD, provisional and executed budgets, 2004–2012, billion FCFA

	Personnel (Heading II)		Operations (Heading III)		Current Transfers (Heading IV)		IR Investments (Heading V)		ER Investments (Heading V)		Total	
	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures	Allocations	Expenditures
2004	1.8	1.2	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.5	0.4	2.7	2.2	6.1	4.5
2005	2.1	1.4	0.3	0.2	0.8	0.7	1.2	1.0	5.8	1.6	10.2	4.9
2006	1.3	1.4	0.4	0.2	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.4	3.2	3.2	6.5	5.9
2007	1.2	2.0	0.6	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.7	5.4	2.4	9.2	6.2
2008	1.8	2.2	0.5	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.6	1.3	4.0	2.1	8.8	6.7
2009	2.1	2.4	0.4	0.3	0.8	0.7	1.6	1.2	2.0	1.5	6.8	6.0
2010	2.6	2.6	0.5	0.5	0.7	0.5	1.0	0.6	2.2	1.0	7.0	5.2
2011	2.5	2.7	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.9	0.2	3.8	2.0	8.4	6.0
2012	3.4		0.5		0.7		1.5		3.1		9.3	
Total	18.9	15.9	4.2	2.7	6.7	5.2	10.2	5.9	32.2	16.1	72.1	45.6

Sources: CES (DGB) for IR projections and expenditures; DEPSI for ER expenditures (provisional data for 2011).

Table A5: National, provisional and executed budgets, 2004–2012, billion FCFA

	Amortization Debt Expense (Heading I)		Personnel (Heading II)		Operations (Heading III)		Current Transfers (Heading IV)		IR Investments (Heading V)		ER Investments (Heading V)		Capital Transfers (Heading VI)		Total General Budget		Special Accounts		Total	
	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.	Alloc.	Expd.
2004	78.8	77.5	121.0	120.9	62.6	62.1	111.6	107.6	73.9	77.8	216.1	155.4	2.1	1.8	666.1	603.1	64.7	37.2	730.8	640.3
2005	79.5	80.4	130.4	139.3	69.2	68.7	121.5	120.6	95.3	90.1	280.4	179.4	3.0	2.3	779.3	680.8	32.5	35.9	811.8	716.7
2006	70.7	62.0	150.2	161.2	80.2	79.5	145.9	143.8	109.7	115.8	331.5	230.0	4.0	3.3	892.2	795.6	46.5	39.5	938.7	835.1
2007	44.3	54.7	166.7	187.1	86.9	100.5	158.4	169.2	131.4	132.4	334.3	244.5	3.0	37.1	925.0	925.5	25.0	18.7	950.0	944.2
2008	46.5	52.3	193.7	198.8	100.3	94.2	159.4	167.7	182.9	175.6	287.6	168.5	13.7	6.2	984.1	863.3	25.9	22.8	1,010.0	886.1
2009	52.6	89.1	207.4	229.8	100.4	93.5	180.3	186.8	195.8	250.3	300.3	196.0	7.0	24.5	1,043.8	1,070.0	17.9	13.1	1,061.7	1,083.1
2010	59.7	67.1	242.0	245.4	100.2	90.7	190.0	187.3	280.3	295.8	270.7	219.3	9.4	3.8	1,152.3	1,109.4	15.6	11.7	1,167.9	1,121.1
2011	60.8	68.3	260.0	269.4	101.1	97.1	198.7	244.1	243.7	282.4	295.0	377.6	7.0	3.8	1,166.3	1,342.7	7.7	14.4	1,174.0	1,357.1
2012	70.1		319.9		104.0		227.8		307.2		365.5		6.3		1,400.8				1,400.8	
Total	563.0	551.4	1,791.3	1,551.9	804.9	686.3	1,493.6	1,327.1	1,620.2	1,420.2	2,681.4	1,770.7	55.5	82.8	9,009.9	7,390.4	235.8	193.3	9,245.7	7,583.7

[1] For the ER expenditures at the National level, it was decided to retain the higher amount between total PIP project expenditures provided by the DEPSI and the government authorizations provided by DGCOOP (provisional data for 2011).
Sources: CES (DGB) for RI projections and expenditures; DEPSI and DGCOOP for RE expenditures.

Figure A1: Overall national budget, evolution of provisional and executed budget, in current and real terms (2004 base), 2004–2012, billions FCFA



Sources: CID (DGB) for RI projections and expenditures; DEPSI and DGCOOP for RE expenditures (provisional data for 2011); http://data.worldbank.org/ for the GDP growth rate deflator used for the calculations of the real budgets; see the detailed data in Annex 2.

Table A6: MAH-MRA-MEDD, share of Heading II executed expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	0.485	0.099	0.655	0.167	0.134	0.111	0.065	0.129	0.042	0.130	0.279	0.012	4.240	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.550
2005	0.432	0.111	0.074	0.216	0.173	0.144	0.028	0.115	0.006	0.189	0.360	0.015	4.740	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.604
2006	1.026	0.115	0.440	0.306	0.245	0.204	0.036	0.163	0.052	0.637	0.510	0.000	4.338	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.073
2007	0.775	0.143	0.569	0.330	0.264	0.220	0.040	0.176	0.078	0.883	0.549	0.000	4.515	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.542
2008	0.816	0.162	0.534	0.350	0.280	0.233	0.048	0.187	0.006	0.979	0.584	0.009	4.413	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.603
2009	0.984	0.151	0.435	0.407	0.326	0.272	0.092	0.261	0.007	0.972	0.679	0.045	4.864	0.000	0.000	0.000	9.494
2010	1.023	0.202	0.462	0.427	0.342	0.285	0.116	0.280	0.009	0.127	0.711	0.066	6.271	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.320
2011	1.053	0.223	0.465	0.439	0.351	0.292	0.175	0.319	0.010	0.323	0.731	0.089	6.460	0.000	0.000	0.000	10.930
Total	6.595	1.207	3.635	2.642	2.115	1.762	0.600	1.630	0.209	4.241	4.404	0.237	39.841	0.000	0.000	0.000	69.117

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A7: MAH-MRA-MEDD, share of Heading III executed expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	0.181	0.212	0.063	0.074	0.029	0.023	0.013	0.027	0.000	0.146	0.069	0.016	0.462	0.000	0.000	0.006	1.322
2005	0.483	0.098	0.005	0.265	0.003	0.001	0.063	0.011	0.000	0.067	0.016	0.003	0.564	0.000	0.000	0.006	1.586
2006	0.048	0.013	0.009	0.032	0.006	0.002	0.008	0.032	0.001	0.082	0.046	0.006	0.648	0.000	0.000	0.742	1.673
2007	0.057	0.030	0.029	0.100	0.008	0.003	0. 016	0.035	0.002	0.084	0.040	0.012	1.273	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.690
2008	0.069	0.028	0.072	0.171	0.012	0.004	0.031	0.025	0.010	0.107	0.054	0.017	0.905	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.505
2009	0.116	0.016	0.052	0.080	0.016	0.005	0.031	0.049	0.005	0.035	0.068	0.024	0.712	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.208
2010	0.099	0.010	0.037	0.076	0.013	0.025	0.019	0.048	0.003	0.166	0.081	0.027	0.785	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.391
2011	0.094	0.008	0.043	0.069	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.032	0.005	0.158	0.075	0.017	0.793	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.331
Total	1.147	0.414	0.309	0.867	0.099	0.077	0.195	0.259	0.026	0.844	0.450	0.123	6.141	0.000	0.000	0.754	11.706

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A8: MAH-MRA-MEDD, share of Heading IV executed expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	0.040	0.022	0.023	0.339	0.332	0.000	0.025	0.289	0.005	0.440	0.008	0.000	0.577	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.101
2005	0.500	0.073	0.007	0.373	0.333	0.000	0.031	0.378	0.007	0.265	0.000	0.000	1.114	0.000	0.000	0.000	3.079
2006	0.150	0.071	0.022	0.316	0.247	0.000	0.051	0.329	0.005	0.657	0.186	0.000	0.691	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.723
2007	0.368	0.109	0.013	0.295	0.257	0.000	0.063	0.315	0.007	0.639	0.031	0.000	0.760	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.858
2008	0.110	0.122	0.029	0.451	0.157	0.000	0.057	0.322	0.004	0.681	0.015	0.000	0.815	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.763
2009	0.026	0.133	0.003	0.406	0.301	0.000	0.034	0.285	0.005	0.675	0.015	0.000	0.904	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.789
2010	0.025	0.117	0.020	0.375	0.255	0.006	0.035	0.228	0.005	0.561	0.076	0.000	1.013	0.000	0.008	0.000	2.724
2011	0.019	0.081	0.016	0.368	0.253	0.004	0.057	0.234	0.003	0.630	0.078	0.000	1.197	0.000	0.010	0.000	2.949
Total	1.238	0.728	0.134	2.922	2.134	0.010	0.352	2.379	0.042	4.549	0.409	0.000	7.070	0.000	0.018	0.000	21.986

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A9: MAH-MRA-MEDD, share of Heading V executed expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	1.689	0.968	0.730	7.669	1.035	0.354	3.932	0.687	1.352	1.665	27.528	0.000	1.726	0.238	3.828	10.356	63.757
2005	2.622	1.217	0.738	12.121	1.007	0.674	4.645	0.300	1.545	0.888	29.726	0.000	0.347	0.415	4.037	7.157	67.438
2006	5.221	1.221	1.173	18.731	1.596	1.337	4.735	0.971	2.533	1.893	41.311	0.000	1.729	0.996	6.904	5.247	95.600
2007	7.538	0.738	0.949	17.385	1.131	1.887	2.989	0.849	0.860	1.396	33.323	0.020	2.805	0.479	3.542	3.973	79.863
2008	15.206	1.388	1.508	9.057	1.276	1.332	2.636	1.077	1.176	1.693	17.113	0.015	11.886	1.773	2.251	0.370	69.758
2009	8.368	2.249	1.815	14.265	4.456	1.199	1.830	1.290	2.891	0.459	12.683	0.036	4.934	0.816	1.608	1.250	60.149
2010	15.578	1.991	1.389	26.781	1.364	2.729	1.272	0.865	1.205	0.530	21.704	0.000	4.288	0.189	3.005	0.639	83.527
2011	19.499	1.871	2.352	31.944	6.126	4.148	1.624	0.027	1.457	1.166	18.640	0.000	4.046	1.688	0.221	1.610	96.416
Total	75.721	11.642	10.653	137.953	17.989	13.660	23.663	6.066	13.018	9.689	202.027	0.071	31.763	6.594	25.397	30.601	616.508

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A10: Other ministries, share of executed agricultural expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	3.827	1.181	0.000	0.694	0.000	1.103	1.218	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.131	5.383	0.000	13.536
2005	1.320	1.955	0.000	1.769	0.000	1.551	0.387	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.445	11.722	0.000	19.148
2006	1.112	1.975	0.000	1.485	0.000	1.689	0.314	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.015	10.665	0.000	19.256
2007	0.054	0.831	0.000	0.384	0.000	1.689	0.013	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	9.862	3.591	0.000	16.424
2008	0.000	0.114	0.000	0.423	0.000	0.631	0.013	0.022	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	5.278	2.496	0.000	8.977
2009	0.309	0.418	0.000	0.024	0.000	1.013	0.013	0.214	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	6.121	28.208	0.000	36.320
2010	1.149	0.040	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.695	0.000	2.032	0.000	0.000	0.804	0.000	0.000	3.992	18.429	0.000	27.141
2011	1.886	0.065	0.000	4.048	0.000	0.736	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.208	0.000	0.000	5.636	0.274	0.000	13.851
Total	9.656	6.579	0.000	8.826	0.000	9.107	1.957	2.268	0.000	0.000	2.012	0.000	0.000	33.480	80.767	0.000	154.653

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A11: Shared inter-ministerial expenditures, share of executed agricultural expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	2.231	0.025	0.001	2.033	0.000	0.106	0.003	0.001	0.000	0.074	0.008	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.006	0.000	4.488
2005	3.094	0.104	0.087	0.734	0.123	0.046	0.001	0.003	0.000	0.006	0.123	0.000	0.000	0.023	0.000	0.048	4.392
2006	3.058	0.004	0.300	0.205	0.000	0.742	0.071	0.067	0.000	0.000	0.103	0.000	0.174	0.000	0.235	0.150	5.109
2007	0.395	0.114	0.000	0.079	0.000	27.991	0.495	0.000	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.000	0.091	0.010	0.486	0.200	29.888
2008	0.020	0.000	0.000	0.776	0.000	8.995	0.028	0.000	0.000	0.043	1.006	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.297	0.075	11.240
2009	9.027	0.097	0.000	0.176	8.446	18.315	0.023	0.000	0.013	0.183	0.254	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.161	0.076	36.772
2010	2.955	0.021	0.000	0.049	0.000	0.815	0.118	0.576	0.000	0.090	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.008	4.632
2011	3.392	0.118	0.000	1.660	0.007	2.021	0.113	0.220	0.000	0.000	0.826	0.000	0.027	0.000	0.000	0.000	8.385
Total	24.170	0.483	0.388	5.714	8.576	59.031	0.853	0.867	0.013	0.423	2.320	0.000	0.292	0.034	1.185	0.558	104.905

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A12: Off-budget projects, share of executed agricultural expenditures in the PNSR sub-programs, 2004–2011, FCFA billions

YEAR	SP 1.1	SP 1.2	SP 1.3	SP 1.4	SP 1.5	SP 2.1	SP 3.1	SP 3.2	SP 3.3	SP 3.4	SP 4.1	SP 4.2	SP 5.1	PR	Other	NC	Total
2004	4.333	0.962	0.026	1.127	0.000	0.884	0.931	0.008	0.022	0.010	9.234	0.000	0.146	0.293	0.878	0.567	19.421
2005	1.465	0.785	0.082	1.828	0.328	1.304	0.784	0.673	0.059	0.327	8.300	0.053	0.263	0.291	0.871	2.244	19.658
2006	3.775	0.177	0.047	1.734	0.453	1.614	1.978	0.023	0.017	1.792	2.628	0.135	0.431	0.578	0.129	0.517	16.027
2007	21.635	0.482	0.059	5.463	1.671	1.409	1.123	0.058	0.000	0.486	7.211	0.023	0.660	0.722	0.377	1.983	43.363
2008	2.064	0.299	0.024	3.350	1.783	13.837	1.497	0.017	0.000	0.646	7.913	0.016	2.132	1.146	0.287	0.489	35.500
2009	8.846	0.194	0.008	1.671	2.057	2.016	1.504	0.040	0.000	0.775	13.364	0.000	1.575	0.999	0.246	2.747	36.042
2010	4.709	0.935	0.005	2.243	0.000	0.297	5.227	0.504	0.128	0.809	6.677	0.000	0.155	0.310	0.005	1.392	23.396
2011	7.260	0.500	0.000	4.531	0.053	1.226	4.208	0.011	0.072	1.541	0.000	0.000	2.166	0.000	0.000	1.641	23.208
Total	54.089	4.333	0.252	21.947	6.346	22.587	17.251	1.334	0.298	6.385	55.328	0.227	7.528	4.338	2.794	11.579	216.615

Source: authors' calculations based on review of project documents and information collected from management units.

Table A13: Agricultural and national value added, 2004–2011, millions FCFA
Value added in current millions FCFA

Heading	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	Total	Share GDP	Share Agr. GDP.
AGRICULTURE SECTOR	808,143	1,016,947	1,032,784	971,481	1,384,987	1,279,151	1,478,043	1,536,968	9,508,503	32.7%	100.0%
Growth (%)	-3.8%	25.8%	1.6%	-5.9%	42.6%	-7.6%	15.5%	4.0%			
Subsistence Agr.	332,849	465,250	442,573	391,109	648,079	549,529	676,783	582,513	4,088,685	14.0%	43.0%
Cash Crops	106,310	158,057	166,087	102,023	175,727	132,631	148,407	174,689	1,163,931	4.0%	12.2%
Livestock	292,150	311,598	331,255	372,929	425,578	452,373	497,783	609,072	3,292,739	11.3%	34.6%
Forest Products	70,961	75,491	85,728	97,702	126,178	134,401	144,022	158,757	893,241	3.1%	9.4%
Fishing	5,873	6,551	7,141	7,718	9,425	10,217	11,048	11,935	69,908	0.2%	0.7%
TOTAL GDP	2,556,133	2,881,405	3,056,120	3,237,842	3,739,492	3,941,885	4,623,687	5,085,434	29,121,999	100.0%	
Agriculture Share	31.6%	35.3%	33.8%	30.0%	37.0%	32.5%	32.0%	30.2%			

Value added in millions of FCFA at constant 1999 prices

Heading	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
AGRICULTURE SECTOR	722,113	798,089	829,911	794,998	952,026	863,700	956,447	916,341
Growth (%)	-3.3%	10.5%	4.0%	-4.2%	19.8%	-9.3%	10.7%	-4.2%
Subsistence Agr.	263,915	291,577	303,527	279,348	368,979	312,573	382,358	319,370
Cash Crops	80,232	104,634	112,936	72,571	112,014	83,505	87,166	89,874
Livestock	230,344	248,651	247,105	261,487	266,069	263,858	274,408	285,234
Forest Products	144,150	149,468	162,633	177,721	200,860	199,608	208,139	217,336

Fishing	3,472	3,759	3,710	3,872	4,104	4,157	4,377	4,527
TOTAL GDP	2,386,123	2,592,806	2,768,282	2,868,112	3,034,462	3,124,448	3,370,847	3,511,169
Agriculture Share	30.3%	30.8%	30.0%	27.7%	31.4%	27.6%	28.4%	26.1%

Source: DGEP (MEF)

ANNEX 3: COMPOSITION OF THE STEERING AND MONITORING COMMITTEE OF THE REVIEW

N°	Name	Organization
1	ILBOUDO SAGA PASCAL	SP/CPSA
2	OUEDRAOGO ABDOULAYE	SP/CPSA
3	PARKOUDA SIBRI	SP/CPSA
4	TOU AMINATA	DGB/MEF
5	BANSE Emmanuel	DGCOOP
6	ZIDA PASSAM MANAGRE	DAF/MAH
7	BANTIRA ASSALIRA	DAF/MEDD
8	COMPAORE ANTOINE	DEP/MAH
9	SIRIMA DIAKOUBA	DEP/MEDD
10	NANA ISSOUFOU	DEP/MRA
11	SANKARA Mandèma	DGTCP
12	COULIBALY MATHIEU	DRRA-C
13	SANWIDI MAURICE	CPF
14	DABIRE FREDERIC	DADI
15	TRAORE SEYDINA OUMAR	DADI
16	BORO TOBABANLA	DAF/MEDD
17	BASSINGA JEAN	DAF/MRA
18	MAIGA MOUSSA	DEP/MAH
19	BAMBARA LUDOVIC	DEP/MRA
20	SOME KOUN**SO**LI	DGDPA
21	YAMEOGO SIBRI FRANCOIS	DGPER
22	SAWADOGO ISSA	DGPSE
23	BADIEL HUBERT	SPONG