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NEPAD PLANNING AND COORDINATING AGENCY

BLUEPRINT FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO IMPLEMENT AGENDA 2063

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THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF THE O.A.U.

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
FOREWORD

Africa is aware of the multifaceted and multidimensional global challenges it must overcome to lay the foundations of its development. A sound planning and results-oriented policies and actions, will be catalyst to the transformation of our continent.

2013 marked the 50th anniversary of the birth of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and presented an opportunity for the continent to take stock of the key milestones of the past 50 years and to plan for the next 50 years. The OAU was the earliest institutionalised post-colonial expression of Pan-Africanism and there is overwhelming recognition that it brought much success to the continent at a difficult epoch, although current challenges remain: elusive peace and security, poverty, unemployment and underdevelopment.

In line with the vision of the founding fathers of independent Africa we pledged to craft a continental plan for the next fifty years, which we call Africa Agenda 2063, to ensure transformation and sustainable development for future generations. This Framework is intended to be the lodestar of all our actions as member states, governments, civil society including business and labour, women, youth and all the peoples of the continent.

Consultations have been held across the continent and in the Diaspora, in which we asked the following questions to Africans from all walks of life and formations: What Africa do we want? How do we build this Africa? And lastly, what role will we play towards the realisation of this dream?

Agenda 2063 builds on previous initiatives by generations of African leaders and their peoples, from the formation of the OAU, through the Monrovia Declaration (1979), the Lagos Plan of Action (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1981), to the establishment of the African Union (AU) and NEPAD (2001).

The NEPAD Program was the first framework that focused on the values of Partnership (at national, regional, and international level), Leadership (by enhancing the dimension of governance, and Ownership (by affirming the importance of internal resources).

The NEPAD Agency is playing an important role in the design and consultations on the framework for Agenda 2063. We appreciate its role as a 'knowledge institution', bringing its expertise and networks to bear, and in the process providing much needed support to the work of the African Union Commission (AUC), the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and member states.

Agenda 2063 must reflect the commitment of Africa to have results-based oriented policies and operational instruments that will accelerate its economic and social transformation, and as a result, will benefit all citizens.

The transformative dimension of Agenda 2063 must influence our actions, our national plans, sub-regional and continental development initiatives, to promote the emergence of strong economies with sustained growth and sustainable capabilities of generating wealth and decent jobs.

Therefore, we welcome the NEPAD Agency's initiative to publish a monograph that presents an alternative narrative on Africa's development trajectory; explores internal and external factors that present challenges and opportunities for the people of the continent in their quest for a better life; outlines alternative policy scenarios and their projected outcomes; and considers the interface between regional and continental initiatives and implementation by member states; and guided by a blueprint that we encourage the agency to develop, in order to support the design, implementation, coordination and monitoring of the agenda.

There is a clear recognition that no progress can be attained if the leaders and peoples of the continent do not think and act with a long-term perspective, and that Agenda 2063 has to be an endogenous effort crafted and owned by Africans. It is our hope that it will also be an important guide and reference for Africa as it engages with its partners and other long-term global development initiatives.

Macky Sall
President Republic of Senegal

PREFACE

On the occasion of the celebrations commemorating the founding of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa – Ethiopia, on May 2013, Heads of State and Government of the African Union (AU) requested the African Union Commission (AUC) to lead the development of a continental Agenda 2063.

The AUC has been working closely with the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA) and is supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) in preparing a framework that is expected to be finalised by mid-2014.

As part of its preparations for contributing to these efforts the NPCA's Directorate for Strategy and Knowledge Management has commissioned research papers and hosted a High-Level Expert Group Seminar in Magaliesburg, South Africa, in December 2013.

The NEPAD Agency's findings are being published in this Monograph and will be widely circulated to Governments, regional institutions, social partners, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other relevant stakeholders. They form part of the technical analysis undertaken for consideration in the formulation of the draft Framework documents.

The Monograph is divided into two sections. Part A consists of a synthesis that offers a broad framing of the historical and contemporary issues that should accompany the proposed African Agenda 2063. It identifies some of the possible challenges to which the Agenda must respond; the existing policy and institutional pillars into which it fits and on which it must build; and a broad menu of issues, which would need to be further reflected upon towards its fully-fledged articulation.

A set of background papers, annexed to this synthesis, offers a more in-depth assessment of some of these issues as a foretaste of the kind of further technical work that is being carried out in the course of the articulation of a robust continental Agenda 2063. These background papers do not present a literature survey, but are concerned with specific issues affecting the continent's prospects, including socio-economic transformation, demographic transition, governance, and the interface between Agenda 2063 and national plans, sub-regional initiatives and regional goals.

Part B explores scenarios and forecasts of Africa's performance under different policy interventions over the next 50 years. After exploring the trends in African development on the current path, this paper turns to a very preliminary exploration of broad policy interventions across major issue areas. The authors judge the impact of the alternative policy choices against three key outcome variables: human development, poverty reduction, and overall economic output. The integrated policy analysis employed for the paper draws upon the International Futures (IFs) modelling system, a one-of-a-kind forecasting tool that has helped governments and international organisations around the world explore historical trends and better understand the interactions among major development systems. We hope that the papers in this Monograph will, individually or collectively, be useful for all involved in the discussions and finalisation of Africa's Agenda 2063.

Dr. Ibrahim Assane Mayaki
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the NEPAD Agency

THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF NEPAD

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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THE NEPAD AGENCY'S MANDATE IS TO:

Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of continental and regional priority programmes and projects

Mobilise resources and partners in support of the implementation of Africa's priority programmes and projects

Conduct and coordinate research and knowledge management

Monitor and evaluate the implementation of programmes and projects

Advocate on the AU and NEPAD vision, mission and core principles/values

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CHAPTER 1

MARCH FROM PAN-AFRICANISM, THROUGH AFRICAN RENAISSANCE TO AGENDA 2063

INTRODUCTION

A new momentum for the structural transformation of the African continent is gathering steam. It is a momentum which is evident, not just in the bullish excitement which has pervaded reflections on the recent performance and future prospects of the countries of the continent, but also in the bold new initiatives which policy officials, political leaders, and private sector investors are willing to venture into and undertake - nationally, regionally, and continentally - in order to accelerate the pace of socio-economic progress.

This momentum has been reflected in the dramatic shift in the international discourse that has been dominant about Africa of late, a discourse which has also been refracted into the making of a new set of narratives about the development of the continent. In statement after statement, within and outside the continent during the last few years, the refrain of "Africa Rising" has pervaded the air as different categories of development actors and commentators attempt, from different points of entry, to capture the dynamics of change unfolding on the continent and the promise which the region is thought to hold as a potential pole of global growth. Africa was described as a "hopeless" continent just over a decade ago, now is considered the land of considerable opportunity and promise.

There are high hopes that the banishment of long-standing problems of underdevelopment might – at last - be within the grasp of Africans. As a result, political leaders and technocrats, local business interests and foreign private investors, donors and consultants, as well as media practitioners and civil society managers have taken turns in different fora to brainstorm on just how best to proceed to "unlock Africa's potential" as the "new" or "last frontier".

Although the global contexts are different in important ways, the on-going discourse on prospects and promise of African transformation are, in some ways, reminiscent of the kinds of high hopes that were expressed about the continent during the late 1950s and through much of the 1960s, as country after country became independent. The narratives of contemporary change in Africa have, without doubt, been both reinforced and made plausible by recent experiences of economic growth which a large number of

countries are enjoying. Coming after a prolonged period of economic stagnation and regression that characterised the period from the early 1980s to the dawn of the new Millennium, the resumption of growth across Africa over the last decade has prompted new thinking in key political and policy-making circles across the continent. This thinking focuses on how, over the medium to the long-term, the continent might convert growth into structural transformation, doing so in ways which will not just avoid the mistakes of yesteryears but also pave the way for a continental renaissance. In this connection, the observation has been made that contemporary African growth is taking place only as a sub-set of a plethora of other changes (economic, social, political, environmental, cultural, and technological) which, if properly harnessed, are seen as having a potential to pave the way for a full-blown continental rebirth. Thus it is that all over Africa, there is a shared determination to ensure that the 21st Century does not elude the continent and that it re-emerges fully, to occupy its rightful place in the community of nations.

In seeking to capture the moment and to consolidate the host of development initiatives they have taken over the years, African leaders have, in a further step, resolved to build a shared programme framework for coordinated continental action in order to secure a durable and shared development for African peoples. This resolve was embodied in the decision they took during the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments in Addis Ababa in June 2012. Underpinned by an enduring spirit of pan-Africanism, African leaders called for an overarching continental framework, which has come to be known popularly as Agenda 2063. The call was meant to set the stage for purposeful and coordinated game-changing actions by African countries in order to turn the tables on underdevelopment on the continent, once and for all. Having launched the call, the Assembly of Heads of States and Governments also demanded that the African Union Commission take the necessary steps to translate it into a workable programme.

This synthesis paper offers a broad framing of the kinds of historical and contemporary issues, which would be useful to consider in fleshing out the proposed African Agenda

2063. In doing so, it re-interprets the African historical experience and some of the key moments in the quest for the pan-African ideal. It does so to underscore the point that the core pillar and contribution of Agenda 2063 must be to help translate centuries of efforts to regain freedom, and to rebuild the self-reliance and dignity of Africans into an agenda for individual and collective renaissance. The paper also identifies some of the possible challenges to which the Agenda must respond if it is to be effective and relevant, the existing policy and institutional pillars into which it fits and on which it must build, and a broad menu of issues which would need to be further reflected upon towards its full-fledged articulation. A set of background papers annexed to this synthesis offer a more in-depth assessment of some of these issues, as a foretaste of the kind of additional technical work required in the course of articulating a robust 2063 Agenda for the continent.

The first part of the paper offers an extensive overview of "the long walk to freedom", to paraphrase the iconic President Nelson Mandela, that the continent undertook to free itself from colonial domination and apartheid, and reclaim the dignity of its peoples and the sovereignty of its lands. The struggles for freedom and dignity were an important part of the story of the quest for continental rebirth and must be understood as such. They also embodied numerous milestones in the effort to give content and meaning to pan-Africanism in global and continental contexts; some of the milestones are broached upon briefly, for their importance in setting a broad background context within which Agenda 2063 could be approached and fully made sense of. The following references are made to the relentless struggles, waged by succeeding generations of Africans to reclaim the continent and rebuild its foundations and core: the birth of the anti-colonial pan-Africanist movement, the wave of independence registered during the 1960s, and the establishment of the OAU, to the second wave independence in the 1970s, the eventual defeat of the Rhodesia project, the fall of the apartheid system, and the historic shift from the OAU to the AU. This is a dynamic which is still on-going and whose correct interpretation and deployment will be critical to the strategic objectives, relevance, expected outcomes and prospects of Agenda 2063.

The second part provides a contextual analysis of some of the key contemporary trends unfolding on the continent, with a view to shedding some light on the leading variables that are shaping the process of change across Africa, with an emphasis on the constants, trends and discontinuities regarding the most critical of them.

The third part indicates some of the analytical steps that will have to be undertaken in order to move Agenda 2063 from a stated wish to an action-oriented agenda that the NEPAD Agency can help the continent to implement. The Nepad Agencys' proposal sets out to help the continent to complete the preparation of a blueprint for the Agenda 2063 implementation.

The blueprint phase will need to:

- Align with member states national development plans;

- Improve on current processes through recommended best practices and automation;

- Optimise future-flexibility of the design to support the growing and changing Africa's social and economic outlook;

- Deliver a design that will allow the objectives of Agenda 2063 to be met;

- Establish a solid foundation for a delivery unit that will be established.

- The NEPAD Agency is ideally positioned to deliver this blueprint successfully in coordination with directorates of planning at national level, with RECs, and with the African Union Commission.

THE LONG AFRICAN JOURNEY FROM DOMINATION TO REDISCOVERY

The African Renaissance as a History of Struggle and Resilience

The story of humankind cannot be accurately told without Africa featuring at its epicentre as the cradle of humanity. It is a story which, over the ages until the onset of the European slave trade across the Atlantic, was characterised by vibrant experimentations in the making of economy, society, governance, and citizenship in which Africans partook wholesomely. Demographers estimate that around 1600, Africa's population was probably smaller than China's, but both were on a similar scale with Africa representing 15% of the world's population at the time. In science and technology, as in the arts and culture, in constitution-building and statecraft as in economic design and social engineering, Africa held its own over the ages and, in so doing, contributed to the making of human civilisation and the extension of its contents and boundaries through successive epochs of creativity and progress.

The onset of the European slave trade, however, marked the beginning of a significant rupture in the delicately balanced relations of power that characterised Africa's engagement with the world. For the first time in its history, Africa was to begin to experience a process of subjugation, domination, and regression that manifested itself in the massive capture and exportation of millions of its able-bodied men and women to the so-called New World as plantation labourers. The subsequent massive pillaging of the continent's raw materials in the name of legitimate trade and, ultimately, the partition and colonisation of the continent only carried with it a process of decline and domination that began with the slave trade and ended in its conclusion. Historians and other chroniclers have rightly recorded the period from 1500 to the 1960s as marking a low point – indeed, the lowest point – in the African historical experience.

Africans signalled their resolve to wage a fight for their freedom and dignity, no matter what it cost and no matter how long the struggle lasted: these included the rebellions during the trek from the hinterlands to the coastal ports from which the shipment of captured slaves took place; the uprisings on slave boats during the long Atlantic crossings; the various forms of resistance that played out on the slave plantations across the Americas; and the organisation of campaigns for the abolition of the slave trade. It was out of this fight that the seeds of modern pan-Africanism were sown.

In the same way that resistance to the slave trade signalled a determination to muster the energies for restoration and rebirth, opposition to the one-sided trade era that followed the slave trade and the travesty of colonialism demonstrated an unbroken spirit of resistance and hinted at a renaissance waiting to sprout and blossom. It was a spirit fuelled by the spread of pan-African ideas and ideals from the Americas and the Caribbean back to the continent, energising the determination of nationalist politicians and their mass of followers to fight for independence, freedom, dignity, unity, and an all-round restoration. This energy set in motion an irreversible movement towards the defeat of colonialism and the onset of the post-colonial era in African history.

The message that came out of the African resistance to foreign colonial dominations was as powerful as it was mobilising: it was better to be free, even if that meant a condemnation to poverty, than to be rich yet be kept in the chains of bondage. With the march to independence also came a shared resolve to translate the ideology and ideals of pan-Africanism into a living experience that will shape the destiny of the peoples of the continent. Independence was won for each of the countries of the continent over the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1990s because of the spirit of resilience and resistance, which Africans carried forward from generation to generation.

1960, the year in which the largest number of countries acceded to independence, came to symbolise the year of African independence. The African journey of restoration was set to gather pace.

Independence clearly opened the door to various possibilities and alternative futures for Africa. One of them related to the manner in which the task of national and continental restoration was going to be achieved. It was clear that such a task could not simply be a rehash of the colonial ideology of "civilisation" and the project of "modernisation" that was constructed around it, but rather a march towards a more-rounded notion of development. Little wonder then that across the continent, irrespective of the ideological leanings of independence governments, there was a shared commitment to a project of development understood in holistic terms as encompassing the economic, the social, the political, and the cultural. Development came to be seen as a cultural engagement aimed at restoring the dignity of Africans, including their history and civilisations, and valorising their cultures.

Development also came to be associated with the quest for the transformation of economies from their agrarian states to industrial ones and, in so doing, providing greater

opportunities than those offered by the simple export of raw materials that the colonial system perfected to the detriment of the continent. Furthermore, development came to be seen as a political process with pride of place accorded to self-determination, self-reliance, and regional cooperation as an alternative to the fragmentation that had followed the scramble for and partition of Africa at the end of the 19th Century and the beginning of the 20th Century.

However, while there was a shared, universal resolve that self-determination was both an inalienable right and an imperative, it would have been too much to expect that there would be complete unanimity on the strategy and tactics of carrying forward the work of restoration and renewal. As is well-known, positions differed between those leaders and social forces who wanted a rapid and immediate programme of African integration and unity, and those who opted for a more gradual approach anchored on incremental, functional cooperation and integration. In the end, the compromise arrived in May 1963 was for the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to superintend the gradual process of integration and unity. It was to undertake this task alongside the mobilisation of resources for the full liberation of the entire continent from colonial and settler/white minority rule.

For over three decades, the OAU invested itself almost single-mindedly in helping to galvanise the African liberation project in order to carry it to its logical conclusion, while attempting simultaneously to advance the process of regional cooperation and integration in order to enhance the continent's presence and voice in a harshly competitive and hostile world. It did so on the basis of its founding principles, namely the sovereign independence and equality of its members, non-interference in the internal affairs of states, and respect for the formal territorial boundaries that were inherited at the dawn of independence.

It was not always an easy task for the OAU to balance the twin dynamics of nationalism and pan-Africanism that defined the post-colonial African world up until the end of the 1990s.

The organisation invested itself heavily in the constant search for the lowest common denominator, on the basis of which independent African countries could agree to move forward together while celebrating the ideals of pan-Africanism and its numerous promises of a bold new world. Understandably, therefore, the pace of movement was not always as swift and decisive as it could have been. Progress, such as it happened, did not translate into binding commitments among member states which, while keeping substantive decision-making powers at national level, also found themselves grappling with a plethora of nation and state-building challenges that sapped energies and tested leaders and citizens alike. To the credit of the OAU, it demonstrated an adaptability, which saw it, against various odds, offering its good offices for mediation, arbitration and conciliation in cases of intra, and inter-state conflicts that arose. It strove to project Africa in a world polarised by Cold War rivalries, working to rally Africans behind an unfinished liberation project, and keeping the flame of an African vision of a better tomorrow burning.

Beside its valiant work for the complete liberation of Africa and the peaceful resolution of intra-African conflicts, the OAU also launched bold initiatives around regional cooperation and integration, and positioned itself as the key platform for the assertion of African socio-economic aspirations. The landmark 1980 Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos summed up the bold vision of the OAU for the continent, working in close concert with the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). The LPA did not achieve its stated objectives for various reasons, however, chief among which was the lack of a clear articulation between national and regional policies. While the LPA advocated the coordinated pursuit of policies of industrialisation and self-reliance, individual countries succumbed to the implementation of externally-driven policies promoted by the Bretton Woods institutions whose deflationary, state-retrenching, and market-liberalising structural adjustment programmes were to dominate policy-making across the continent for the period from the early 1980s into the dawn of the new Millennium.

Throughout much of the structural adjustment years, the agenda of regional cooperation and integration was significantly downgraded, as countries tried with the conditionality-laden help of the IMF, the World Bank, and bilateral donors to overcome their economic problems and return to the path of growth and development. To this end, public enterprises were privatised, commercialised, and liquidated as part of a vast, unidirectional market-liberalising programme that was underwritten by bilateral and multilateral donors, and whose flip side included, inter alia, the drastic reduction of the social expenditure of the state.

The adjustment years were Africa's season of anomie. Economies already mired in crises were put through deflationary measures, which further drove them into decline. From experiencing average growth rates of about 6 - 7 per cent in the 1960s into the 1970s, African countries entered into the most prolonged period of stagnation and decline that they had known since their independence. Various social indicators that had been improved upon after independence fell into negative territory with consequences that played out from massive unemployment and collapsing incomes and health sectors, to increased levels of poverty and generalised social exclusion.

The dissolution of the post-colonial social contract between state and society in Africa opened new dimensions of the crisis of political legitimacy, which in some instances, translated into the collapse of central governmental authority and a period of prolonged and violent intra-state conflict. Governments in most countries were to lose their control over domestic socio-economic policy as key frames for decision-making were taken over by the Bretton Woods institutions. Economies were deindustrialised and denationalised. The regional integration agenda stalled and was pushed down the ladder of priorities.

The structural adjustment programmes did not, of course, go uncontested both intellectually and politically. Africa was indeed to put forward an alternative framework for reform, one that would bring about change without sacrificing growth and the broad socio-economic gains of post-colonial development. Two major initiatives were launched to that end: the African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (AAFSAP) spearheaded by the UNECA, and the Abuja Treaty spearheaded by the OAU. AAFSAP represented Africa's direct response to and rebuttal of the intellectual foundations of the Washington Consensus and the structural adjustment policies that flowed from it. Although the Bretton Woods institutions pilloried it, its publication actually marked the beginning of the end of the hegemony of the Washington Consensus and the unflinching certitude with which it was imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. The adoption of the Abuja Treaty marked the re-launching of the African integration agenda as conceived in the LPA before the structural adjustment framework temporarily sidestepped the project. With the signing of the Abuja Treaty, an important economic pillar of the African quest for renewal and restoration was put into place, ready to come into force once fully ratified.

The collapse of the apartheid system in South Africa, with the formal inauguration in May 1994 of Nelson Mandela as the first democratically-elected President chosen by all the citizens of the country, added impetus to the quest for an Africa beyond structural adjustment. It was a quest which reignited discussions about pan-Africanism and the future of Africa. At one level, having won the battle for the political liberation of the continent, the question was how to win the battle for economic emancipation. At another level, the issue of the options for closer continental economic integration was brought back to the front burner of political and policy reflections.

Furthermore, voices re-emerged for the re-launch of the quest for one form or another of deeper continental political union, complete with a possible union government. In all of this, there was a shared perspective that the end of institutionalised apartheid, coming as it did in the broader framework of the end of the Cold War, marked the onset of a new phase in Africa's post-colonial history and all creative faculties should be mustered to make the most of the possibilities that were presented, possibilities which included the opening up and reform of domestic political spaces to various degrees of pluralism and generalised democratisation.

Out of the discussions about the future of a post-apartheid Africa emerged the most radical re-engineering of the institutional arrangements for pan-Africanism since 1963. It involved the dissolution of the OAU and its replacement with the African Union, complete with new organs and various innovations that included the adoption of the Diaspora as the sixth region of the continent and the creation of an Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) for the continuous mobilisation of citizen input. New pan-African institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament and the Court of Justice were also established.

An enhanced mechanism for conflict management and security was created. As part of the overhaul of the pan-African institutions, NEPAD was launched to focus energies on the imperatives of rapid continental socio-economic development, with a view to decisively turning the tables on underdevelopment. The emphasis on partnership embodied in the name of the initiative signalled the recognition by African leaders that the hitherto dominant model of aid relationships that tied the continent in a one-sided way to a host of bilateral and multilateral donor institutions could no longer be maintained, and Africa would have to look inwards to itself for alternative modalities for financing its development initiatives and programmes.

In the framework of NEPAD, the APRM was also established as a unique Africa-owned and Africa-led mechanism for raising the standards of governance. A robust debate, popularly referred to as "the grand debate", was opened on what shape a possible union government might take, and whether the time was right for a move towards a United States of Africa. It was a debate that was reminiscent of the discussions that took place in the early 1960s and the historic exchanges among the pioneer pan-Africanists in the USA.

As the structures of the new AU began to be set up amidst a new continent-wide spirit of pan-Africanism, Africa entered the new Millennium brimming with a vibrancy of ideas and thoughts about its long-term future and the imperatives of a continental renaissance. Countries across the continent took steps to bring development thinking and planning back into their policy processes and domestic institutional arrangements. Classic IMF/World Bank structural adjustment was running its course and the demands of employment creation and social policy called for nothing less than the adoption of new macro-economic orientations that could allow for the revival and expansion of local economic production. Thus it was that ideas about the making of developmental states in Africa began to flower and, with them, the restoration of development planning institutions and processes that had been dismantled during the structural adjustment years.

Out of these have flowed new national development plans and long-term visions in recent years, which embody national ambitions to achieve middle and high-income status within a generation or two. Several plans and visions drew inspiration from the long-term perspective studies that were undertaken in different African countries during the 1990s, but which had been left unsupported on account of the hegemony of neo-liberal ideas and policies.

Overall, the mood across Africa marked a significant departure from the rampant Afro-pessimism of the 1980s and 1990s. This departure came to be bolstered by the restoration of economic growth on the continent, with most countries registering an average of 6 per cent growth on a consistent basis for several years running, and being positioned to maintain their growth run into the medium-term at least. Africa, it would seem, is in the throes of a full rediscovery – and the world is beginning to notice.

Agenda 2063: An Act of Courage, Wisdom and Faith

The summit-level decision of African Heads of States and Governments to call for a conscious, forward-looking and coordinated approach to managing African areas over the next 50 years is embedded in the conviction that the continent is at a historic juncture in its long-standing quest for transformation. It is in this light that the call must be read as a significant act of political courage, wisdom, and faith designed to carry the pan-Africanism project to a higher level in which a new bargain might be forged between state and society, anchored in a shared project of transformation and renewal.

Based on the plethora of decisions which African leaders have made since the dawn of the millennium, and locating these decisions within the broad flow of pan-African ideas, it would seem that three critical postulates underpin the quest for an Agenda 2063. The first of them is the idea that the future is a realm of freedom that can be planned and engineered.

Unlike the past, which cannot be reconfigured, or the present which offers very limited breathing space for reshaping things, the future can be mastered and configured – and it is for Africa to summon the will and determination to own the future. A horizon of 50 years would serve as a disciplining framework within which to own that future and shape it for the benefit of the peoples of the continent. This first postulate is reinforced by a second one which is that planning the future is not an exclusively technocratic

exercise, but a predominantly technocratic one because it is, ultimately, about power. The third postulate is that collective action yields results provided it is grounded in a shared vision. The implication of this is that the future is the realm of the will, and ideas can become a powerful instrument of change once the people internalise them.

To understand the significance of the postulates, it will be useful to recall the fact that over the period since African countries began to accede to independence, vibrant struggles have been waged to determine the direction in which the continent would go. One result of these struggles is the fact that, at different points in time, the African agenda came to be underpinned by reactive behaviour and maladjustments to external stimuli. The crisis management mode, which prevailed under the structural adjustment years, transmuted itself into "the tyranny of the emergency" and the accompanying shrinking of policy space for long-term, structural transformation issues.

Although the structural adjustment programmes attracted support from the donor community, their short-term horizons inhibited the capacity of leaders to keep an eye on the big picture and to drive national strategic choices in fulfilment of their responsibilities towards their people and future generations. Embracing that dimension of inter-generational as well as intra-generational equity in the development discourse requires a significant departure from the business-as-usual scenario that had prevailed until

now, and the risk aversion behaviour that had characterised the political elite. It requires political courage, because the new emphasis on inclusiveness could lead to significant change, not only in the geography of wealth but also in the geography of power.

Clearly, no progress can be sustained in the long run where collective action and ownership of policy direction is lacking. By emphasising the need to ensure that Agenda 2063 will be an endogenous effort and will be owned by Africans, African leaders have expressed their faith in the capacities of the Africans to formulate a common Agenda that they will own and fight for, but also their faith in the capacities of African States to reclaim their sovereignty and the policy spaces they lost during the structural adjustment years. Doing so, as they did on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the OAU, added a measure of symbolism to the call. It immediately called for innovative thinking that could help translate the proactive action of African leaders into a workable and sustainable reality.

BUILDING ON AFRICA'S SELF REDISCOVERY: SOME CRITICAL ISSUES

Economic growth, such as Africa has known over the last decade, is the lynchpin of current narratives about Africa Rising. According to its proponents, economic growth has not only opened the doors to new possibilities for the continent to prosper, it has also increased the attractiveness of African countries for business. Critics of this narrative argue that economic growth is nothing new on the continent and recall the first post-independence decade in which growth was stronger in Africa than in Asia. Interesting as such a debate could be, it is likely to be inconclusive as the main emphasis is on one aspect of the African reality, namely, the economic sphere. Rather than a piecemeal approach, which tends to overemphasise some aspects of African reality and, conversely, downplay other aspects, what is called for is a holistic, systemic approach that is able, in an integrated manner, to uncover the complexities of the "African moment". With this in mind, Agenda 2063 should take as its starting point, the vision expressed by the heads of State in July 2004, which is one of a united, peaceful, and prosperous Africa built on a foundation of democratic governance, social inclusiveness, and a plethora of shared values.

Going by the 2004 vision enunciated by African leaders, four variables suggest themselves as being critical to securing a renascent Africa in which the people are able to exercise their citizenship to the fullest extent possible. These variables are demographic, economic, societal, and political in nature.

The importance of the **demographic variable** cannot be overemphasised as development is first and foremost about people. Therefore, the numbers of people who must be managed at any given point in time, their spatial distribution, their age structure, their movement and mobility, and their profile matter a great deal and, indeed, are of the utmost importance to a project of structural transformation. In this connection, the demographic dividend that Africa is enjoying and within it, the youth bulge, deserve particular attention. It is no longer news that Africa is the last continent to experience a population boom. The population of the continent had remained stable for centuries, even decreasing in some regions, and at best grew very slowly until the 1920s. The current population boom that has become the subject of much commentary did not really begin until the middle of the 20th Century. Thus, in a sense, Africa was lagging behind the rest of the word with regard to the possibilities for tapping the potential benefits of population expansion. Much of the surge in the continent's population rate is due to a significant decline in mortality rates alongside high fertility rate.

Accompanying the population boom are accelerated processes and dynamics of urbanisation. In the 1950s, barely 10% of the African population lived in cities. Africa was definitely under-urbanised, compared with the rest of the world. Today, the urban population represents not less than 37% of the total population and a great number of analysts think that this figure is underestimated. Although Africa continues to lag far behind Europe and the Americas, the proportion of urban dwellers now roughly equals that of Asia. The trend is likely to continue for the foreseeable future.

Regarding the **economic variables**, the important point to keep in mind is that economic growth is an important determinant in any process of transformation and helps to drive processes of structural transformation, in combination with other variables which have their own orders of magnitude of importance. Africa's return to the path of economic growth in recent years offers an important opportunity, which should not be lost. This is due to the sustenance of that growth in the face of the crises in the economies of Europe and United States, and the benefit of the expanded and growing appetite of China, India, Brazil and others for the continent's agricultural and mineral commodities.

This is especially so as the external factors currently favouring African growth are complemented by a host of domestic factors, including the growth of an indigenous private sector, which is itself actively underwriting investments and innovations across different economic sectors. It does so by taking advantage of reforms in the regulatory and policy environment that are favourable to business. However, even as Africa is experiencing growth, the continent also has to contend with the challenges of persistent poverty

and rapidly growing inequality, the erosion of domestic industrial production capacity, an acceleration of the de-agrarianisation of African economies, and an expansion of the boundaries of the informal economy;

Alongside economic and demographic change in Africa are a host of **societal variables**, which cannot be overlooked in the search for a broad renewal across the continent. The centrality of societal dynamics to the project of structural transformation in Africa is underscored by the fact that individuals, families or enterprises operate first and foremost within a social fabric that is characterised by a web of relations and interrelations that could hamper or advance development. There are many different if interconnected dimensions to the shifts that are occurring in contemporary societal dynamics across Africa. One of the most frequently discussed dimensions concerns the emergence of a new middle class and, with it, a growing domestic market for various consumer goods. The size of the middle class increased significantly over the last decade in most African countries although there are notable differences explained largely by differences in initial conditions, social structure, size of the government and, most of all, the degree of asset inequality.

Attention has also been drawn to the emergence of the Africa diaspora as a key source of household income and socio-economic investment, as well as new cultural experimentations. These changes are taking place in a context of an inexorable and accelerated revolution in digital technologies and innovation with implications for the organisation of economy, society, and politics; and the growth and expansion of the reach and uses of new social media, including for mass mobilisation in favour of governance reforms.

The changes taking place in Africa have also been underpinned by various **political variables**. Authoritarian military and single party forms of governance, which hitherto dominated the continental political and governance landscape, have been replaced with multi-party political systems and the organisation of regular elections. The 2013 Mo Ibrahim Index on governance suggests that such is the shift that has occurred in the system and culture of governance that 94% of the population of the continent lives in countries where there have been significant improvements in governance.

Alongside the various domestic factors within which contemporary growth and associated change is being incubated and unfolded are important shifts in the international system, which carries implications for Africa's long-term prospects. They include:

- A shift in the global locus of economic power and influence from the West to the East. However that change in "the geography of wealth" has not been matched by a commensurate change in the geography of power, or a significant recomposition in the instruments of global governance.

- The recomposition of the global security agenda to incorporate a complex "war on terror", even as traditional inter-state and intra-state conflicts endure around a plethora of issues;

- The emergence of a global civil society movement and the expansion of its role in global decision-making;

- An emerging new scramble for Africa's natural resources;

- The entry of climate policy concerns into the global policy agenda;

- Continuing integration of the world economy as captured by the power and reach of various global financial institutions and funds, and the subjugation of production to their logic and interests.

94% of the population of the continent lives in countries where there have been significant improvements in governance

The internal and external contextual factors that serve as the conditioning framework for contemporary Africa's growth suggest that Africa and its people live in a world that is in the throes of a transition that is perilous and fraught with much uncertainty and many dangers. The continental quest for transformation is thus faced with a mixture of challenges and opportunities, which need to be properly managed in order for the continent to complete the task of continental rebirth and renaissance. To do so, African leaders must individually and collectively answer a core set of critical questions.

These questions include how to:

a. Take full advantage of Africa's contemporary demography and the central position of the youth therein, in order to turn it into a dynamic factor of growth and fuel for structural change, rather than a time-bomb waiting to detonate;

b. Manage the unfolding process of urbanisation across the continent in order to meet a plethora of social, economic, and political challenges, including how to feed, clothe, house, administer, and gainfully employ a burgeoning urban mass;

c. Rebuild the productive base of African economies, with particular attention to agriculture and industry, and with a view to achieving greater economic resilience, improving employment levels, enhancing continental self-reliance, and achieving structural transformation;

d. Mobilise the needed resources for the development of the continent, including domestic sources of financing to carry the costs of the huge investments needed domains such as infrastructure;

e. Improve intra-African trade, investments, and labour mobility, in part as a boost to the regional cooperation and integration agenda, but also in order to strengthen continental resilience in an age of neo-liberal globalisation;

f. Address the root causes of enduring poverty and overcome growing socio-economic inequality; in doing so, to pay attention to the imperatives of inclusion and all-round participation as the centrepieces of the exercise of citizenship;

g. Better harmonise policy coordination among the national, regional and continental decision-making bodies across Africa, and enhance the interface between decisions at regional and continental levels and actions at national level;

h. Better ensure that democracy-building and democratic governance go hand-in-hand with the delivery of concrete socio-economic dividends to citizens; it being understood that democracy, development, and service delivery are mutually self-reinforcing, and citizens are entitled to expect nothing less than a democracy that is able to deliver material and non-material improvements to their livelihoods;

i. Retool the African state with a view to enhancing its capacity to design and deliver development within a strategic and long-haul vision, a retooling which should also allow for the continent to reclaim previously lost policy space and re-establish sovereignty over its decision-making;

j. Deepen intra-African collaboration and cooperation around continental public goods, including those like water resources that have a potential to generate conflict.

Most of these questions are not new. Indeed, one could argue that they have been on the African development and governance agenda for quite some time. This is particularly the case for issues pertaining to regional cooperation and integration, and the processes of political rejuvenation needed to buttress economic transformation. Few people would disagree with such an assessment. Few people would also disagree that, more than ever before, as Africa changes and its economies continue to grow, there is an imperative for coordinated action that allows African countries to move forward with a common vision of their shared destiny and future destination. More than ever before, African citizens need such a framework to serve as a compass and manifesto to stimulate hope and action around the project of continental rebirth. In order to achieve such goals, however, a number of analytical steps have to be undertaken and it is to these that attention is now turned.

FURTHER ANALYTICAL STEPS FOR DEVELOPING A COMPREHENSIVE, SOUND AGENDA 2063

As indicated in Section 1, the call for a new collective African continental agenda that looks forward to the next 50 years was a mark of the shared determination to carry the unfolding work of self-rediscovery and a continental renaissance to its logical conclusion. It would not be the first time since independence, however, that Africa is seeking to forge a collective programme of action. Learning from past experiences and building on contemporary successes, it would seem that the call for a continental agenda towards 2063 requires a set of steps that would ensure that it will be both **analytically grounded, socially relevant, and politically sustainable**. These steps will inevitably include:

A Dynamic and Strategic Situational Analysis

A sound situational analysis is a foundation and prerequisite for a crisp definition of the strategic objectives and goals of any agenda around which consensus can be built. In the case of the proposed Agenda 2063, such a situational analysis is a condition *sine qua non* for any further work, and it should include a properly articulated vision of expected end results *vis-à-vis* the established African integration agenda. Key internal and external challenges have been identified earlier in this paper, but they bear highlighting again here on account of their central importance. They include:

The youth bulge and its impact on savings: Africa has the highest active-dependent ratio (Africa's is nearly 1, while in East Asia, the ratio has decreased to 0.5). Africa also has a record number of young people to educate, while the proportion is now decreasing on the other continents.

Urbanisation: African cities have not yet become the engines of increased productivity they have been on other continents. The magnitude of the informal sector may account for the stagnating level of productivity. As urbanisation is a long-term trend which is not likely to stop, it is critical to explore ways and means to enhance the productivity of urban-based activities.

Migration: People are not only migrating from rural areas to nearby cities, they are also migrating to other African countries where relative prosperity creates a high demand for labour. Except for a small number of well-defined areas, intra-African migration has not played a key role in total population growth. Nor has emigration to industrialised countries had a significant impact on African demographics. This is not the case, however, with brain drain occasioning a massive loss of trained and experienced talent in key sectors such as health and education

Income: As Africa grows, it is experiencing a widening income and non-income inequality gap, derived both from the nature and pattern of the growth that is occurring, the impact which it is having on the realignment of socio-economic structures, and the poverty of social policy across the continent. Particularly badly hit by the dynamics of inequality are women, children, and the elderly. In too many countries, the resulting social exclusion is becoming a time bomb, which if not addressed, could generate unimaginable problems of governance and sustainability. Policies that foster the broadening of opportunity and inclusion need urgently to be put in place, beginning with macro-economic policies.

Education/human capabilities: No society is ever able to transform itself without attention to the development of its human resources, through educational policies and services that are able not just to keep pace with changing demands and needs but also to anticipate them proactively. The current state of education in Africa, which most people will characterise as below expectation in every respect, and the generalised paucity of special skills in key domains that are critical to an agenda of structural transformation, will need to be redressed as a matter of priority if the continent is to build a future that will be assured and rewarding for its citizens.

Out of the situational analysis that needs to be carried out, it should be possible to come to terms with the question: what lies behind the picture? And from there, it should also be possible to proffer appropriate responses. The right question begets the right answer. The situational analysis should also include:

- A careful study of the national development plans and visions which have been adopted by African countries over the last decade and the identification of the common denominators that link them and which could also serve as a link to a continental agenda;

- An unpacking of regional programmes of action that have been adopted by member states with a view to similarly identifying their common denominators and their possible linkages to a continental agenda;

- The unpacking of the slew of continental policy frames and standards that have been adopted under the auspices of the AU or carried over from the OAU, for their internal consistency and compatibility with one another. This should also be done with a view to matching them with national and regional plans and visions, to allow for coherence, build solid grounds for the future domestication of the regional agenda, and strengthen a sense of collective ownership.

As simple as it may look, a mapping of the key issues around which collective African effort can and should be mobilised, and the organisation of in-depth analyses on them, will not be an easy task as the different conceptual and analytical frameworks that underpin them would be at play. Moreover the analysis will have to be made with some sense of prioritisation, with a clear accent being placed on those issues which will be key to the making of a continental renaissance. Luckily, methods exist for carrying out a prioritisation of issues when the web of variables and interrelations between them is as complex as it is in the case of the African momentum. Whatever methodological framework will eventually be used, the situational analysis should clearly help Africans identify three major elements of any systemic approach:

- the constants of the systems, i.e. those variables which will not change during the next 50 years;

- the trends associated with the systems and which are likely to be present and operative in the years to come; and

- the seeds of change which may come into play in the system and eventually bring elements of discontinuity that are capable of altering the trends of the day

The Construction of Scenarios

The construction of scenarios must be part and parcel of the process leading to the formulation of an Agenda 2063. There is no dearth of scenarios concerning Africa at different time horizons. Broadly speaking, three families of scenarios are currently on offer, and can be summarised as follows:

- One is a scenario of low growth, mainly driven by an external demand where periods of boom will be followed by periods of contraction and recession, but basically the productivity of labour as well as capital will remain low. The State would have failed to create an enabling environment for development and will eventually lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the disadvantaged groups, thus sowing the seeds of discontent, which may be dealt with using different strategies ranging from clientelism and outright repression to the co-option of the elite. This is basically a trend-based scenario. Africa would be trapped in a low growth, haphazard development trajectory that would be far below the expectations of the masses.

- Another scenario is one in which economic transformation would take place as a result of the diversification of sources of growth, a significant improvement in the value addition taking place on the continent, and a diversification of sources of funding. Led by a developmental state, the transformation would be based on a better balance between the State and the private sector, both local and foreign. To a large extent, the states and organisations advocating for an Africa rising to the status of middle-income countries in the next few years adhere to that scenario.

- A third scenario has been drawn up, in which economic and social transformation would go hand in hand with a political and cultural renewal. Such a radical transformation would require new alliances at the national, regional and global levels, between different social forces around a development paradigm and strategies for significant transformative growth and a mitigation of the mechanisms that generate inequality.

As is to be expected, each scenario or family of scenarios is based on a number of hypotheses, the combination of which generates different images and conveys different

trajectories, leading to the final image depicted in the scenario. What will make the difference between these scenarios and make them more or less plausible in a given

time frame is the soundness of the underlying hypotheses and assumptions. In order to assess the challenges that lie ahead, it is therefore important that various actors and stakeholders discuss these hypotheses broadly, as robustly as possible, and agree on the action needed to overcome them. Democratic deliberations around these scenarios are, therefore, not a luxury nor a fancy academic exercise but a way to ensure that there is a real understanding of what will make them possible as well as what may derail them. Such knowledge is critical to avoid the pitfall of a scenario which is merely an idealised representation of the future based on aspirations, but which is not anchored on the reality.

From Formulating a Sound Agenda 2063, through Strategic Planning, to Operationalisation

The translation of an agenda into a plan of action is, by far, the most critical challenge that often marks the difference between success and failure. In the case of the proposed Agenda 2063, three important considerations need to be kept in mind and followed up on.

1. The first one is the **identification and definition of key pillars of action.** As suggested in this section there are a number of lines of action, programmes and projects which have been devised, formulated and implemented according to different philosophies. The diversity is striking even if one were to limit the scope of investigation to AU and NEPAD-initiated programmes only. Whereas such diversity can be seen as a sign of vitality, one can also wonder whether there is not room for a rationalisation of the activities so as to ensure greater coherence and better synergies between them.

2. The second challenge, not unrelated to the first one, is the **articulation between the national, regional and continental levels.** As stated earlier, it has been argued that lack of articulation between these levels accounts to some extent for the failure of the LPA, and conversely that the relative success of the SAPs can be explained by the robust framework and the discipline that countries and regional organisations had to adhere to as part of their agreement with the Bretton Woods institutions. Although it is not in any way being suggested that Agenda 2063 should take a leaf from the straightjacket strategy employed to enforce the structural adjustment programmes, it should go without saying that the project of Africa's rediscovery and renaissance will require a certain discipline at national, regional and continental level. Monitoring and evaluation systems will also need to be developed as key instruments for ensuring consistency and accountability throughout the period covered by the Agenda.

3. The third challenge relates to **funding.** Agenda 2063 will be implemented in what has been dubbed "an age of choice" when it comes to funding. For reasons which have to do with changes affecting the "geography of wealth", international public financing, which for a long time came from the industrialised countries of the OECD and was the main source of development funding, is seriously challenged by international private financing from the same countries or from other countries. Moreover, external funding, whether public or private, which was also an important source of funding is also being seriously challenged by the mobilisation of domestic, national, regional, or continental resources. Each of these sources comes with its advantages and weaknesses. The challenge will be to maximise benefits by making the right choice among the different available instruments. In making the choice, technical elements will have to be weighed against other imperatives, including political ones.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Following the celebration of the 50th anniversary of post-colonial pan-Africanism as embodied in the founding of the OAU in 1963, and its succession by the AU in the new Millennium, Africa would seem to have entered a new and possibly decisive phase in its quest for renaissance. Agenda 2063 offers the continent an opportunity to build a collective vision and plan for securing that quest. It is an opportunity for the exercise of coordinated action at different levels, whose starting point must necessarily be an unalloyed faith in the pan-African ideal and whose end-result would have to be a structurally transformed and better-integrated Africa. It would call for the mobilisation of popular support among Africans and will demand political wisdom, leadership, and vision. It will necessitate the application of technical knowledge in different domains and will involve the creation of global partnerships on terms that are attuned to the strategic objectives of the proposed Agenda 2063. A new day beckons in Africa. It is one which, beyond the allures of "Africa Rising", must deliver a democratic and development-focused Africa built on a new contract between state and society in which the freedom, dignity, well-being, and security of the citizenry would be guaranteed.

CHAPTER 2

INTERFACING AGENDA 2063 WITH NATIONAL PLANS, SUB-REGIONAL INITIATIVES AND CONTINENTAL GOALS

Coordination and planning role of the NEPAD Agency

INTRODUCTION

Agenda 2063 will not be the first time that Africa seeks to mobilise joint, collective action for continental development. In response to the loss of growth momentum in late 1970s, for example, African leaders came up with their own economic blueprint - the *Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980-2000* (LPA) - crafted by Africans working through two major institutions, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the Secretariat of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

As the Lagos Plan of Action, and the NEPAD Programme, Agenda 2063 enunciates the goals of collective self-reliance, emphasising among others the development of domestic markets in Africa rather than reliance on external markets, the control of natural resources by states, the role and importance of domestic factor inputs in development, the imperative of self-sufficiency in food production, the development of human capital and the provision of social infrastructure for the African people. Clearly, by concentrating on sectoral programmes, as the Lagos Plan of Action, and the NEPAD Programme, Agenda 2063 envisages the structural transformation of African economies.

However, the LPA achieved very little because of the lack of an implementation strategy, contrary to the Nepad Program that benefited immediately from creation of a secretariat hosted by South Africa, and financed by its founding members. As a result, CAADP was designed as the first continental sectoral strategy. The fact that the Plan repudiated the logic of the raging neo-liberal development did also constitute an obstacle to the support of the initiative.

Instead of supporting the LPA, and within a year after its adoption by African leaders, the World Bank launched its own report entitled, *Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action.* The report blamed Africa's economic weaknesses on domestic "policy inadequacies and administrative constraints" and advocated for substantial currency devaluation and trade liberalisation, along with dismantling industrial protection measures. Importantly, these recommendations formed the basis of structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that became conditional to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans made to African countries. Unlike the LPA, the World Bank Agenda was boiled down to specific policies, which each country was obliged to implement in order to secure financial support from the World Bank and IMF (the IFIs). In essence, the World Bank Agenda had a clear interface with policies at national level through the articulation of SAPs. A similar framework was lacking for the LPA, making it easy for the IFIs to seize much of the policy initiative, and foreclose the debate – insisting that there was no alternative to SAPs. In addition, the LPA was not accompanied by an explicit financing strategy, possibly because it was counting on the support of the development partners, who had a different idea of what was wrong and how to fix it.

With the shift of emphasis from broader development to macroeconomic stability, the ministries in charge of industry, rural development, education, health and employment and infrastructural development were downgraded. In several African countries, the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning was stripped of its economic planning functions in order to focus all its attention on short-term issues: macroeconomic management, emphasising shrinking government budgets and the associated minimalist state syndrome; exchange rate and interest rate liberalisation, ignoring the implications of the policies for real sector development and structural transformation. What is more, all African countries, regardless of their state of development and initial conditions were 'coerced' to adopting these policies hook, line and sinker – the familiar one-size-fits-all syndrome.

While the LPA could not be implemented, African leaders and their institutions, especially under an excruciating SAP regime, continued to tinker with alternative an development strategy separate from the neo-liberal doctrine of the SAP. Examples include Africa's Priority Programme for Economic Recovery (APPER) (1986-1990), which was presented to the United Nations General Assembly as a blueprint for Africa's development, and subsequently modified and adopted by the UN General Assembly as the UN Programme of Action for Africa Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990 (UN-PAAERD). In addition, a counter-proposal to SAPs titled *Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programme for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation* (AAF-SAP) was developed by the UNECA in 1989. Furthermore, the African Charter for Popular Participation and Development was adopted in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1990. All these economic proposals for Africa's development remained mere statements of intention, as the IFIs deployed their political and economic leverage on African countries to sway them away from such blueprints.

During the first decade of the Millennium, a renewed urge to reclaim development agenda setting in Africa by African leaders was galvanised with the establishment of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in October 2011[1]. NEPAD is the second major attempt by African leaders, after the aborted Lagos Plan of Action, to muster collective will to engineer economic development in Africa. It represents a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development, and, at the same time, to prepare them to participate actively in the world economy and in global politics.

NEPAD has seven priority areas of intervention:

1. Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution;

2. Promoting and protecting democracy and human rights;

3. Restoring and maintaining macro-economic stability;

4. Revitalising and extending the provision of education, technical training and health services, with high priority accorded to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other communicable diseases;

5. Promoting the role of women in social and economic development;

6. Building the capacity of the states in Africa; and,

7. Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification.

To achieve the above-mentioned priorities, NEPAD[2] calls for policy reforms and increased investments in the priority areas of agriculture and food security, science and technology, environment, trade and market access, governance, infrastructure (energy, transport and water sanitation, and information and communication technologies), gender, and capacity development. NEPAD, in conjunction with the African Development Bank and UNECA, also continue to emphasise the participation of the private sector, civil society organisations and the African Diaspora in fostering development on the continent. Unlike previous initiatives by African leaders and their institutions, which directly challenged the raging orthodoxy, NEPAD was perceived differently. As a result, the developed world typified by the G8 had no difficulty in giving tacit endorsement and support to the NEPAD initiative. The much expected financial support was, however, not forthcoming.

The upshot of the foregoing is that the previous initiatives by African leaders to mobilise joint, collective action for sub-regional development apparently suffered from limited interface with national development policies. This made it easy for competing agendas, inspired and vigorously promoted by the dollar-dangling IFIs, to hold sway. The fact that the LPA directly challenged the raging orthodoxy of the time only compounded the situation. Perhaps if a framework that interfaced with national plans had accompanied the LPA, it would have been more difficult for the proponents of SAP to sway African leaders from their chosen path.

Meanwhile, it is significant to note that Agenda 2063 comes at a more auspicious time than the LPA. First, it is being articulated at a time when development thinking is making a comeback on a global scale. Like in the immediate post independence era, virtually all African countries are articulating long-term national visions. Second, sub-regional cooperation and integration are enjoying a rebirth, with the adoption of various sub-regional sectoral development programmes aimed at promoting sub-regional production networks and intra-African trade. Third, the Agenda comes against the backdrop of the adoption, under the aegis of the African Union, of a plethora of sub-regional/continental standards, frameworks, goals, and targets that span the entire field of socio-economic development. In essence, necessary conditions seem to exist for the success of Agenda 2063. In order to capitalise on these favourable conditions and avoid the risks of being side-lined by the possible rebound of the neo-liberal paradigm soon after the resumption of economic growth in Europe and North America, Agenda

2063 should secure effective interface with national plans, sub-regional initiatives and continental programmes.

Accordingly, Agenda 2063 should address the following questions:

- How should Agenda 2063 best relate with the range of national plans and visions that have been developed or which are being revised, and vice versa?
- How should Agenda 2063 relate with the various existing sub-regional plans and strategies?
- What are the opportunities that should be tapped for financing Africa's development, including Agenda 2063?
- What must Africa do to ensure that Agenda 2063 occupies the centre-stage of policy action and wins popular acceptance at national and sub-regional levels?

This paper intends to contribute to this by proposing a framework for securing an interface between Agenda 2063, the sub-regional and national development plans. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: the next section presents features of effective interface among national plans, sub-regional initiatives and continental initiatives. Section III examines the imperatives for securing the interface including financing issues, and section IV presents proposals for strengthening the interface (synergy and complementarity) among national plans, sub-regional initiatives and Agenda 2063, and the proposal of a blueprint for the Agenda 2063 implementation by the NEPAD Agency.

Features of Effective Interface among National Plans, Subregional Initiatives and Agenda 2063

Interface among national plans, sub-regional development initiatives and continental development agenda (Agenda 2063) describe a way in which they all come together and have an effect on each other. In articulating the features of interface among these systems, it is instrumental to examine the complementarity of the pertinent features of interfacing systems. In the context of development planning, therefore, we identify the **key activities** involved in a typical planning process, **key actors** who should participate actively in the planning process, and the **time horizons** of plans. Beginning with key activities of a participatory planning process, the following can be identified:

- **Development of Agenda/goal-setting activities** during which development challenges/problems are identified and goals are set;
- **Plan Formulation activities** during which alternative courses of action are identified, analysed and decisions made as to the most suitable and acceptable option;
- **Plan Implementation activities** during which implementers operationalise the programmes and policies, take necessary steps towards implementation, monitor the implementation; and
- **Plan Impact assessment activities** during which the impact/outcome of the implemented programmes and policies are evaluated and feedback provided for setting new development agenda/goals.

In the context of interfacing, all these activities feature at the national level while only the first two (agenda setting and plan formulation) and the fourth activity (impact assessment) feature for subregional and continental development initiatives. This is precisely because plan implementation is normally the responsibility of the national authorities in whom control of territories are vested. Subregional and continental authorities do not have territorial authority. As a result, national authorities are the agents of sub-regional and continental authorities in implementing sub-regional and continental development initiatives.

The **key actors** are:

- **the government policy makers and implementers**, made up of politicians in power and the bureaucrats,
- **the special interest groups outside government** encompassing politicians not in power, business interest organisations whose membership includes owners and/or managers of indigenous and foreign business organisations, labour unions, civil society organisations, non-governmental organisations and a host of sundry interest groups; and
- **the international development partners.**

These groups of actors participate to varying degrees in the aforementioned activities undertaken during the planning process:

Again, in the context of interfacing, while subregional and continental organisations may have their own policy makers and implementers, they have to work in concert with their national counterparts. Indeed, in recognition of the supremacy of national policy makers and implementers, their counterparts from international organisations are typically advisory and/or technical assistants. The remaining two groups of actors cut across local and international boundaries. Indeed, the international donor community members are densely sub-regional, continental and global.

> On **time horizon,** we can identify:
>
> • short-term (annual) plans,
>
> • medium-term plans (3-5 years) and
>
> • long-term plans (10 years and above).

In the context of interfacing, short-term plans are typically the preserve of national authorities; while national, sub-regional and continental authorities can have medium and long term plans. Meanwhile, there is symbiotic relationship among plans of different time horizons with medium-term development plans serving as instruments for implementing the long-term perspective plans. The annual plans are, in turn, the instruments for implementing the medium term plans.

Typically, financing strategies are broadly stated in long and medium-term plans. They contain an indication of the desired degree of reliance on domestic resources and the preferred areas in which international finance will be need and welcome. This includes foreign direct investment (FDI), and commercial/concessional loans from private, bilateral and multilateral sources. The short-term plan (the budget) contains precise estimates of resource availability from various sources and how they will be deployed. While the source of resources should be guided by the broad strategy in the underlying medium and long-term plans, the expenditure patterns should reflect the development priorities enunciated in the underlying medium-term plan.

IMPERATIVES FOR EFFECTIVE INTERFACE AMONG NATIONAL PLANS, REGIONAL AND CONTINENTAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES AND AGENDA 2063

In considering imperatives for an effective interface among national plans, regional development initiatives and Agenda 2063, we ascertain the compatibility of key components of a typical plan, the roles of various actors and the time frame. With respect to compatibility of components, the requirement is that the development agenda, plan objective, analysis of options, choice of options and programming, implementation arrangement and monitoring and evaluation should cascade from continental to regional and national levels.

As mentioned earlier, virtually all African countries now embrace different degrees of participatory development planning, and realise that their economies are fundamentally mixed. Accordingly, national visions have been prepared with input from key stakeholder groups. These long-term visions are quite detailed in several cases and provide guidance for articulating medium-term plans necessary for implementing long-term visions. However, the relationships between the short-term plans (the budget) and the medium-term plans are quite tenuous in

many countries. While some of the reasons for the tenuous relationship is understandable, justifiable and hence temporary, (e.g. in cases of unanticipated natural and/or man-made disasters), a persistently tenuous relationship and outright disconnect are due to a lingering aversion to development planning at the operational level. In several African countries, the lack of planning discipline is reflected in anchoring the government budget on the so-called medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF), which is essentially financial programming with no explicit consideration of the requirements of an underlying medium-term development plan. The result is that there is no systematic implementation of the visions, so well articulated in a participatory manner at national level

A cursory look at some regional and continental development initiatives, as well as regional trade policies, also suggests that considerable efforts went into articulating the development agenda, objective(s), analysis of options and choice of options to be followed. Several of them also contain guidance on implementation, including

prescriptions on the proportion of the national budget that should be devoted to such activities. For example, in July 2003, African Heads of State and Government decided that at least 10% of the national budget should be allocated to Agriculture and Rural Development within the next 5 years[3]. Some also called on the international community to honour their financial pledges to programmes like Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other related infectious diseases[4].

In many cases, the programmes and policies do not contain adequate guidance on impact assessment/review. Rather, member countries may carry out an impact assessment, primarily to support grievances and seek concessions, especially in the context of regional trade policies. Meanwhile, the lacunae at national level with respect to the instrumentality of annual plans (budgets) in implementing the medium-term plans imply that continental and regional development initiatives detract from the systematic implementation of regional development initiatives.

With respect to Agenda 2063, quite a number of the key sections are still being articulated. This should afford the opportunity to ensure that the pitfalls of its predecessor, the LPA, are avoided. Above all, it is a long-term development agenda that should be properly domesticated by member countries, ensuring that the objectives and plan of action of their respective national development plans flow from Agenda 2063. For this purpose, Agenda 2063 should clearly articulate policy directions that are adaptable to the contexts and realities of different African countries at different times and stages of economic transformation, thus avoiding the dangers of the one-size-fits-all characteristic that was typical of the erstwhile SAP.

Agenda 2063 should contain a clear financing strategy. In this regard, Agenda 2063 should draw inspirations from the recently concluded report Domestic Resource Mobilisation for Implementing National and Regional NEPAD Programmes and Projects – Africa Looks Within. In particular, Agenda 2063 should further develop the idea canvassed by the leadership of NEPAD and UNECA in the report, namely,

…Africans must own and drive the continental agenda utilising their own financial resources to deliver the much-desired structural transformation. Fifty years of political independence with the establishment of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor, the African Union (AU) ten years on, some African countries are still largely dependent on external resources for public finance and domestic investment. A fully sovereign Africa should exude self-reliance and value-driven partnership, not dependence. Therefore, the effective mobilisation of requisite domestic resources to finance African-owned programmes and projects is most urgent and paramount.[5]

Agenda 2063 should also codify all the declarations incorporating decisions on resource allocations, reflect on them and propose adjustments necessary to prioritise sectors and activities compatible with the 2063 vision.

Importantly, Agenda 2063 should contain a detailed operational framework for monitoring progress, especially, assessing impact/outcome. The overarching framework of developmental state advocated in Agenda 2063 should be fully developed to provide guides to the changing roles of the state as economic transformation progresses. For example, it should contain clear guidance on the changes that should be made by national authorities to the character and degree of participation by various stakeholders in each of the activities in the development planning process as the economic transformation progresses.[6] Similarly, it should provide guidance on the changes in the interface between public and private sector agents as economic transformation progresses.[7]

Responsibility for implementing Agenda 2063 ordinarily belongs to national authorities. Nevertheless, Agenda 2063 should contain a framework for monitoring and reporting on progress at regular intervals. Inspiration can be drawn from the APRM in this regard.

NEPAD AGENCY PROPOSALS FOR PROMOTING INTERFACE AMONG NATIONAL PLANS, REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES AND AGENDA 2063

The foregoing suggests that there is really no conflict among the objectives of national plans, sub-regional and continental development initiatives and Agenda 2063. Clearly, they all seek to secure inclusive growth and economic transformation. Agenda 2063 comes at a time when the neo-liberal development paradigm is giving way to pragmatism and when virtually all African countries are returning to long-term planning. This creates necessary but not sufficient conditions for success. In order to succeed, Agenda 2063 should effectively interface with national plans and regional/continental development initiatives. The planning process at national level should be fully participatory and the character of participation should reflect the context and reality of various African countries. As all economies are mixed, including African economies, success also requires appropriate changes in the character of interface between public and private sector as economic transformation progresses. The developmental state framework advocated by Agenda 2063 should be fully

articulated to provide guidance to the changing roles of the state as development progresses. This way, Agenda 2063 will take firm root in the policy domains at national levels such that, even if there is a resurgence of the neo-liberal paradigm soon after the economies of Europe and US resume growth, African countries will be able to stay the course as did several East Asian countries during the SAP days, for example.

Although African countries are returning to planning and the desired envelope relationship between long term-visions and medium-term plans are observable, there is a considerable disconnect between short-term plans (the budgets) and the underlying medium-term plans. While some of the deviations are justifiable and should be temporary, a sustained disconnect reflects the lingering aversion to planning as ministries of finance rely on MTEF, which have little or no bearing with the medium term development plans. Persistence of this situation will detract from the success of Agenda 2063.

Against this background, we suggest the following options for promoting effective interface among national plans, subregional/continental development initiatives and Agenda 2063.

- **Foremost, Agenda 2063 should strongly advocate rebuilding and strengthening development planning institutions in Africa.** Development planning functions should be revived and be enabled to provide anchorage and clearing framework for all policies and programmes of all government agencies, including the Ministry of Finance. As the human resource base of planning agencies have been degraded under the yoke of SAPs, major efforts should be made to rebuild the capacity of staff of these agencies to undertake participatory planning in mixed economies that are undergoing economic transformation, elements of which are in Ajakaiye (2012) and Ajakaiye (2013). In this regard, the Institute of Development Planning (IDEP), for example, should be supported in its effort to rebuild capacity of public sector staff in participatory planning.

- **There is need to make development planning mandatory and discourage the tendency to mistake essentially financial plans (MTEF) for development plans.** For this purpose, and in the context of the appropriation process in both the legislative and executive arms of government, Agenda 2063 should prescribe that each budget proposal (the short-term plan) should contain a **Plan Compatibility Statement** detailing deviations (if any) from the Plan's policies and programmes with justifications. The Plan Compatibility Statement will prevent plan and budget indiscipline and secure sustained plan implementation.

- **There is need to re-install a Weberian bureaucratic system and culture with embedded autonomy, meritocracy, security of tenure and appropriate remuneration.** This is important if Agenda 2063 and the underlying developmental state framework is to be effectively operationalised at national level.

- **In the context of setting up the developmental state, Agenda 2063 should prescribe that the capacity of non-state actors to actively participate in all stages of development planning be built by the state in collaboration with willing development partners**. For example, participants in training programmes designed to rebuild the capacity of planners should be drawn from public sector organisations, private sector business interest organisations and other non-state actor organisations.

- **Agenda 2063 should also prescribe the installation of the developmental, state complete with effective participatory planning processes and effective multi-stakeholder deliberation processes, devoid of adversarial relationships and that will minimise the risks of capture and undue interference by external agents.**

- **In view of the prevailing situation whereby the traditional development partners are preoccupied with addressing their own internal economic and financial crises, Agenda 2063 should encourage African countries to engage strategically with the emerging global economic powers in the South.** This is especially so for China and India, who should be encouraged to assist in investments aimed at upgrading their infrastructural bases and, above all, incorporating African countries in their global production networks.

Agenda 2063 Blueprint

The NEPAD Agency proposal aims firstly to help build the interface between the objectives of national plans, sub-regional and continental development initiatives and Agenda 2063. Secondly, it will equip that interface with tools and methodologies that will build from experiences, best practices, combined with delivery unit that will take care of the monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of Agenda 2063.

The blueprint phase will need to:

- Align with member states national plans of action;
- Improve on current processes through recommended best practices and automation;
- Optimise future-flexibility of the design to support the growing and changing Africa's social and economic outlook;
- Deliver a design that will allow the objectives of Agenda 2063 to be met;
- Establish a solid foundation for a delivery unit that will be established to support the implementation.

Objectives

The NEPAD Agency has developed and is supporting a set of continental frameworks that should be mainstreamed into the objectives of Agenda 2063 to anchor it into the preoccupations of member states and RECs. The establishment and effective implementation of these continental frameworks that aim to support the development of the African continent, build from a solid foundation of methodologies and tools of a blueprint that would benefit Agenda 2063's implementation.

The NEPAD Agency would propose that a full review of the proposed blueprint be conducted with all the key stakeholders of Agenda 2063, as part of the blueprint commencement activities. The outcome of this review would be a final plan for approval by the Agenda 2063 Project Sponsors.

Key Principles of the blueprint

A number of key principles have been followed in developing the blueprint:

- **Teaming:** Throughout the Agenda 2063 blueprint, and indeed throughout our whole approach to proposing services and support, a great emphasis should be put on partnering closely with the directorates of development planning at the national level, with the RECs, the African Union Commission and the development partners. This teaming is a critical success factor in the successful delivery of Agenda 2063.

- **Managing for success:** The implementation plan shall employ proven approaches and techniques to effectively manage the risks inherent in an initiative such as this. In particular, the need to consider non-technical risks is emphasised via the inclusion of project management, stakeholder management, expectation management, quality assurance and dependency management frameworks.

- **Maximise the use of accelerators:** The NEPAD Agency leverages a number of "accelerators" that build from its continental frameworks such as CAADP that will increase the speed of implementation of Agenda 2063 and its alignment with national priorities and regional programs. These include proven project management toolkits. The blueprint plan shall fully incorporate the use of these "accelerators".

- **A plan is a key communication tool:** The blueprint plan will be a critical communication tool for Agenda 2063 and its stakeholders. For example, it will provide the stakeholders with key information on milestones, deliverables risks etc.; it will form the basis of an induction pack for all team members; and it will provide stakeholders with a clear understanding of the Agenda 2063's scope, objectives and likely impact.

- **Structure of the plan:** The plan shall be divided into three main activities. Firstly, the blueprint project plan, including an overall approach of implementing Agenda 2063, the NEPAD Agency accelerators, the scope, workplan, tasks, team organisation and roles and responsibilities.

  The second set of activities spell out the key elements of project management, including governance structures, risk and issue management, monitoring and reporting, change management, document management, quality assurance etc.

  The third set of activities shall include key aspects of the delivery phase, and would provide high level plans and further considerations for the Delivery phase.

Agenda 2063 delivery unit

Some detail of the main activities for the Delivery phase is described below. The list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to demonstrate our experience of some of the key tasks that will be facing the Agenda 2063 implementation teams.

Project Management

The project management workstream will be similar to that of the Blueprint. Some of the key processes that will be operated as part of the project management function include: plan work; manage resources, scope, report status, change requests, issues, risks, quality, and project communication.

Design and Build

The project teams that will be established at the RECs and national levels will adapt the Agenda 2063 blueprint into a working solution that should connect with national and regional plans.

Knowledge Management

The knowledge created, captured and shared by practitioners and policy experts, about national and regional level actions, is indispensable in informing global discussion, providing policy guidance and contributing to efforts to speed up implementation of Agenda 2063. Therefore the leveraging the capabilities of the knowledge management frameworks and platforms established by the NEPAD Agency will greatly enhance the adoption, dissemination, and ultimately the implementation of Agenda 2063.

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1   In all, five African leaders, namely, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria were critical in the establishment of NEPAD.

2   As part of the process to integrate NEPAD into the African Union structures and processes, the 14th African Union (AU) Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25 January – 2 February 2010, decided to strengthen the NEPAD programme by transforming the NEPAD Secretariat into an implementation Agency – the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA).

3   See Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, 10-12 July 2003 (Assembly/AU/Decl. 7 (II)). Available from http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2014].

4   See Maputo Declaration on Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Other Related Infectious Diseases, 10-12 July 2003, Assembly/AU/Decl.6 (II). Available from http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2014].

5   See NEPAD & UNECA, 2013, Mobilizing Domestic Resource Mobilization for Implementing National and Regional NEPAD Programmes and Projects – Africa Looks Within. viii (NEPAD Secretariat and UNECA, Final Report, 25 May 2013). Available from http://www.africanbondmarkets.org/fileadmin/pdf/Publications/Domestic%20Resource%20Mobilisation%20Study%20May%202013-NEPAD.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2014].

6   See Ajakaiye (2012) for a characterisation of the changing roles of actors in participatory development planning process as economic transformation progresses.

7   See Ajakaiye (2013) for suggestions in this regard.

BLUEPRINT FOR AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO IMPLEMENT AGENDA 2063

CHAPTER 3

DIMENSIONS AND DYNAMICS OF SOCIETAL CHANGE: OVERCOMING POVERTY AND TAMING INEQUALITY IN THE MARCH TOWARDS 2063

INTRODUCTION

Over the past five decades, the social landscape of the African continent has changed significantly in terms of the size and structure of the population, as well as structures of human capability, people's participation in income and wealth creation, and welfare and social security. African economies have gone from rapid growth following independence, through the slump of the 1980s and 1990s, to more rapid and sustained growth from the turn of the Century. These changes have created millionaires as well as paupers, educated and illiterate, slum dwellers and mansion dwellers, and a host of other contradictory tendencies that have exerted considerable pressures on African states capacity to deliver people-centred development through policy-making and strategy. The contradictory tendencies of these changes have seen societies erupt in violent conflict ranging from food riots, to xenophobic attacks, coups d'état and the dramatic overthrow of despots from state power as persistent poverty and gross inequalities bite deeper into the social fabric of African countries.

It is in recognition of the link between conflict and unequal access to income and opportunities that world leaders now call for inclusive development within countries as well as across countries and regions. Africa's reflection on its own future is thus also a reflection on how to foster inclusive prosperity, reduce potential for violent confrontations and create conditions for peaceful co-existence. While the recent upturn in economic growth gives hope that such growth could provide an enabling environment to overcome poverty and tame inequality, there are worrying signs that the options for Africa's development strategies are shrouded in considerable uncertainties and constrained by internal contradictions. This is happening in the context of the changing global environment, where centres of political and economic power are now geographically separated [with economic power having shifted dramatically to emerging economies in the global south while political and military power remains firmly in the western].

This paper highlights some of the salient dimensions and dynamics of social change that need to be taken into account to inform the choice of strategy among competing social, economic, and other objectives and in the context of global economic and environmental shifts. The 2008 continental social policy framework encapsulates the reading of the pressing problems faced by Africa and the interventions needed to make a difference. These include the challenges of

- population, migration and urbanisation dynamics;

- social policy deficits regarding labour and employment, social protection and security, health and diseases, as well as education; and

- the vulnerabilities of certain population groups such as children and youth, the aged, women, and the disabled who are victims of the deepening inequalities in African societies.

This paper will focus primarily on the dynamics of population change, migration and urbanisation and their profound implications on other areas of social and economic development policy and strategy: taking housing and education as representative areas of social policy. The crosscutting and underlying problems of poverty and inequality will be highlighted as the consistent thread in the analysis of the relations between population dynamics and social policy and development.

It is important to appreciate that the development models that have been represented by industrialised economies, are now recognised as posing a threat to human survival. This has implications for the context in which African development strategies are built. At global level, uneven developments in the spread of science and technology have culminated in a situation in which the most industrialised regions of the world consume a relatively excessive amount of the world's resources but do not feel the brunt of the

adverse effects of such consumption patterns, nor the concomitant impact on the global ecosystem. By contrast, while those in the least advanced regions can barely meet their basic needs, they meet the consumption demands of the richer regions (minerals, energy, agricultural produce and a number of tradable goods) in a manner that exerts intolerable pressure on their immediate ecosystems. This situation is exacerbated by the high impact of the industrial and consumption patterns of their richer co-inhabitants of the earth. Persistent poverty, deadly diseases, ill health, hunger, malnutrition, limited human capability, inadequate access to productive resources and services, income inequalities, etc., are thus problems that hit hardest on those who consume the fewest natural resources, and who have the least capacity to protect themselves.

Governments can play an important developmental role using policy as an instrument for both economic growth and social justice. Social policy is the means by which benefits are channelled to people from the fruits of economic activity within the boundaries nature's provisions. Poverty and its persistence therefore reflect insufficient access to the benefits of the goods and services that societies produce and is therefore an eloquent comment on the quality, impact and sustainability of the instruments through which benefits are distributed. The core roles of social policy are redistribution, protection and reproduction of development outputs, which have traditionally been facilitated through the provision of the basic social services of education, health, housing, sanitation and water supplies. Additionally the social provision of energy supplies, information, income support for vulnerable groups, social insurance, social protection, and transport and communication have also become critical to social justice.

The distribution and consumption of social services therefore give good indications of social justice in and by themselves. They also have an impact on other social conditions, such as the number of people who survive, the rate of population growth, migration and settlement patterns, supply and quality of labour, employment patterns and trends, etc., which in turn have implications for the consumption and use of natural resources, the availability of resources to support consumption, and economic activities that produce goods and services. Demographic patterns and structures that emanate from the effective provision of social services also, in turn, affect the quality of provision of these services. We will therefore start our assessment of the dynamics of African social change and its implications for social justice and poverty alleviation by reviewing population trends and demographic transitions.

POPULATION DYNAMICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Four distinct patterns in population structure and size have emerged that have had and will continue to have a bearing on Africa's prospects for improving the material and social conditions of its people. These are population growth rate and overall size, changing age composition and the projected current youth bulge, migration, and nature and structure of urbanisation.

Population Size and Variation

The African population has grown by almost four times in size since the 1960s, when the population of very few African countries exceeded 2 million as reflected in Figures 1a to 1d. Today, one third of all African countries have a population in excess of 15 million and, together, make up 79% of the continent's total population. The population of each one of these countries is projected to increase to over 40 million by 2050 and, together, they will still constitute nearly 80% of the total African population. Nigeria is a distinct outlier here in terms of both its sheer size and the pace of its growth. It is followed by Ethiopia, the DRC and Côte D'Ivoire. It is worth noting that in 2013, the DRC had the second lowest human development ranking among African countries, while Nigeria was at the top end of the scale.

The African population has grown by almost four times in size since the 1960s

Figure 1a: Projected Population Growth for the Largest African Countries [over 40 million]: 1950-2050

Twenty-one percent of African countries have between 10 and 15 million inhabitants each, and are expected to double their size and increase their share of the total continental population from 13% in 2010 to 15% by 2050 Cameroon and Malawi are projected to lead this group, while Zimbabwe is projected to reduce its growth rate and move from second place on the list of medium large countries to the bottom of the scale, thus also significantly reducing pressure on its resources.

Table 1: Current Situation and Projected Changes in the Population Size of African Countries

Year	Largest countries (over 40 million)	Medium large countries (21-40 million)	Medium small countries (6 to 20 Million)-	Smallest countries (less than 6 million)	Total
	Thousand People				
2010	817350	138413	59012	16537	1031312
2020	1007336	176357	71248	19399	1274342
2030	1200711	216475	82616	22096	1521898
2040	1391486	257701	93371	24529	1767087
2050	1567689	298145	103173	26749	1995756

	Largest countries (over 40 million)	Medium large countries (21-40 million)	Medium small countries (6 to 20 Million)-	Smallest countries (less than 6 million)	Total
Year	Percentage distribution				
2010	79	13	6	2	100
2020	79	14	6	2	100
2030	79	14	5	1	100
2040	79	15	5	1	100
2050	79	15	5	1	100
Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects					

The lower medium-sized and smallest countries account for 45% of the total number of countries and only 8% of the population. They are set to reduce their share of the total population to 6% by 2050, as Table 1 above illustrates. Tunisia has been the largest country in this group, but is projected to reduce its growth and fall to third position by 2050, while Burundi and Togo grow positively. Among the 14 smallest African countries, the Gambia started accelerating its growth rate in the 1990s, overtaking Mauritius in 1995 and Guinea Bissau in 2005. It is expected to overtake Botswana and Lesotho by 2020 and Namibia by 2045 if current growth rates continue. Yet it is has some of the greatest challenges in meeting its human resource development and welfare needs. Namibia has also been growing fast and, by 2050, is set to be the second largest in this group of countries, after the Gambia.

The sheer increase in population in all four categories of countries has implications for social development as well as the capacity of African countries to continue providing food, employment and basic social services to their people. This is so, especially because life is still characterised by considerable levels of poverty at national and household levels across the continent. For most of these countries, population growth occurs under conditions of scarce capital and development resources, as will be illustrated in relation to education and housing.

Changing Population Structure and the Projected Youth Bulge

A second aspect of the changing structure of the African population is that the proportion of children is reducing in relation to the share of people of working age. In 1980, all but five African countries had a population in which more than 40% were children under the age of 15. Figure 2a illustrates the age structures of medium large to the largest African countries. Rwanda and Niger topped the charts in this group of countries, with children accounting for 48% of the population. The highest numbers, however, were Swaziland and Zimbabwe with children making up 49% of the population. These large proportions reflected the positive health programmes adopted by most post-independence African states, which greatly reduced child mortality rates.

The number of countries in which children made up more than 40% of the population has declined by more than 20% ,from over 91% in 2010. In fact in 30% of African countries, the population share of under-15 year-olds had declined to 33% or less. These include Libya (33%), Mauritius (26%), Seychelles (28%), South Africa (33%), and Tunisia (30%). According to the 2012 UN population projections *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*, the number of African countries with under fifteen year olds making up more than 40% of the population will have dropped to just

56% by 2020 and 5% by 2050. This will be a great reduction of the large dependency ratios that most African countries and households have carried since the 1980s.

The reduction in the share of children aged below 15 has seen a youth bulge, as the 15 to 29 years-olds increased their share from around a quarter to an average of 29% of the population in over 90% of the countries by 2010. For a quarter of these African countries, the share of 15 to 19 year-olds even rose to over 30% of their population. This youth bulge is projected to continue into 2020 for at least 80% African countries, but with fewer exceeding 30% youth. However, Angola, Burundi, the Gambia, São Tomé e Príncipe, Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Nigeria are some of the countries that will continue to have over 40% of their population being children aged under 15. On the other hand, most other countries will increase the share of the working age population to more than 65%. By 2050, however, only nine African countries will have more than 36% of their population being children aged under 15. The vast majority (i.e. more than three quarters of the countries) will have youth aged 15 to 29 making up 30% of their populations and therefore accounting for a very significant proportion of the working age population. This is the youth bulge that will present both a blessing and a challenge: on one hand,

Figure 2a: 1960 Age Structure of African Population in largest and Medium Large Countries

Fiure 2b: 2010 Age Structure of African Population in Largest and Medium Large Countries

Source: Source: Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects, 2012 revision.

Figure 3: 2020 Projected Population Age Structure of Largest and Medium Large African Countries

Figure 4: 2020 Projected Popultion Age Structure in Smallest and Medium Small African Countries

Source: World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision

the increase in the proportion of working age groups means reduced dependency ratios at both household and national levels; on the other, it means greater demand for jobs which will require vastly different employment creation capabilities on the continent than has been the case during the past five decades.

The opportunities heralded by recent growth trends in African economies, and widened trade opportunities with emerging global economies will test Africa's maturity and capacity to transform its policy-making, towards efficient population management and turning challenges into positive outcomes. One of those testing points is whether, and to what extent, African countries can equip their youthful populations with skills to turn them into powerful human resources that would play a leading role in the social, economic, political and cultural development of the continent. We can assess the prospects by examining the record of the last fifty since independence, in terms of its impact on the development of human capabilities and the quality of labour resources.

Migration and Urbanisation Structures and Trends

Africa's population is also urbanising, and this is set to deepen over the next few decades. In the 1950s and 1960s, for instance, more than 90% of the population of almost all African countries lived in rural areas. However, as illustrated in table 2, by 2010 more than one third of the countries had at least half their populations living in urban areas. By the end of this decade, the proportion of African countries with over 50% urban populations is projected to increase to 40% and onward to 60% by 2030 and 85% by 2050. These spatial changes in population distribution have an important bearing on employment structures as well as on food production, housing, sanitation, waste disposal, drinking water, physical infrastructure, social services and natural resources, whose availability is already problematic as Africa accounts for more than 80% of countries least able to provide for their own people. The current Human Development Report shows that 86% of all countries with low HDI are African, while only 22% of those with medium indexes are African.

Table 2: Distribution of African Countries by Current and Projected Levels of Urbanisation from 2010 to 2050

Urbanization level	2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Proportion of African countries									
<30	25	19	17	15	11	9	6	4	0
30-39	25	17	13	13	9	8	6	8	9
40-49	17	28	30	26	23	13	13	8	6
50-59	13	8	9	9	21	30	30	23	15
60-69	13	21	19	19	9	11	13	23	34
70-79	4	4	6	11	19	21	23	23	15
80+	4	4	6	6	8	8	9	13	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

The African urban space is also home to slums, a reflection of the failure of social policy to provide adequate housing for the continent's urbanising population. The increasing rate of urbanisation therefore has serious implications for the continent's continued capacity to develop its urban built environment in a socially inclusive manner. Currently the countries with the highest rate of urbanisation are also those most likely to have medium to high Human Development Indexes. These include countries such as Libya, Algeria, Botswana, South Africa, and Tunisia. Some countries like Djibouti (76%) and São Tomé e Príncipe (62%), however, have low Human Development Indexes and are representative of the majority of African countries in that respect.

Another aspect of the spatial movement of people is that of crossing boundaries. With countries differing in economic growth and employment opportunities, the tendency for large cross-border movements increases: creating new challenges in competition for employment and housing services that is often reflected in conflicts between migrants and local populations. These raise questions about the significance of a single African citizenship, as large numbers of people acquire residence in countries other than their country of origin.

SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS AND OUTCOMES IN HUMAN DEVELOPMENT, HOUSING AND VULNERABILITIES

Africa is home to the largest proportion of people with tenuous access to decent incomes, employment and a host of other social development resources. It is characterised by many contradictions in relation to the directions and dimensions of economic change on the one hand, and social change and welfare on the other. For instance in some regions of the world, urbanisation translates into high rates of absorption of labour into industrial and commercial sectors, away from agriculture. For many African countries, however, urbanisation very often means shifting of labour form agriculture into the informal economy, characterised by low income returns and operating essentially at subsistence level. Much of the failure of African economies to deliver higher Human Development Indexes can be partially explained by the extractive and mono-cultural character of the economies, but also by their social development polices and programmes. Education and housing are two areas of social policy that best highlight the impact of past development efforts on both current and future prospects for transformation.

Education and Human Capital Development in Retrospect and Prospect

The developmental role of education, in terms of both enhancement of human resources and as a means of distributing national wealth and income, has never been doubted by any post- independence African leader. Most African countries inherited educational systems that provided for a very tiny minority of the citizens. For instance, comparative databases of global educational attainment (Barro and Lee, 2011) suggest that while at global level 47% of the population aged 15 years and above had no schooling at all in 1950, for Africa three quarters of this age group had not been to school. However, after independence, most African countries greatly expanded their educational institutions to increase intake very rapidly, and to provide access to an ever-increasing proportion of children and youth; thus creating a basis for enhancing the skill and educational development of the working age groups.

The overall impact of Africa's past educational strategies is best reflected in the educational attainment of people aged above 24 and who are the major source of the labour force. As Table 3 illustrates, in this age group 80% had no schooling at all in 1960, but by 1980 when the structural adjustment programmes hit the continent, this proportion had been reduced to 66% and would continue declining right down to 38% by 2010. Primary education, on the other hand, would increase from 18% attainment in 1960 to 33% in 2010; with the proportions continuously challenged and undermined by fast population growth and fertility rates. Secondary educational attainment for this age group rose by eight times the 1960 base point, to reach 25% by 2010, while tertiary educational attainment increased from practically zero to 4%. There are wide variations in countries which transitioned from predominantly zero schooling to educational attainments ranging from largely primary to largely secondary. At the bottom end are countries like Niger, Mali and the Gambia where more than 70% of the population above the age of 24 had still had no access to education at all by 2010. Several others also had more than half their population in this age group, with zero schooling. These include Burundi (57%), the Central African Republic (53%), Liberia (54%), Rwanda (53%), Sierra Leone (65%) and Sudan (56%). One third of the countries, however, have reduced zero schooling to less than 20% of the population aged 25 years and above, with Mauritius and Zimbabwe as the most successful at less than 10%.

Table 3: Percentage of National Population Aged over 24 with NO Schooling from 1960 to 2010

	No school						No school			
	Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010		Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010
1	Algeria	85	70	29	16	7	Congo	88	66	41	32
2	Benin	89	89	70	64	8	Cote d'Ivoire	93	84	58	47
3	Botswana	73	55	25	16	9	DRC	87	73	52	48
4	Burundi	93	82	71	57	10	Egypt	92	76	50	37
5	Cameroon	82	63	29	18	11	Gabon	89	67	33	18
6	CAR	90	82	62	53	12	Gambia	96	93	80	73

		No school						No school			
	Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010		Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010
13	Ghana	86	65	40	40	26	Rwanda	92	77	60	53
14	Kenya	77	59	25	16	27	Senegal	58	54	41	31
15	Lesotho	43	30	21	17	28	Sierra Leone	95	89	74	65
16	Liberia	92	83	59	54	29	South Africa	50	32	20	13
17	Libya	86	63	33	27	30	Sudan	89	79	56	56
18	Malawi	69	54	43	29	31	Swaziland	76	47	24	15
19	Mali	97	93	82	77	32	Togo	92	77	35	26
20	Mauritania	64	63	55	45	33	Tunisia	90	72	47	38
21	Mauritius	48	27	12	7	34	Uganda	77	59	41	27
22	Morocco	95	84	61	51	35	U R of Tanzania	71	57	34	24
23	Mozambique	83	81	80	75	36	Zambia	59	50	24	18
24	Namibia	55	41	26	21	37	Zimbabwe	48	31	13	9
25	Niger	91	91	83	78		AVERAGES	79	66	45	38

Source: Barro and Lee, 2011

As illustrated in Table 4, a number of African countries have graduated from predominantly zero education for ages 25 years and above to predominantly primary school educated by 2010. These include Kenya (55%), Cameroon (54%) Lesotho, (61%), Malawi (56%), Senegal (54%), Togo (66%) and Tanzania (61%). A further one third have managed to reach primary school completion targets of between 30% and 48% among their population. Several other countries have graduated even further to predominantly secondary school level attainment for their population. Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, for instance, have reached 71%, 59% and 54% respectively of secondary school attainment for ages 25 and above, while Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius and Swaziland have reached between 42% and 44% secondary school attainment among this population group (Table 5).

Table 4: Primary School as Highest Education Attainment Level X % National Populations Aged Over 24 years: 1960 to 2010

	Primary School Attainment [%]						Primary School Attainment [%]				
	Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010		Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010
1	Algeria	14	22	40	42	12	Gambia	1	2	4	3
2	Benin	8	8	16	18	13	Ghana	12	7	13	13
3	Botswana	25	41	14	9	14	Kenya	20	32	54	55
4	Burundi	7	16	25	36	15	Lesotho	55	64	64	61
5	Cameroon	16	30	50	54	16	Liberia	5	5	18	19
6	CAR	10	15	24	29	17	Libya	13	26	31	24
7	Congo	10	20	14	22	18	Malaŵi	31	42	49	56
8	Côte dIvoire	5	8	24	31	19	Mali	3	6	14	17
9	DRC	12	24	27	29	20	Mauritania	35	35	36	41
10	Egypt	3	11	14	11	21	Mauritius	44	52	49	43
11	Gabon	10	22	31	38	22	Morocco	2	7	18	21

	Primary School Attainment [%]						Primary School Attainment [%]				
	Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010		Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010
23	Mozambique	17	18	17	22	31	Swaziland	18	36	38	37
24	Namibia	30	36	46	46	32	Togo	7	14	59	66
25	Niger	9	8	13	17	33	Tunisia	7	17	27	32
26	Rwanda	7	21	35	39	34	Uganda	19	37	30	32
27	Senegal	41	41	48	54	35	Tanzania	29	40	55	61
28	Sierra Leone	3	7	15	20	36	Zambia	40	37	49	47
29	South Africa	23	40	24	20	37	Zimbabwe	46	56	41	36
30	Sudan	9	17	29	29		AVERAGES	18	25	31	33

Source: Barro and Lee 2011

Table 5: Secondary Education as Highest Attainment Level X% National Populations Aged 25 years and Above: 1960 to 2010

	Secondary School Attainment						Secondary School Attainment				
	Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010		Ages 25+	1960	1980	2000	2010
1	Algeria	2	7	26	34	20	Mauritania	0	2	8	12
2	Benin	2	2	12	16	21	Mauritius	7	19	37	46
3	Botswana	2	4	57	71	22	Morocco	3	8	14	19
4	Burundi	0	2	4	6	23	Mozambique	1	1	2	3
5	Cameroon	1	7	20	26	24	Namibia	13	20	25	31
6	CAR	0	3	13	16	25	Niger	0	1	3	4
7	Congo	2	12	41	44	26	Rwanda	0	2	5	6
8	Cote dIvoire	2	6	13	17	27	Senegal	1	4	9	11
9	DRC	1	3	20	22	28	Sierra Leone	2	4	10	14
10	Egypt	3	10	32	42	29	South Africa	24	27	47	59
11	Gabon	1	8	26	32	30	Sudan	1	3	13	13
12	Gambia	3	5	14	22	31	Swaziland	5	15	34	44
13	Ghana	1	27	44	44	32	Togo	1	9	5	7
14	Kenya	2	7	19	26	33	Tunisia	3	9	24	27
15	Lesotho	2	6	14	21	34	Uganda	3	5	23	31
16	Liberia	2	10	21	18	35	Tanzania	0	2	7	11
17	Libya	1	10	32	33	36	Zambia	1	13	25	33
18	Malawi	0	4	8	15	37	Zimbabwe	4	9	44	54
19	Mali	0	1	3	4		AVERAGES	3	8	20	25

Source: Barro and Lee 2011

Tertiary education attainment in Africa lags behind other regions of the world partly because of the adverse impact of the 1980s Structural Adjustment Programmes, and partly because of the heavy emphasis of the MDGs on basic education following the economic slump of the 1980s and 1990s. Another contributory factor is the high rate of non-completion at

both primary and secondary educational levels. Primary school completion rates have risen from an average of just 4% in 1960 to 18% in 2010. Even among countries with high primary school attainment levels, the rate of non-completion is high. For instance, Cameroon's 54% primary education attainment drops by 23 percentage points to 31% completion rate, while Tanzania's drops by 36 percentage points from 61% attainment to 25% completion. Kenya is a rare exception where competition is just 5 percentage points below attainment. Botswana's impressive 71% secondary school attainment drops to just 29% completion, while Zimbabwe's 54% drops to 9%. By contrast, Algeria's attainment rate of 34% secondary school attainment is matched by 33% completion rate: thus enabling its 25 years-plus age-group to proceed to tertiary education in significant numbers. In general, however, few African countries have managed to achieve more than 5% tertiary education attainment.

What these educational attainment figures suggest is that African countries are way behind other countries in producing the quality of human resources that is adequate for the task of transforming their economies as well as gaining competitiveness in skills and productivity of labour: a factor that may also be arising from the largely extractive nature of their economies which have so far had very little value chain addition. This poses enormous challenges for the African Union's vision of an Africa that would be prosperous as well as driven and managed by its own people. The skills and education gap in the current labour force requires fast tracking policies that recognise the importance of developing a competitive and capable workforce to drive the transformation of its productivity. Lessons from other countries are instructive here. The first one is that while most African countries have invested a considerable amount of their limited resources in educational strategies that gave priority to basic education. The more successful countries have sought a balance between basic education and skills development, in order to give themselves professional, entrepreneurial, research, and technical capacity.

The People's Republic of China, a country which has undergone major economic transformations in the past few decades, had a lower average number of schooling years for the population aged over 24 years than some African countries like Botswana and South Africa. It however had a higher completion rate for those attaining secondary school, representing 40% of this labour force. The lower average number of years for China means that in order to industrialise, it aimed at balancing secondary education completion before guaranteeing basic education for all. So in 2010, 30% of China's population aged over 24 had only attained some primary education, while 56% had secondary and 40% completed tertiary. That educational strategy seems to have worked well not only for China in terms of capacity building, but for other growth economies as well. In 2010, for example,32% of the United Kingdom population aged over 24 years had only attained primary school (24% completed), compared to 45% secondary and 21% tertiary.

For countries such as Togo, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Niger, Mali and others where the combined secondary school completion and tertiary attainment levels are below 5% of the total population aged over 24 years, the challenge of transforming their human resource skills is onerous, but not impossible given the examples of other countries that have faced such challenges and overcome them. Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Gabon were educationally worse off than many other African countries in 1960, in terms of the rate of non-schooling among populations aged over 24. By 2010 however, their combined secondary completion and tertiary education attainment had risen much higher than in most other African countries: being 42% for Algeria, 33% for Libya, 32% for Egypt and 30% for Gabon. They have surpassed South Africa, Mauritius, and Zimbabwe, which had already reached 10% to 17% of this target population in terms of completion of secondary school and attainment of tertiary education. Africa cannot hope to make the transition to innovation and control of its development under social conditions in which its working population has, at best, largely just attained an incomplete secondary education and, at worst, an incomplete primary education or none at all.

To illustrate the point and its implications for the future, we can examine the structure of attainment levels in the population that will still be active in the labour force in the coming decades. Of the current total population aged over 24 years, only those between 25 and 44 will still be actively involved in the labour force two decades from 2010. The 15 to 24 year-olds will be aged 35 to 44 in 2030, and 45 to 54 in 2040. Their educational attainment is therefore critically important for Africa's transformation in the next two to three decades. Here again there are still a number of countries that have yet to transform this potential labour force into a potent workforce for a transformative future. Among the population aged between 20 and 24, for instance, school is still a pipe dream in Benin, the Gambia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, and Sierra Leone where more than half of this age group has not had any schooling at all. Niger tops the list with 70% non-schooling. This age cohort is thus carrying into the labour force, no education at all.

Secondary school attainment reached significant levels for this age group in only a few countries, including Botswana (94%), South Africa (84%), Mauritius (65%) Zimbabwe (62%), Ghana (63%) and Egypt (63%). However completion rates reduce these relatively impressive proportions significantly to 40% or less. On a positive note, the number of African countries whose 20 to 24 year-olds have never been to school has dropped significantly from a majority to less than half. This situation is similar to the 25 to 29 year-olds. Zero schooling has also dropped significantly among 15 to 19 year-olds, with only the usual suspect countries exhibiting high rates of non-schools for their teenagers. Overall, the education attainment of teenagers is still quite low by global standards.

Educational attainment is also characterised by varying levels of inequalities between male and female citizens. In most African countries with low HDI, the gender differentials

in educational attainment are very substantial as illustrated by the examples of Togo, Zambia, the Gambia, Benin, Côte D'Ivoire, etc., where women's access to education has been half to one third that of males. In Togo, 45% of males above the age of 24 have had secondary school, compared to just 15% females. In Côte D'Ivoire the comparative rates are 30% males to 14% females, while in Liberia the rates are 39% males to 15.7% females. In only a handful of countries do female attainment rates slightly exceed those of men. These include the Seychelles (66.9% females to 66.6% males), Libya (55% females to 44% male), Gabon (54% females to 35% males) and others like Lesotho and Swaziland. These gender disparities translate into disparities in terms of employment, income levels, housing, social security and many other areas of life in which education often gives advantages. Basic literacy, at a level which is necessary for survival in an increasingly literate world, illiteracy rates are very high among adult females in many African countries. The worst cases are in South Sudan, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Guinea and Benin where female illiteracy rates are currently higher than 70%. At the other end of the spectrum Lesotho, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Zimbabwe, and Namibia have low adult illiteracy rates, ranging from 4% to 11% for females and generally under 12% for all adults.[8]

Considering the sheer volume of people without access to secondary and tertiary education, the job of building African's human resources beyond basic education is still quite substantial. The opportunities for doing so may be enabled by the decline in the population share of children aged below 15 years. The youth bulge that has become significant since 2010 however, is equally challenging as it suggests a greater demand for jobs and skills which are currently being supplied largely by the informal sector. The increase in the population of working age is thus putting considerable pressure on the continent's capacity to mobilise adequate resources to meet the challenge of both expanding skills training and employment creation. African countries will therefore need bold fast-tracking policies to bridge the considerable gap left over from the SAP decades and the basic education strategy of the MDGs, to create a viable critical mass of educated and technically capable workforces. In the context of the window of opportunity created by increased demand for raw mineral resources and primary goods that Africa has a comparative advantage in, the education strategy must be broader based in curriculum content to encompass value chain addition.

This would ensure that graduates of African educational institutions can manage value addition and sever the legacy of restrictive extractive economies. Infrastructural developments that are badly needed on the continent have potential, not only for capital-formation but for skilled human resources development that is necessary to manage such transformation. An emphasis on education beyond the basic level thus has potential to produce broader based skills and human capabilities required for inclusive and more engaged economic transformation.

Urbanisation and Housing Poverty

Housing poverty is an eloquent testament of the related problems of inequality and deprivation that have come to characterise Africa's development experience since independence. Beyond the usual comment on income disparities between rural and urban areas, it is in urban areas in fact that housing poverty and the gross income inequality it epitomises is most visible. Most African citizens who migrate to urban areas cannot find affordable living space in the formal housing markets because such markets typically target the relatively few high-income earners who have benefitted from the educational and employment strategies prevalent across the continent.

Formal sector employees are typically provided with institutional housing only when they are in middle and high-income brackets. Over time, as the middle classes and their incomes have grown in Africa, so too has the transition from mainly institutional housing to private housing markets. This is also a relatively tiny market, however, given the limited target groups and the tiny contribution that mortgages make to Gross National Products on the continent. The 2013 yearbook on housing finance in Africa shows that less than 5% of people in most African countries do not earn an income high enough to afford the cheapest house provided in their formal sector. In Benin and Burundi for instance, only 5% earn enough income to afford the cheapest house, while in Cameroon only 2% have the necessary income.[9]

For the excluded majority of low-income urban residents, the typical strategy open to them has been to squat on the outskirts of formal townships because housing policies simply do not cater for them. The majority of African urban dwellers are thus housed in informal settlements and slums, where their sheer numbers have enabled them to withstand repeated attempted evictions by governments and property developers alike. Urbanisation therefore effectively means increased slum dwelling and its associated health hazards, social insecurities and lack of dignity. It creates a stark spatial divide between high-income and low-income social classes.

Within this general picture, however, there are examples of countries that have made some progress in dealing with the problem of slum development and whose example therefore illustrate possibilities for managing the challenge of projected high urbanisation rates that will characterise the African landscape in the next two to three decades. Botswana for instance was able to deal with the problem of emerging slums very early into independence by embarking on mixed-class residential developments that included site and service land for the poor. This guaranteed, for instance, that the supply of water servicing State House is the same quality and from the same source as the water servicing low-income housing estates. Certificates of right were first offered to poor urban residents whose squatting signalled their need for housing. The certificates of right were thus issued as part of a housing strategy for the poor that borrowed somewhat from the customary system, but included material loans for constructing basic housing structure (a site and service scheme generally known as Self-Help Housing Agency (SHHA).

The scheme was initially applied in Gaborone, which was the first settlement in Botswana to be developed on the basis of a plan. It was later extended to other emerging urban areas before being rolled out to rural areas where most people already had land rights. The advantage of this strategy has been that although the demand for affordable housing and serviced land is much higher than supply, Botswana does not have slums. However, because of the rapid growth in the urban population in the context of slow growth of serviced land and housing markets, the site and service areas have typically become overcrowded places with poor quality housing structures and overused sanitation facilities. This is because plots initially intended for single-family units now typically accommodate an average of three families.

The city of Gaborone, which has borne the brunt of urbanisation, has thus become a place where most low-income dwellers can only afford single rentable rooms in the low-cost housing estates, as well as in the backyards of the more affluent estates which usually have quarters initially meant to house domestic servants. Government response to the problem has been to take services that are customarily provided in urban areas to neighbouring urban areas and other big villages. In so doing, they have attempted to accommodate the urban spillage and reduce the pressure on towns and cities emanating from the demand for employment. This has resulted in considerable urban sprawl, the rapid urbanisation of surrounding villages as well as deforestation, which hurts the poor who are overwhelmingly dependent on firewood for cooking.

In North Africa, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia dealt with the problem of slums differently in that they had accumulated large populations of slum dwellers by the 1990s, before they developed housing strategies to reduce them. The policies and strategies they adopted enabled substantial increases in low income housing supply by systematically upgrading slums and informal settlements to habitable estates: thus reducing slums by half within a decade. The South African Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) similarly sought to reduce the housing backlog of the apartheid era by subsidising the delivery of homes to low-income earners. As most African governments attempting to deal with housing scarcity among the poor have found, this is a huge task because it tackles a problem that has built up over decades and is now being made urgent by the rapid pace of urbanisation. The 2011 Habitat Report on Affordable Housing in Africa estimates that up to 2009, demand for urban housing had risen to more than three million across the continent and that there is need for at least 60 million housing units to meet rising needs. The report also shows large gender differentials in access to both residential land and housing. Decent housing is generally linked to income and employment and thus tends to exclude women due to their limited access to these key sources.

With decades of policy failure and the resultant backlog of housing delivery in urban areas, Africa is in dire need of imaginative fast-tracking policies that will reduce slums and urban sprawl as well as prevent future increases as urbanisation intensifies. For some countries the size of the problem is already extremely huge. According to the 2011 UN Habitat Report on Affordable Land and Housing in Africa, for instance, slums account for 90% of Chad's urban housing stock, 79% of Ethiopia's, 82% of Niger's and 80% of Mozambique's. These countries have the lowest human development ranking in the world and are also characterised by multidimensional poverty. The report also cites annual deficits of some 70,000 units for Cameroon, 240,000 for the DRC, 120,000 for Kenya, and 175,000 for Algeria. Practically all African countries have need for large extra stocks of housing units. An upgrading of large tracts of slum areas for countries such as Kenya, Angola, Ethiopia, Mali, Sudan and Tanzania would reduce the pressure. The unmet need for decent accommodation for such a large number of people flies in the face of the principle of housing as a human right with the following key components:

- **Legal security of tenure.** All persons should possess a degree of security of tenure, which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats.

- **Availability of services, materials, facilities and infrastructure.** An adequate house must contain certain facilities essential for health, security, comfort and nutrition. All beneficiaries of the right to adequate housing should have sustainable access to natural and common resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation and washing facilities, means of food storage, refuse disposal, site drainage and emergency services;

- **Affordability.** Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at such a level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised.

- **Habitability.** Adequate housing must be habitable, in the sense of providing inhabitants with adequate space and protecting them from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to health, structural hazards, and disease vectors. The physical safety of occupants must be guaranteed as well. In addition, Health Principles of Housing, prepared by World Health Organisation, should be applied to make housing habitable. These view housing as the environmental factor most frequently associated with conditions for disease in epidemiological analyses i.e. inadequate and deficient housing and living conditions are invariably associated with higher mortality and morbidity rates);

- **Accessibility.** Adequate housing must be accessible to those entitled to it. This includes disadvantaged groups such as the elderly, children, the physically disabled, the terminally ill, HIV-positive individuals, persons with persistent medical problems, the mentally ill, victims of natural disasters, people living in disaster-prone areas and other groups, should be ensured some degree of priority consideration in the housing sphere. In addition, both housing law and policy should take the special housing needs of these groups fully into account.

- **Location.** Adequate housing must be in a location which allows access to employment options, health care services, schools, child-care centres and other social facilities. This is true both in large cities and in rural areas, where the temporal and financial costs of getting to and from the place of work can place excessive demands upon the budgets of poor households. Similarly, housing should not be built on polluted sites nor in immediate proximity to pollution sources that threaten inhabitants' the right to health.

- **Cultural adequacy.** The way housing is constructed, the building materials used and the policies supporting these must appropriately enable the expression of cultural identity and diversity of housing. Activities geared towards development or modernisation in the housing sphere should ensure that the cultural dimensions of housing are not sacrificed, and that, inter alia, modern technological facilities, as appropriate are also ensured.

Few African countries have adopted the right to housing as a guiding policy principle to facilitate decent and affordable housing for their poor. Insufficient housing is a problem, however, but with the developmental potential of creating jobs and widening the limited structure of the financial institutions in Africa to become more responsive to the demands of the majority. Financial institutions on the continent are shallow and highly risk-averse. They tend to make huge profits by servicing a narrow base of clientele and thus restricting themselves to an insignificant role in African economic development[10]. Governments, on the other hand have tended not to consider housing as both a basic need and a means of expanding the construction and built environment industries that can create badly needed jobs. It is an area with the potential to impact on the curriculum content of African educational institutions, and to broaden the skill base that can in turn help deepen employment creation and economic diversification.

Social Justice and Democratisation of the Development Voice

The inequalities embedded in the provision of the two social services of education and housing are illustrative of the structural inequalities and corresponding poverty that characterise African socio-economic development. Providing access to such a limited number of people creates and perpetuates systemic poverty across a wide range of social life. Those who benefit educationally, also benefit in terms of access to employment, quality housing, banking and credit, quality health services, water, electricity, sanitation, social security as well as life and health insurance. Education also gives people political voice and the capacity to make demands on their governments and hold them accountable.

The exclusion of such a sizeable proportion of African citizens from access to quality education invariably translates into a society dominated by people who lack the capability to demand accountability from their governments, except through riots and mass demonstrations that are very often also violent. Such rates of social exclusion are a breeding ground for coups d'état, authoritarian regimes, ethnic conflicts and a generic lack of accountability on the part of both the citizen majorities and their governments. The recognition of the importance of a developmental state as a driver of structural transformation is well founded. However, the strength, nature and character of a developmental state require a supportive developmental society below to voice developmental goals and participate in the formulation of strategies and policies, in institution-building, and in expressing majority interests while protecting vulnerable groups. There is a dynamic relation between state and society that requires mutual nourishing in order to engender a developmental state and a developmental society. It is the state's role to provide social services that enhance societal capacity.

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8 In all, five African leaders, namely, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria were critical in the establishment of NEPAD.

9 As part of the process to integrate NEPAD into the African Union structures and processes, the 14th African Union (AU) Summit, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 25 January – 2 February 2010, decided to strengthen the NEPAD programme by transforming the NEPAD Secretariat into an implementation Agency – the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA).

10 See Declaration on Agriculture and Food Security in Africa, 10-12 July 2003 (Assembly/AU/Decl. 7 (II)). Available from http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2014].

11 See Maputo Declaration on Malaria, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Other Related Infectious Diseases, 10-12 July 2003, Assembly/AU/Decl.6 (II). Available from http://www.nepad.org/system/files/Maputo%20Declaration.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2014].

12 See NEPAD & UNECA, 2013, Mobilizing Domestic Resource Mobilization for Implementing National and Regional NEPAD Programmes and Projects – Africa Looks Within. viii (NEPAD Secretariat and UNECA, Final Report, 25 May 2013). Available from http://www.africanbondmarkets.org/fileadmin/pdf/Publications/Domestic%20Resource%20Mobilisation%20Study%20May%202013-NEPAD.pdf [Accessed 4 August 2014].

13 See Ajakaiye (2012) for a characterisation of the changing roles of actors in participatory development planning process as economic transformation progresses.

14 See Ajakaiye (2013) for suggestions in this regard.

15 African statistical Year Book 2013

16 Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2013.

17 Word Bank, 2007, IMF, 2009.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

Agenda 2063 comes at a time when all the right indicators exist for a favourable regional and internal climate for transformative change. This begs the questions: first, to what extent can Agenda 2063 provide new direction in African development that is organic to the interests and needs of the people? Second, if it is to differ from past development experiments, what are the key levers and drivers for the needed transformation? Agenda 2063 is coming at a time when the neo-liberal development models are giving way to realism and when nearly all African countries are committed to a Long-term Continental Agenda on integrated sustainable development. Moreover, subregional cooperation and integration are enjoying a renaissance with the adoption of various subregional sectoral development programmes aimed at promoting subregional production networks and intra-African trade. The Continental Agenda comes against the backdrop of the adoption, under the support of the African Union, of a plethora of subregional/continental standards, frameworks, goals, and targets that span the entire field of socio-economic development.

In order to capitalise on these favourable conditions, Agenda 2063 should secure effective interface with national plans, sub-regional initiatives and continental programmes. In considering imperatives for effective interface among national plans, regional development initiatives and continental processes it is important to check the compatibility of key components of a typical plan, the roles of various actors and the time frame. Member countries should properly domesticate a long-term development agenda, ensuring that the objectives and plan of action of their respective national development plans flow from Agenda 2063. The key elements of an effective transformation agenda for Africa should comprise: a declining share of agriculture in GDP and employment; the transformation of rural areas into vibrant hubs of agri-business and industrial activity; the rise of a modern industrial and service economy; the translation of Africa's youth bulge into a demographic dividend; access to social services that meet minimum standards of quality, regardless of location; reduced gender inequality; and progression towards an inclusive green growth trajectory. Africa's reflection on its own future should be on how to foster inclusive prosperity, reduce potential for violent confrontations and create conditions for peaceful co-existence.

NEPAD's role shall be to guide and promote sub-regional growth initiatives through thematic programs within the framework of Agenda 2063. The NEPAD programs, ranging from economic and social challenges to specific projects (such as the 54 PIDA infrastructure projects) seek to promote strategic regional initiatives in order to provide the necessary momentum and the enabling conditions for solid growth. However, the states must face the domestic challenges of producing added value in order to create growth. NEPAD must address the challenges of guiding the economic partnerships between African countries and their major emerging partners, so that the use of resources is counterbalanced with the ownership of production techniques, in order to avoid the partial plundering of the continent in the twenty-first century.

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